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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of EU-level rules in defence industrial matters 
within the context of European integration and inter-state cooperation more generally.  
This is a remarkable development, as the defence industrial policy area has been 
viewed as a core of nation state sovereignty and appeared impervious to injections of 
“more Europe.”  At the centre of this nascent policy regime is the increasingly 
institutionalised European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). The first and most 
significant elements of EDEM to date have been the 2009 Defence Procurement 
Directive issued by the European Commission and the voluntary Code of Conduct on 
Defence Procurement launched by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2006. 
These sets of rules have materialised despite EU member states’ resistance to 
meaningful constraints of national autonomy in defence procurement, and a distaste 
for the involvement of the European Commission in particular. An analytical puzzle 
thus emerges: why have member states acquiesced to binding regulation in the shape 
of the Directive, having already enacted a soft cooperation mechanism represented by 
the Code?  
The thesis answers this question by pursuing three lines of inquiry, which correspond 
to three hypotheses and specify clear pathways whereby external adaptation pressures, 
such as the Euro-Atlantic defence budgetary trends, may result in states’ acceptance 
of particular constraints. Firstly, the project examines the lobbying activity of the 
EU’s major transnational defence firms in pursuit of a larger, more integrated “home” 
defence equipment market. In addition, this thesis evaluates the success of the 
European Commission as a determined “policy entrepreneur” in securing member 
states’ acquiescence to unprecedentedly binding defence procurement rules. Finally, 
the development of an EU security and defence policy as a source of “vital policy 
rationale” for an EU defence equipment market is also investigated. The tension 
between the supranational and intergovernmental modes of organising the defence 
industrial field constitutes a central theme of this thesis, while the “policy cycle” 
framework is used to order the causal significance of each hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION, 
RESEARCH QUESTION, AND 
RATIONALE 
	  
Introduction	  and	  Research	  Question	  	  
Regulation in armament cooperation which has recently emerged at the level of the 
European Union constitutes a remarkable development in the evolution of the EU in 
general and its newly acquired autonomous military capacity in particular. As will be 
emphasised below, the entire armaments policy area has been historically regarded as 
a strict prerogative of sovereign nation states, to be insulated from the reaches of 
international organisations and supranational institutions, even in such an arguably sui 
generis case as the EU. Yet, within the armaments policy field, production, trade, and 
procurement aspects, the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) has in recent 
years transitioned from an aspirational goal of the EU, consistently invoked as such in 
official rhetoric and delegated to the European Defence Agency (EDA) for 
“realisation,” to a nascent policy regime,1 endowed with the first tangible rule-making 
instruments (Wilson, 2000). In particular, an EU-wide defence procurement 
framework is emerging within the EDEM construct, represented by the 2009 Defence 
Procurement Directive issued by the European Commission, and, until its suspension 
from March 2013, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement launched by the 
EDA on 1 July 2006 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2009; EDA, 2005).2 
This development constitutes the subject of the research presented here.  As will be 
elaborated below, it is puzzling to see member states acquiescing to the terms of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Wilson’s	  (2000)	  conceptualisation	  of	  a	  policy	  regime	  is	  meant	  here,	  which	  is	  turn	  relies	  on	  international	  regime	  literature	  (Harris	  and	  Milkis,	  1996;	  Esping	  -­‐Anderson,	  1993;	  Kratochwil	  and	  Ruggie,	  1997;	  Dougherty	  and	  Pfaltzgraff,	  1997).	  A	  policy	  regime	  is	  organised	  around	  a	  specific	  issue	  area—in	  this	  case,	  defence	  procurement—	  and	  consists	  of	  four	  dimensions.	  The	  first	  dimension	  concerns	  power	  arrangements,	  that	  is,	  an	  actor	  or	  group	  of	  actors	  that	  support	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  regime,	  and	  thus	  act	  as	  its	  power	  brokers.	  A	  policy	  paradigm	  forms	  the	  second	  dimension,	  which	  “shapes	  the	  way	  problems	  are	  defined,	  the	  tpes	  of	  solutions	  offered,	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  policies	  proposed.”	  The	  third	  dimension	  of	  a	  policy	  regime	  includes	  the	  policy	  making	  and	  implementation	  arrangements,	  that	  is,	  agencies	  and	  organisations	  “involved	  in	  maintaining,	  developing	  and	  implementing”	  the	  policy.	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  dimension	  is	  the	  policy	  itself,	  which	  “embodies	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  policy	  regime”	  and	  the	  “rules	  and	  routines”	  of	  the	  implementing	  organisation.	  	  2	  The	  Code	  was	  agreed	  in	  July	  2005,	  but	  became	  operational	  on	  1	  July	  2006	  
	  	   10	  
Directive in particular, especially as voluntary, intergovernmental cooperation had 
already been established in the form of the Code. Moreover, given that member state 
governments have a history of fiercely guarding their defence procurement autonomy, 
that divisions between member states with large arms production capabilities and 
those that purchase most of their defence equipment from abroad are deeply 
entrenched, and that prior integrationist efforts in this policy arena have repeatedly 
failed, the dynamic represented by EDEM constitutes an intriguing analytical puzzle: 
why have EU-level defence procurement rules emerged which clearly constrain 
national autonomy? This in turn leads to the research question to be addressed by this 
thesis— why member states have made the more costly move toward binding 
regulation in the shape of the Directive, having already enacted a soft cooperation 
mechanism represented by the Code? 
Before exploring the rationale for advancing this line of inquiry, it is useful to review 
the major provisions of the two instruments. Like the EDA itself, the Code was 
intergovernmental, voluntary and legally non-binding, with the objective of extending 
internal market competition rules to defence procurement. Subscribing member 
states3 committed to enhance common competitiveness through lowering mutual trade 
barriers and aligning policies in defence procurement activities which are exempt 
from EU’s internal market procurement rules based on Article 346 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or the Lisbon Treaty as it has 
become known since its signing.4 This clause grants member states the right to 
derogate from existing EU procurement law— which includes supplier non-
discrimination and open competition stipulations supporting the Single Market and 
injecting “more Europe” into all trade sectors, including defence — to protect their 
“essential security interests.”  Thus, the Code applied to sensitive defence 
procurement that is theoretically to be carried out of “outside” of EU law.  While it is 
couched in broad principles to allow member states maximum manoeuvre with regard 
to actual implementation, the key practical stipulation of the Code was the 
requirement that national contracting authorities publish defence contract notifications 
on the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB), an online portal.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  2013,	  25	  of	  the	  EU’s	  28	  member	  states	  as	  well	  as	  Norway	  had	  subscribed	  to	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  (all	  EU	  member	  states	  except	  Romania,	  Denmark,	  and	  Croatia)	  	  4	  Again,	  until	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  on	  1	  December	  2009,	  Article	  346	  was	  known	  as	  Article	  296.	  As	  with	  the	  ESDP/CSDP,	  the	  post-­‐Lisbon	  numeration	  is	  used	  here,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  confusion	  and	  preserve	  continuity	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The purpose of publicising defence contract notices was to open up defence 
procurement to EU-wide competition—that is, suppliers from all participating 
member states—in cases when the Article 346 exemption has already been invoked 
by the purchasing government. Consequently, the Code encouraged competitive 
procedures within defence procurement as a norm, except in situations of operational 
urgency, “extraordinary and compelling reasons of national security,” and follow-on 
work, including post-delivery provision of goods and services, to existing contracts 
(Heuninckx, 2008b: 8).  Other principles included equal treatment of suppliers from 
across all subscribing member states, and a reporting and monitoring mechanism 
encouraging governments to provide the EDA with data on national application of the 
Code. The former provision meant that all suppliers, regardless of geographic origin, 
were entitled to transparency, objectivity, clarity and equality when it came to 
provision of information regarding the tender and selection criteria for the award of 
contract. Unsuccessful bidders were entitled to a “debrief” (Heuninckx, 2008b: 8). In 
addition, member states were expected to make data available to the EDA regarding 
how often and how effectively the competitive procurement provisions of the Code 
were and were not applied. The idea was that member states would then use such 
information in order to scrutinise each other’s compliance with the Code and justify 
cases when they have eschewed its provisions. This would form the basis of the 
instrument’s “institutionalised peer pressure” mechanism and means of “moral 
coercion” (Neuman, 2010: 18).  
It is of course the case that subscribing member states faced no legally binding 
obligations or sanctions for non-application of the Code of Conduct, and remained the 
prime orchestrators of this instrument. Despite its voluntary nature, however, the 
Code nevertheless conditioned states’ policy choices through its peer pressure and 
reciprocity provisions.  Furthermore, by virtue of its field of application, the Code 
inserted standards of behaviour into procurement carried out under Article 346, an 
area previously wholly subject to member states’ discretion. It had, moreover, added a 
further level of complexity into member states’ defence procurement decisions by 
subtly, yet inherently, competing with the Directive for “subject matter” coverage 
(Georgopolous, 2007: 220; Heuninckx, 2008b). No “official” reason had been 
provided by the Agency for the decision to suspend the Code of Conduct and, as part 
of its 2014 restructuring process, phase out its Industry and Market (I&M) Directorate 
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that oversaw all EDEM-related activities (EDA, 2013:14, 18). As these events had 
occurred during the primary research stage of this project, they have been raised in 
interviews with officials and industry executives—indeed, by the interviewees 
themselves—and the findings are discussed in Chapter V of this thesis.  
 In contrast, the Defence Procurement Directive (EC/2009/81), which entered into 
force on 21 August 2009 is a binding legislative instrument intended to regulate, 
harmonise and inject transparency and competition into member states’ fragmented 
procurement policies. Containing specific regulations, the Directive is ostensibly 
designed to take account of the specificities of the defence sector, including 
provisions to safeguard security of supply (Art. 23) and information (Art. 22) while 
promoting sub-contractor competition (Art. 21). Specifically, it allows member states’ 
contracting authorities to award contracts for the supply of military goods and 
services through the so-called negotiated procedure, with prior publication of a 
contract notice. Under current EU public procurement regulations—Directives 
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC—all contracts, with limited exceptions, must be 
awarded by competitive methods, such as public tender open to domestic as well as 
international suppliers. This means that, after advertising the contract award to invite 
expressions of interest from suppliers, the contracting authority is required to follow 
the open tender process, in which the competition for award is opened to all interested 
domestic and international suppliers, and the winner then selected competitively. 
Under certain conditions, however, the negotiated procedure allows the contracting 
authorities to pre-select one or more specific suppliers and negotiate the terms of the 
contract directly with these candidate(s).  
Since this course of action could constitute “single-source procurement” and would 
inherently violate the open competition rules on which the EU’s internal market is 
founded, the negotiated procedure is technically reserved for a limited number of 
cases, while its use must be justified in each instance. In practice, and as will be 
explained more fully below, the member states have long ignored these limitations 
with no meaningful consequences. As a result, favouring preferred, usually domestic, 
defence equipment suppliers had become “the standard operating procedure of arms 
procurement” (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1125). By legitimising “restricted 
competition” and even “non-competitive procurement procedures” in “limited, 
prescribed” instances when the general open-competition procurement regulations are 
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deemed harmful to member states’ security concerns, the Defence Procurement 
Directive aims to reduce the reasons for which contracting authorities derogate from 
the EU’s internal market rules (Teare and Nelson, 2012: 4).  The Directive also 
contains regulations on research and development (R&D) activities (Art. 13, Art. 28), 
and commits the member states to the principle of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of all suppliers. This stipulation thus enshrines competitiveness of the given 
bid as the sole criterion upon which contract award is to be based, and prohibits 
favourable treatment of bidding defence firms based on geographical considerations.  
Most important for this thesis, however, is the effect of the Directive on Article 346, 
which is the member states’ institutional instrument of choice when it comes to 
asserting sovereignty in defence procurement. While the “security interests” 
exemption remains in force, the Directive has for the first time imposed limitations on 
member states’ invocation of it. In particular, they must be prepared to convince the 
Commission that this measure is indeed “essential for the protection of [their] 
essential security interests,” on a case by case basis (Art. 16), or face sanctions from 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as well as other consequences, such as 
challenges from industry over national procurement decisions. In this regard, the 
“burden of proof” rests with the member states to, if called upon, demonstrate that 
their invocation of Article 346 in the course of a procurement procedure is indeed 
crucial to safeguarding a specific “essential security interest” and that even the 
specialized provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive described above would 
not be sufficient to ensure this (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1125). 
Consequently, these beginnings of EDEM represent emerging rules emanating from 
EU institutions that constrain the decision-making autonomy of EU member states in 
defence procurement matters.  Matters that would have previously been wholly in the 
remit of national governments, concerning the number of bidders for defence 
contracts, sub-contracting requirements, or the mode of contract publication, must 
now also conform to rules emanating from EU institutions, both supranational and 
intergovernmental. For the first time, an “EU level” of importance has entered 
member states’ policy calculus in defence procurement. Paramount among the new 
measures are the limitations on member states’ invocation of Article 346, and, by 
extension, their decision-making autonomy. Until now, member states have made 
persistently indiscriminate use of Article 346, and jealously guarded their prerogative 
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to do so. In fact, accounts of the fragmentation and protectionism within the European 
defence market uniformly attribute these failings to the tenuous and automatic claim 
that a wide variety of goods are related to member states’ “essential security 
interests.” For instance, in 1997 Spain used it to exempt its military imports from 
VAT, arguing that this was necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of its forces in 
national defence and in NATO.  Italy, in 2005 and 2006, purchased helicopters from 
the Italian company Augusta for its police force and fire service respectively, using 
non-competitive procurement under Article 346, arguing that this was necessary to 
ensure confidentiality of information regarding the helicopters’ production 
(Koutrakos, 2010: 209-211). To be sure, the exemption is often invoked to protect 
national industries and local markets from competition, in order to preserve the large-
scale domestic employment and investment they represent.  At the core of the 
economic rationale for protectionism, however, lies the assumption and 
institutionalised recognition that national security ought not to be scrutinised by an 
external authority. Analyses of EU Treaty Law attribute both the purpose of Article 
346 and the reason for its loose invocation to a widespread perception amongst 
member states that defence industrial matters are inextricably connected to national 
sovereignty, and thus beyond the reach of supranational structures (Koutrakos, 2010: 
207; Trybus, 2004: 202).  Batora, whose study, reviewed in Chapter II, deals with 
colliding institutional logics at the heart of the EDA, also finds that “the logic of 
defence sovereignty is…formalised in Article 346” (Batora, 2009: 1086).   
In this context, the Code of Conduct and the Defence Procurement Directive 
circumscribe individual states’ actions and may begin to shape actors’ expectations in 
the defence procurement realm. This development is both important and perplexing 
for several reasons. Firstly, dominant theoretical trends in international relations, in 
both realist and constructivist traditions, view the production, acquisition, and 
maintenance of armaments as inextricably connected to nation state sovereignty. 
Secondly, this conceptualisation is consistently reflected in national policymakers’ 
rhetoric concerning the defence sector, while the empirical record reveals persistent 
fragmentations within EDEM that may be traced back to fundamental differences 
between member states’ political traditions, foreign policy orientations, and strategic 
cultures. These fault lines have endured due to the normative entrenchment of nation 
state sovereignty within defence- and foreign policy-related areas of the European 
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project, and the resulting institutional arrangements that safeguard it. Finally, as a 
direct consequence of this, member states have resisted prior attempts at 
harmonisation and integration in the defence procurement field. Against this 
backdrop, it is all the more remarkable that the Directive was “discussed, agreed, and 
adopted” with unprecedented speed, and despite significant opposition from member 
states and industry (Georgopolous, 2010; Interview 1, 15 December 2011, Industry). 
The Code of Conduct, and the EDA in general, have also been noted for surprising 
inter-member cooperation and speedy establishment (Georgopolous, 2007: 221-222; 
Interview 3, 15 December, Member State Permanent Representation). 
Before progressing further, several caveats are necessary.  Firstly, the effectiveness of 
both the Code and the Directive in achieving their stated objectives is questioned.  
Throughout its “lifetime,” the Code of Conduct had been applied to an 
inconsequential—although increasing— number of contracts and therefore remained 
limited in impact (Major and Moelling, 2010: 17). The transposition of the Directive 
into member states’ domestic law had been encumbered by a number of delays, while 
the exceptions from its provisions and lack of clarity regarding its application to non-
EU countries have raised doubts regarding the instrument’s significance.5  Secondly, 
the Code and the Directive did not usher in an EU-level defence procurement policy, 
EDEM still remains an objective rather than reality, and protectionism and 
fragmentation will not be done away with in the near future. This thesis does not 
make claims to the contrary. Rather, it argues that the instruments examined here 
represent a first set of commonly applied and accepted rules in defence procurement, 
which limit near-automatic national preference when it comes to contract awards, 
curtail member state prerogatives in this intergovernmental field, lay the groundwork 
for further developments towards EU-level institutionalisation, and signal key, if 
tentative, steps towards linking the EU’s military capacity to capability generation. 
Moreover, supranational regulation has been hitherto taboo in defence procurement, 
while any enforceable EU-level limitations on national use of Article 346 are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5Intelligence-­‐related	  contracts,	  counter-­‐intelligence	  contracts	  for	  border	  protection,	  counter-­‐terrorism	  and	  organised	  crime,	  cooperative	  procurement	  programmes	  with	  an	  R&D	  phase	  involving	  at	  least	  two	  member	  states,	  government	  to	  government	  purchases,	  and	  national	  R&D	  programmes	  are	  all	  exempt	  from	  the	  Directive,	  although	  once	  the	  latter	  move	  into	  mature	  product	  stage,	  open	  competition	  is	  expected.	  Arms	  trade	  with	  third	  countries	  will	  also	  not	  be	  covered,	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  WTO’s	  Government	  Procurement	  Agreement.	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unprecedented.6  
 
Institutions	  and	  Institutionalisation	  
Although the conceptualisation of institutions adopted here is principally associated 
with codified rules and formal organisations, it also incorporates sociological and 
normative components (Duffield, 2007). This is partly because such formative 
definitions of institutions in IR as those advanced by Keohane, North, and Young 
feature these three dimensions, having been neatly integrated by Smith (Keohane, 
1989; North, 1990; Young, 1989; Smith, 2004). Young has a largely sociological 
perspective when defining institutions as “patterns of behaviour and practice around 
which expectations converge,” while Keohane’s seminal, oft-cited conceptualisation 
has been characterized as rationalist and takes institutions to mean “persistent and 
connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations’’ (1989: 3). Moreover, institutionalist approaches in 
both sociological and rationalist traditions have normative aspects, as well. Thus, 
despite the wide range of definitions with which “norms” and “rules” have been 
endowed in IR literature, the two terms are usually used interchangeably due to the 
strong similarity of meaning which they share (Duffield, 2007; Smith, 2004). 
Consequently, rules are understood as “well-defined guides to action or standards 
setting forth actions that members [of an institution] are expected to perform (or to 
refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances” (Young, 1989:16). Norms 
refer to shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of 
actors” that contain carry ‘‘a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be 
followed’’(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 22; Chayes and Chayes, 1995:113).  
Therefore, considering the notable conceptual over-lap between the rationalist, 
normative, and sociological understandings of institutions, and taking into account his 
particular concern with EU foreign policy—rather than inter-state cooperation in 
general—Smith’s definition of institutions and institutionalisation is used in this 
thesis. Relying on North, he takes the former to mean the “rules of the game,” a set of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  are	  far-­‐reaching.	  Conditions	  for	  Article	  346	  invocation	  would	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  governments	  to	  require	  offsets,	  essentially	  complex	  side	  investments	  included	  in	  acquisitions	  to	  improve	  balance	  of	  trade.	  Many	  EU	  governments,	  like	  most	  states	  worldwide,	  rely	  heavily	  on	  offsets,	  which	  result	  in	  market	  distortion.	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norms, which structure the behaviour and condition the choices and expectations of 
actors in a social space  (North, 1990: 3). Before progressing further, it is also 
important to distinguish between institutions, as conceptualised above, and 
organisations. Although the former term is often used in the literature to refer to the 
latter entity, the understanding of institutions underpinning this thesis necessitates a 
distinction (Stein, 1990: 26; Sandholtz, 1993; Haas et. al., 1993: 397). Thus, 
organisations refer to ‘‘material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), 
offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets” and “may or may not accompany” 
institutions (Young, 1986: 108; 1989: 32, 12-13, 35). Although the delimitation 
between organisations and institutions has been critiqued as unnecessarily sharp—a 
number of organisations are, after all, “primarily sets of roles and rules”— it is useful 
in this analysis, as it helps operationalize the “processual” conceptualisation of 
institutionalisation elaborated below (Duffield, 2007: 4; Smith, 2004: 39; Barzelay 
and Gallego, 2006). In particular, as will be explained shortly, the institution-
organisation distinction helps differentiate between sets of rules within the EU, for 
instance, regulations, directives, and decisions, and organisations from which they 
emanate, such as the Commission, Council of Ministers, or European Parliament. In 
order to highlight the association of organisations with institutions that these bodies 
represent, that is, to signify that sets of rules and norms had in these cases become 
“endowed” with offices, staff, funds, and paperwork, this thesis will refer to them as 
permanent, or formal organisations (Smith, 2004: 39).  
 In the literature, the term institutionalisation is often used synonymously with 
institutional development and institutional change, although here institutional 
development is preferred since it “encourages us to remain attentive to the ways in 
which previous institutional outcomes can channel and constrain later efforts at 
institutional innovation” (Pierson, 2004:133).7 Institutionalisation, then, refers to “the 
process by which those norms, or shared standards of behaviour, are created, 
developed” and extended to wider or deeper areas of key actors’ behaviour (Smith, 
2004: 26; Goldstein, et al, 2001: 385). More specifically, such proliferation is evident 
in the multiplication and clarification of norms, whereby more norms are created or 
are clarified “in greater detail” (Smith, 2004: 38-39). Furthermore, institutionalisation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  As	  historical	  institutionalism,	  concerned	  with	  unpacking	  the	  “construction	  of	  policy	  issues	  and	  associated	  institutions,	  would	  contend,	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  this	  process	  circumvent	  the	  options	  available	  to	  actors	  during	  the	  later	  steps,	  making	  it	  “iterative	  and	  incremental”	  (Armstrong	  and	  Bulmer	  1998:	  56).	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entails the transition from “informal customs” to “formal rules,” and in the context of 
the EU, the integration of community rules and “permanent EC institutions” into this 
process (Smith, 2004: 39).  As such, the institutionalisation of the European Defence 
Equipment Market is understood as the application of common rules, whether 
formalized, legalized, or voluntary, emanating from and monitored by permanent EU 
organisations, to the issue area of defence procurement. While the rule-centred 
conceptualisation of institutions has been criticised for its ostensibly limited 
rationalist perspective, this framework enjoys particular longevity and legitimacy in 
IR (Duffield, 2007:13; Onuf, 2002: 224; Sandholtz, 1993). Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the Directive represents a particular type of institutionalisation, 
which has been termed legalisation by Goldstein et al., and is characterised by 
proliferation of legally binding and precise rules, with delegation of “policing” 
powers to a – theoretically –neutral third party (Goldstein, et. al., 2001:3).  
In addition, there is a strong rationale for employing a rules-focused 
institutionalisation framework when the subject of study is the EU. Stone Sweet, 
Sandholtz, and Fligstein highlight several reasons why “institutionalisation in Europe 
has generally meant more rules, more procedures, and more formality” (2001: 21). 
Firstly, the EU’s sui generis nature in the international system means that the 
administration of its space requires extending its authority, concentrated in the body 
of EU law, “across jurisdictional boundaries” (ibid). The resulting propagation of rule 
of law within the EU “constitutes, by definition, profound institutionalisation in a 
formal direction” (Stone Sweet, et.al., 2001: 22).  In addition, the development of the 
internal market has been accompanied by a significant expansion of supranational 
governance, which operates through rule-making as it stipulates compliance and 
coordination (Fligstein, 2009: 37). Finally, intergovernmental organisations, 
particularly the Council of the EU and its agencies, also “govern by promulgating 
rules”—such as issuing decisions, guidelines and codes of conduct—which continue 
to reach into policy areas beyond the supranational “hard core” of the internal market 
and trade policy (Turnbull and Sandholtz, 2001).  
Institutionalist literature has distinguished between a number of processes through 
which institutionalisation occurs, according to sources and dynamics of institutional 
change. Thus, one section of institutionalist scholarship focuses on exogenous factors, 
such as external crises, shocks and systemic shifts in the socio-political context as 
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catalysts of institutional development (Stone Sweet, et.al., 2001: 10; Smith, 2004: 
34;). Another set of approaches focuses on sources of change that are internal to the 
“existing spaces of governance,” in which repeated interaction amongst actors 
prompts them to  “seek new rules,” more suited to their interests and policy goals 
(Stone Sweet, et. al., 2001: 10). Such patterns represent what Smith terms “functional 
logic” of institutionalisation, by which actors “encourage institutional change” to the 
“extent that they believe the institutional arrangements” will benefit them (2004: 33; 
Visser and Rhodes, 2011: 81). Endogenous analyses also pay attention to dynamics of 
change which could be categorized under the “logic of normative appropriateness” 
rubric (Smith, 2004: 33;Visser and Rhodes, 2011: 79). Here, actors may both generate 
and encounter “ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions” between and within 
existing institutional domains, particularly if there is an overlap in remit or 
responsibility, as they pursue their objectives and attempt to enhance their positions 
(Smith, 2004: 33; Stone Sweet, et. al., 2001: 10).  In the process of exploiting 
“existing EU rules, procedures and access points”—including by lobbying EU 
organisations—such actors may find them inadequate and seek their modification. 
The resolution of such conflicts then leads to institutional change, as norms are 
reproduced, clarified, formalized or elaborated (Smith, 2004: 33; Stone Sweet, et. al., 
2001: 10-11, 19). Operating across these logics are “skilled social actors” or 
“institutional entrepreneurs”—an institutionalist “version” of policy entrepreneurs—
who, seeking to induce “dynamic policy change,” generate and promote ideas aimed 
at defining institutional or policy problems and specifying attendant solutions in a 
manner that “other actors find convincing and useful” (Fligstein, et. al., 2001: 11-12; 
Mintrom, 1997: 739).  In order to achieve a resonant problem-solution combination, 
skilled social actors construct and manipulate cultural frames which then help build a 
coalition of supporters by attaching their “their interests and identities to a set of 
ideas…that allow for further institutional development” (Stone Sweet, et. al., 2001: 
12). In empirical reality, as scholars of institutionalisation point out, these logics and 
dynamics are intertwined, existing and exerting their influence cumulatively.  
The extension of rules and norms in the course of the institutionalising process 
implies progression and means, of course, that such rules must first exist.  Indeed, 
armaments cooperation in Europe was not norm- and rule-free prior to the launch of 
the Code of Conduct and the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive. As will 
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be demonstrated below, a number of dedicated organisations and cooperative 
arrangements “governing” various components of the armaments policy field had 
been developed over the decades following World War Two. Furthermore, in recent 
years, aspects of defence procurement were technically subject to the EU’s general 
Public Procurement Directive (2004/18/EC), as explained above. In order to capture 
this progressive nature of institutionalisation, whereby rule and norms grow more 
numerous, detailed and pervasive, Smith conceives of sequential stages of 
institutionalisation (2004: 40-48). In “real life,” these may be inconsistent and over-
lapping, but serve a useful analytical purpose of demarcating successive periods of a 
policy field’s development.  Thus, in the first instance, an intergovernmental forum is 
established as member states commit to cooperation in a particular policy domain.  
This commitment may develop organically, without an explicit legitimation by actors, 
but the much more typical scenario would be a public decision by actors to engage in 
organized cooperation. This may entail and informal agreement, a treaty, or the 
creation of a new dedicated organisation.  Subsequently, as actors within this 
intergovernmental forum engage in discussions regarding the goals and dynamics of 
their cooperation, they enter into the information-sharing stage of institutionalisation. 
Although such communication may not generate specific policy outcomes, actors’ 
regular participation in such debates is likely to facilitate the development of 
“common understandings” and thus generate demand for “greater structure” (Smith, 
2004: 42).   
When such inter-state information sharing progresses to discussions of possible 
solutions to specific problems associated with that particular policy area, the stage of 
norm creation and codification may be said to take hold.  As intergovernmental 
communication leads to the emergence of shared views amongst officials regarding 
the “means and ends” of their cooperation, they are able to establish more defined 
obligations to structure the emerging policy domain. As participants strive to preserve 
the consensus already achieved—for instance by formalizing problem-solving as 
modes of decision-making peer pressure as a means of enforcing compliance—they 
codify behavioural norms and generate expectations that these will be obeyed. The 
next stage of institutionalisation entails the establishment of formal, permanent 
organisations for the purpose of administering and monitoring the institutionalizing 
space. Existing organisations and agencies, such as those of the European community, 
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may also become involved in the emerging policy regime during this stage. Smith’s 
final stage, which he terms “toward governance” in a sense comes full circle, and 
envisions the member states devising and implementing policies, which are anchored 
in shared norms, in order to achieve specific objectives they have themselves defined. 
They also allocate resources and design policy oversight mechanisms in order to 
ensure members’ compliance and policy effectiveness. The resulting system of 
governance, then, is endowed with the “authority to make, implement and enforce 
rules in a specified domain” (Smith, 2004: 47; Anderson, 1995).  
	  
Armaments	  Policy,	  Sovereignty,	  and	  Fragmentation	  of	  EU	  Defence	  
Procurement	  	  
Sovereignty here is viewed as a combination of a state’s ultimate supremacy over all 
existing authorities within its delineated territory, as well as its ultimate independence 
from any external authority (Bull, 1977). The literature concerning EU armaments 
cooperation inevitably turns to the fragmentation of the defence equipment market 
within the EU, and cites the centrality of armaments issues to nation state sovereignty 
when describing it. However, the causal or conceptual link between state sovereignty 
preservation and the state of armaments cooperation between member states of the 
EU is seldom made in sufficient detail. Nevertheless, as this connection exists not 
only in major theoretical approaches in IR but also in policy discourse permeating this 
field, it is essential for understanding the empirical characteristics of the EU defence 
procurement sphere, and, as this thesis will argue, the institutionalisation process that 
culminated in the Directive and Code of Conduct. 
 
Theoretical Conceptualisations 
Scholarship on the political significance of armaments points out that in the Middle 
Ages, and even dating back to Classical antiquity there has been political intervention 
into armaments production and trade. With a short “exception” during the Industrial 
Revolution, regulation has characterised the international system since. For instance, 
Hellenistic military innovation was “lavishly supported” by the rulers of the day, 
while Charlemagne prohibited the export of the prized Frankish armour from his 
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territories (Krause, 1992: 34-45; 61). Finally, there is evidence that Christendom of 
the later Middle Ages featured at least informal prohibitions on armament sales to the 
Ottoman Turks (Harkavy, 1975: 213).  Nevertheless, the linkage between producing, 
trading, and using arms and state sovereignty is in many ways a distinctly 
Westphalian phenomenon, particularly through the connection between defence 
industries and that notoriously nebulous term, national security (Laurance, 1992: 4).  
By making the connection between territoriality and sovereign state borders, the 
Westphalian state system has legitimated and defined defence industries as part of the 
national security establishment (Sjolander, 1998: 119; Mawdsley, 2008: 368). Trade 
of defence-related goods and services naturally involves the distribution of military 
power, which forms the environment within which transactions occur and is also part 
of the outcome of transactions (Cornish, 1995: 76).  The “drive to defence-industrial 
self-sufficiency,” long associated with the behaviour of Great Powers, has also come 
to denote a state’s ability to “conduct an independent foreign policy,” not least 
because “arms exporters can manipulate deliveries to coerce importers into supporting 
their foreign policies” (DeVore, 2012: 4). After all, as The Economist summarised the 
attitude of EU governments in an early call for a single arms market in the EU, “how 
can you trust foreigners to provide you with the means of defence in an uncertain 
world?” (The Economist,1995). 
It should be noted that the connection of defence industrial autonomy to nation state 
sovereignty as well as the overriding importance states accord to its protection, is 
largely associated with realist conceptualisations of the international system.8 The 
anarchic nature of the system obliges states—in which they are viewed as dominant 
and unitary actors— to practice self-help in order to ensure their survival, which at its 
most fundamental  hinges not only on the possession of military capability, but on the 
security of, and therefore direct control over, its supply (Waltz, 1979; Resende-
Santos, 2007).  Realist theoretical traditions emphasise the role of military production 
and defence procurement as the ultimate instruments of safeguarding territorial 
integrity, maintaining or increasing influence in the international system, and 
minimising strategic threats (Jervis, 1978; Morgenthau, 1966). In an international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Realism	  is	  not	  a	  unified	  theory,	  but	  comprises	  a	  number	  of	  strands,	  including	  classical	  realism,	  neorealism,	  neoclassical	  realism,	  and	  defensive	  and	  offensive	  realisms.	  These	  orientations	  differ	  as	  to	  the	  weight	  of	  various	  levels	  of	  analysis	  and	  structural	  factors	  in	  explaining	  state	  behaviour.	  For	  overviews,	  see	  Guzzini,	  2004;	  Wohlforth,	  2008,	  Jervis,	  1998	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system of power imbalances, ensuring national security becomes a fundamental driver 
of policy formation. An extension of the realist framework to the political economy 
realm, namely approaches focused on mercantilism or economic nationalism, 
emphasises the critical role of maximisation of economic potential and strategic 
industrial autonomy in defence in state policy formation (Krotz, 2011: 53).   
Where interstate institutionalisation in the “national security realm” does occur, it is 
instrumental to the maximisation of the dominant states’ interests, such as the need to 
balance another actor that could jeopardise its position in the system (Mearsheimer, 
1994/1995; Snyder, 1997; Walt, 1987).  As such, inter-state institutionalisation does 
not exert an autonomous causal influence on states’ external policies or interests 
(Jones, 2007). Arms sales, moreover, comprise a key component of states’ foreign 
policy, and are thus another key aspect of sovereignty affirmation (Krause, 1992). 
Consequently, states will not endanger the security of their military supplies and will 
not cede any of their decision-making autonomy in an issue area as fundamental to 
their raison d’etre as arms acquisition to institutional structures which they 
themselves cannot unequivocally control. This is why “most governments…treat the 
ability to make weapons almost as seriously as the ability to use them, and will cede 
neither to foreigners” (The Economist, 1995b). 
However, legal-, economic-, and policy-oriented accounts of EU armaments 
cooperation also contain numerous references to the “status” of armaments policy, 
and of the defence procurement and industrial policies it encompasses, as essential 
components of nation state sovereignty- something of a “distinguishing emblem of the 
modern nation-state,”  (Heisbourg, 1988: 86). Indeed, “a defence industry, rather like 
a currency, can turn into a kind of national virility symbol” (The Economist, 1997a). 
Constructivist approaches to IR stress this symbolic importance of weaponry within a 
conceptualisation of nation state sovereignty as normatively constructed, linking 
“authority, territory, population (society, nation), and recognition in a unique way and 
in a particular place (the state)” (Biersteker and Weber, 1996:3). State identity, shaped 
in large part by the surrounding “cultural security environment,” features prominently 
the advanced weaponry sought by states not only for its power projection capabilities 
but also for its “symbolic throw weight” (Eyre and Suchman, 1992: 154). Possession 
and ultimately production of armaments then becomes a legitimation of states’ 
identity, which is notoriously resistant to significant transnationalisation (Sagan, 
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1996/97; Risse, 2001). Sociological institutionalism shares much of social 
constructivists’ view of the defence establishment as a defining symbol of statehood, 
but attributes  its entrenchment to the impact of transnational institutionalised norms 
which are shared and adapted to by states. Sovereignty, and its connection to military 
force, is an example of an institutionalised transnational norm, although the “look” of 
this institutionalisation varies among states. An “ideal of sovereignty”, is thus created, 
which exerts influence on the policy-making process as “statespersons, diplomats, and 
intellectuals…establish and police practices consistent with the ideal” (Biersteker and 
Weber, 1996:3).  
This is by no means an exhaustive overview of various conceptualisations of the 
sovereignty-armaments relationship in IR. Rather, it is intended to demonstrate that 
the discipline’s major theoretical traditions, whether in the realist or constructivist 
strands, place the military instrument as well as the industrial infrastructure necessary 
to equip it in the centre of the practice or construction of nation state sovereignty. 
Although these approaches disagree on the reasons for the importance of defence 
trade and production, they converge on its existence and point to similar policy 
implications in defence procurement—widespread protectionism, insistence on 
national suppliers, and preservation of national decision-making autonomy.  
 
Empirical Manifestations: Duplication, Fragmentation, and National Preference 
While several arguments have been advanced in favour of a gradual untethering of 
sovereignty from military acquisitions (Krause, 2011), an empirical overview of the 
current EU defence procurement architecture is nevertheless a powerful testament to 
the persisting equation of defence industrial matters to core state functions as well as 
the embeddedness of national prerogatives in this realm. In fact, states’ defence and 
security policies enshrine the protection of sovereignty as a fundamental duty of the 
state, which is fulfilled through wielding the military instrument. For instance, 
Germany’s defence policy guidelines state that “the role of the defence industry is to 
serve the Bundeswehr, [German armed forces],” which are in turn defined as the 
“centrepiece of the security and protection of Germany,” and “the basis of the 
nation’s willingness and preparedness to defend itself” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 
2011:8). Similarly, France’s 2008 Defence White Paper stresses that the country’s 
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“industrial skills…are crucial to retaining [its] strategic autonomy” (Ministry of 
Defence of France, 2008: 251). Although the document cites European 
interdependence as an objective of the French defence industrial policy, the most 
important factor is the need to “manufacture and maintain the military equipment 
essential to areas of sovereign prerogative, where in view of… political choices, 
sharing or pooling is not an option” (Ministry of Defence of France, 2008: 254). 
Similarly, Poland regards its defence industry as “an important element of the 
economic sphere of [the country’s] security,” while Spain’s security strategy asserts 
that “the industry and technological base associated with security and defence 
constitutes a key element in our response capability in the face of threats and risks” 
(Republic of Poland, 2007: 17; The Government of Spain, 2011: 43). 
In addition, EU capability development forums and conferences dedicated to 
furthering procurement harmonisation are  saturated with references to sovereignty 
and national security. Speaking at these gatherings, policymakers consistently cite 
“sovereignty concerns” as central impediments to deeper collaboration. For instance, 
the 2012 annual conference of the EDA was dominated by invocations of sovereignty, 
with the then Belgian minister of defence Peter de Crem emphasising member states’ 
worries about its loss, and senior industry executives reiterating that sovereignty 
concerns were at the root of the fragmentation of the European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) (EDA, 2012 : 5).9  Military 
representatives expressed similar views, with one admitting that assuaging national 
sovereignty worries were a routine component of his senior post in the CSDP 
structures  (EDA, 2012).  
A poignant illustration of the depth of such perceptions in societies is provided by the 
Anglo-French defence deal of November 2010, which sparked intense media 
coverage and a flurry of public commentary from the highest levels of government. 
Establishing joint testing and development centres for nuclear weapons, the bilateral 
agreement also includes a joint expeditionary force and a series of interoperability 
measures, aircraft carrier synchronisation, submarine technology cooperation, joint 
pilot training, satellite communications, and co-development of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).  At their joint press conference with French President Nicholas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	  conclusion	  is	  also	  reinforced	  by	  the	  author’s	  personal	  attendance	  of	  the	  EDA’s	  2012	  annual	  conference.	  It	  took	  place	  on	  31	  January	  2012	  in	  Brussels,	  Belgium.	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Sarkozy following the signing, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron rushed to 
stress that “this is not…about weakening or pooling British or French sovereignty,” as 
soon as he had summarised the provisions of the treaties (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
President Sarkozy, for his part, asserted that “in France sovereignty is as touchy an 
issue as it is in Britain, but together we will be stronger” (Cabinet Office, 2010). The 
French embassy in Britain also released a statement by then Minister for Defence and 
Veterans Alain Juppe describing the aim of the agreement as “reducing overall costs 
whilst preserving national sovereignty” (Juppe, 2011). What is more, media coverage 
and policy-makers’ statements that both preceded and followed the deal demonstrated 
the public preoccupation with maintaining sovereignty despite cooperation and 
governments’ need to address that concern.10 These episodes reflect the extent to 
which coupling of armaments with nation state sovereignty is ingrained in popular 
perception, and demonstrate both the near automaticity of public concerns over 
sovereignty “losses” and policymakers’ recognition thereof.   
The European defence equipment market is characterised by persistently protectionist 
behaviour of member states aimed at maintenance of national employment, 
investment, and control over security of military supply and information.  It is not 
uncommon for EU governments to be controlling, or at least major, shareholders of 
defence companies. Indeed, even though this trend may have decreased in recent 
years, governments remain if not sole then most important customers, regulators, and 
investors of the defence industry. France is perhaps the most widely cited example of 
this, with the French government historically acting as an arbiter of all defence 
industrial deals and restructuring, even if this trend appears to be slowly reversing.11  
Italy and Spain are other notable examples of state ownership of defence industry, 
with the governments having proved reluctant to move toward privatisation.  EU 
member states justify their golden shares, and other measures aimed at restricting 
foreign investment, with arguments about maintaining security of supply and 
operational sovereignty. This is particularly the case with capabilities that 
governments have earmarked for “national” independence (see below).  Other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See	  “New	  Era	  Dawns	  for	  Anglo-­‐French	  Defence:	  Countries	  Destined	  for	  Much	  Greater	  Cooperation,	  but	  Governments	  Insist	  Sovereignty	  will	  be	  Kept,”	  28	  October	  2011,	  The	  Guardian;	  “Liam	  Fox:	  Anglo-­‐French	  Defence	  Treaty	  will	  not	  Compromise	  UK	  Sovereignty”,	  2	  November	  2011,	  The	  Guardian;	  11	  The	  French	  government	  holds	  shares	  of:	  	  27	  %	  in	  Thales,	  27.08	  %	  of	  Safran,	  62.5	  %	  of	  shipbuilder	  DCNS,	  100%	  of	  Nexter	  (although	  the	  privatisation	  process	  has	  been	  initiated),	  and	  10.9	  %	  of	  Airbus	  Defence	  (via	  SOGEPA)	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instruments of protectionism include barriers to entry of foreign defence firms, such 
as (too high) requirements for economies of scale, position on the learning curve, 
product differentiation, or too sophisticated or complex programme specification 
(Bekkers, et al., 2009). National ownership, and divergent forms of government-
industry relationships in general, presents a persistent impediment to industrial cross-
border cooperation and establishment of multinational defence companies.   
Protectionism is closely associated with duplication, excess capacity, and—other than 
a handful of “giants” or primary contractors (referred to as primes)—defence firms 
with small revenues catering to equally small, primarily national, markets. Indeed, as 
one senior European Commission official phrased it, complex weapons systems are 
made on such a small scale in Europe that “they are almost hand-made” (Interview 2, 
15 December, 2011, European Commission). At the time of the Defence Procurement 
Directive’s approval, there were 12 major warship building companies in the EU, 
compared to a maximum of four in the US and 89 different defence research 
programmes, versus the 29 in the US (European Parliament, 2009). France, UK, 
Sweden, Poland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria and Switzerland not only each 
possess manufacture, research, and technology capabilities for armoured fighting 
vehicle production (AFV), but also purchase them from predominantly national 
suppliers (Dickow, et.al., 2011). While the unsustainability of this status quo is 
acknowledged by EU policymakers, as when President Sarkozy stated at the 2007 Le 
Bourget Airshow that “Europe cannot afford the luxury of five ground to air missile 
programmes three combat aircraft programmes, six attack submarine programmes, 
and twenty-odd armoured vehicle programmes,” it does not seem to translate into 
policy choices. During the European Parliament debate preceding its vote on the 
Directive, the rapporteur lamented that although the “European defence equipment 
market” yields approximately 91 billion euros’ worth of goods and services, only an 
average of 13 per cent of this amount put to an EU-wide tender, while the remainder 
is spent domestically (European Parliament, 2009). He also noted that Germany, one 
of the biggest defence exporters and “his own member state,” opened only two per 
cent of its procurement to EU-wide competition (European Parliament, 2009). Figures 
released annually by the EDA during the period 2005-2012 repeatedly placed 
spending on national procurement programmes at 75-82.4 per cent, while between 82 
and 89.3 per cent of investment into research and technology, the fundament of 
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capability development, has remained stubbornly national (EDA, 2011, 2013). 
The EU defence equipment market is also characterised by divergence among 
member states. Not only do the national barriers described above vary in structure and 
extent across member states, defence equipment acquisitions within the EU are also 
carried out through divergent terms of publication, tendering procedures, selection 
award criteria, pricing schemes, and efficiency incentives (European Commission, 
2012; Bekkers, et al., 2009: 35). To a certain extent, divisions are structural. The 
smaller member states, in defence terms, are largely arms importers and contain 
mostly second-tier defence companies, or sub-contractors, while only six states 
account for 90 per cent of defence spending and contain the majority of defence 
production in the EU, as well. Many of these large states, that is, the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain, are intent on preserving autonomy in weapons 
programmes they define as “essential security concerns.” The UK, for instance, would 
like to maintain freedom of manoeuvre in the procurement and maintenance of 
nuclear submarines, core warship building, ammunition and cryptography, as well as 
support capabilities for fixed wing combat aircraft, helicopters, and armoured fighting 
vehicles. France is protective of its nuclear deterrent, ballistic missiles, nuclear 
submarines and information system security (Bekkers, et al, 2009: 35). 
In practice, this means that governments are keen to maintain defence industrial 
capabilities for such equipment under direct control, outside of any form of EDEM, 
and most often within their territory. Underlying this state of affairs is a widespread 
and deep-seated commitment of national governments to domestic defence industry 
first, and the United States second, when it comes to supplying their armed forces 
(Bekkers, et al., 2009: 133). Yet, widespread “abuse” of Article 346 is usually the 
first reason given in literature and policy documents for the fragmentation described 
above. A number of Article 346 exemptions, however, do pertain to legitimate 
security objectives of member states. These objectives, and the demands for weapons 
programmes they yield, vary across member states, resulting in 28 different R&D and 
production specifications. They are nationally defined, arising from differing strategic 
cultures, contending industrial demands, and diverse defence industrial policy 
choices, in themselves reflecting divergent national political traditions.   
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What Came Before 
Resistance to Integration 
It will therefore not come as a surprise that this policy area has been resistant to 
significant steps toward integration. At the same time, attempts of supranational 
institutions to harmonise defence procurement procedures of EU member states—and 
hopes of a consolidated armaments policy—are not new. Already in 1989 the then 
Internal Market Commissioner Martin Bangemann called for a central Community 
role in arms production and trade (Bauer, 1992: 39).12 In fact, this statement reflects 
the persistent arguments in favour of if not an elimination, then a limited application 
of Article 346 (then Article 223) consistently advanced at the time by the Commission 
despite its barely-there competence in defence-industrial matters (Cornish, 1995: 1). 
The European Parliament also, through its Poeterring report of 1991, or Report on the 
Outlook for a European Security Policy, proposed the removal of Article 346 and 
discussed the creation of an autonomous European armaments agency (European 
Parliament, 1991). 
 In 1996, the Commission issued a Communication on the defence industry and 
armaments market within the European Union, entitled The Challenges Facing the 
European Defence-Related Industry: a Contribution for Action at European Level 
(European Commission, 1996). The report underlined the dual nature of defence 
industry- that is, a “major means of production and essential to foreign and security 
policy”- and proposed “an integrated European market for defence products…using a 
combination of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal: Community and Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, legislative and non-legislative instruments” (European 
Commission, 1996: 2,5). Again, the Commission reiterated its dictum of restrictive 
Article 346 interpretation, which hinted that “adapting the resources within the 
Community’s jurisdiction” may be necessary (p.10). The overall tone of the 
Communication, however, focused on the commercial aspect of the defence trade, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Cited	  in	  Cornish,	  1995:	  18	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making the case for supranational regulation of armaments, while de-emphasising the 
political character of the issue, and thus casting this initiative as brash, fanciful, or 
divorced from reality in the eyes of the member states (Georgopolous, 2007:214).  
A second Communication came in 1997, under the name ‘Implementing European 
Union Strategy on Defence-Related Industries’ and was notably more conciliatory 
and cognizant of member states’ sensitivities regarding defence industrial matters and 
what could therefore be achieved in that field (European Commission, 1997). In 
particular, in its call for a European defence equipment market, the Commission 
allowed for significantly more non-legislative components. The Communication also 
mapped out a timetable for the proposition and discussion of the various components 
of an EU armaments policy, for instance, a European company statute, export 
controls, and competition policy in addition to public procurement (Moerth, 2003: 
97). However, this timeline was not to be realised, while the previous initiatives have 
not led to tangible outcomes or policy outputs. By 2000, the 1997 Communication 
(COM 97) was under discussion in the Council of the European Union, and 
specifically within the Ad Hoc Working Party on a European Armaments Policy, or 
POLARM, where the proposals had stalled. It is interesting to note that POLARM 
produced a non-paper entitled The Opening Up of Procurement in the Arms Sector, in 
which it noted the member states’ excessively “broad” interpretation of the national 
security exemption provided by the Treaty, and ventured that the Commission could 
well issue an “interpretive document” in order to affect greater “transparency” in this 
regard (POLARM, 1996:3).13  
The non-paper set out a series of recommendations for achieving “major savings…by 
using flexible, streamlined joint procedures modelled on those in the public 
procurement directives” (POLARM, 1996: 3). However, illustrating that perhaps 
ideas do really “have their time,” a CFSP Common Position on armaments, proposed 
in COM 97, faced opposition from member state governments, as it implied a 
common defence policy and necessitated a stronger role for the Commission in the 
field of armaments, which member states viewed as premature and unacceptable in an 
issue-area considered inherently intergovernmental in national capitals (Moerth, 2003: 
98-99; Ackrill and Kay, 2011). And this is precisely due to the governments’ view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  2006,	  the	  Commission	  did	  indeed	  issue	  such	  an	  Interpretive	  Communication,	  which	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  its	  “declaration	  of	  intent”	  to	  “go	  after”	  the	  defence	  procurement	  field	  (see	  Chapter	  III).	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that “certain prerogatives of national sovereignty should be maintained for political 
reasons” (Moerth, 2003: 98-99). When POLARM did produce recommendations that 
were adopted by the Council, they were general and non-committal (Council of the 
European Union, 2003). 
 
Cooperation Outside of the EU 
Instances of cooperation on armaments issues between member states of what is now 
the EU are also not at all new. In fact, the notion that European states need to 
cooperate in this sphere has a long history.14 It has, however, predated the European 
Union, developed outside of its structures and was more characterised by the 
organisations it created rather than the concrete outcomes it produced. In addition, the 
institutions that armaments cooperation between European states did produce have 
suffered from over-density and ineffectiveness.  
Already in 1976, defence ministers of European NATO members15 established the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) outside of NATO’s structure, aimed 
at promoting European cooperation on defence production and R&D. Although it 
remained inconsequential until the mid-1980s, IEPG in 1998 produced the IEPG 
Action Plan “on the stepwise development of a European Armaments Market.”16 
Voluntary, without sanctions, and entirely subordinate to the defence ministers, the 
Plan envisaged a “partial gradual, negotiated liberalisation of the armaments market” 
(Walker, 1989: 431). As work on the plan was underway, the Western European 
Union (WEU) was charged with furthering European armaments development in 
conjunction with IEPG and NATO’s Conference of National Armament Directors 
(CNAD). Intergovernmental and formally separated from the EU, the WEU entered 
the business of armaments precisely because it “reassured states that it would not 
undermine their sovereignty,” as a Commission role would have (Bauer, 1992: 26). In 
1992, the European defence ministers transferred IEPG’s role to the WEU’s Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  DeVore	  (2012),	  whose	  work	  will	  be	  reviewed	  in	  Chapter	  II,	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  armaments	  cooperation	  involve	  European	  states,	  dating	  back	  to	  1945.	  As	  a	  detailed	  examination	  is	  not	  possible	  here,	  only	  mechanisms	  with	  a	  clear	  defence	  industrial	  and	  procurement	  focus	  will	  be	  included.	  15	  At	  the	  time,	  this	  included	  13	  states	  and	  Turkey,	  and	  excluded	  Iceland	  16	  The	  Action	  Plan	  and	  its	  accompanying	  communique	  were	  published	  in	  Atlantic	  News,	  No.	  2065,	  Annexes	  1	  and	  2,	  15	  November	  1988,	  cited	  in	  Walker,	  1989:	  431.	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European Armaments Group (WEAG), which, without a legal personality, served as a 
consultative forum on increasing the transparency, competition and efficiency of the 
defence industrial base in the EU, and fostering cooperative R&D. The major output 
of WEAG was the first framework for EDEM, intended to open up national defence 
markets. It also formally established the juste retour principle, which is still a major 
characteristic of the EU defence equipment market and is widely recognised as a key 
contributor to its inefficiency and protectionism.17  
 
Again, WEAG’s EDEM framework was entirely voluntary and non-enforceable, 
while institutional equality of all its members meant it fell victim to opposing agendas 
of big and small members (Georgopolous, 2006: 208). To reduce this ineffectiveness 
and market fragmentation, WEAG’s defence ministers in 1996 created the Western 
European Armaments Organisation (WEAO). A subsidiary of the WEU and the first 
European armaments organisation with an international legal personality, WEAO was 
initially tasked with coordinating WEAG’s research and technological activities. In 
addition, the WEAO together with WEAG was envisioned as the oversight body for 
the proposed independent European Armaments Agency (EAA), a forerunner of the 
EDA (WEAG, 2002). However, the political will and interest from national 
authorities necessary to establish EAA did not materialise in WEAG, while the 
WEAO, functioning as a Research Cell and “de facto contracting agency,” has 
remained inconsequential, responsible for contracts totalling only 2.5 per cent of EU 
military research and technology (R&T) spending (Schmitt, 2003: 23). Although the 
WEAG ceased operations in 2005, as did WEAO in 2006, their story highlights the 
fragmentation and duplication that continue to characterise the armaments 
architecture in Europe. Moreover, this early history reveals a coexistence of 
supranational and intergovernmental initiatives – a coexistence that is replicated today 
and one that has often been tense (Chapters IV and V).  
 
What Exists Now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  (Fair	  return),	  a	  work	  share	  arrangement	  in	  collaborate	  procurement	  programmes,	  which	  channel	  work	  to	  national	  industries	  in	  proportion	  to	  their	  governments’	  planned	  acquisition	  of	  the	  programme	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Common arrangements on armaments issues in Europe but outside of EU institutions 
nevertheless persist today.  The Joint Organisation for Armaments Cooperation 
(known by its French acronym OCCAR) was established through a convention at the 
International Farnborough Air Show in 1998 between the UK, France, Germany and 
Italy.18 Spain and Belgium have since joined as member states, while, as of 2012, 
Finland, Sweden, Poland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Turkey also participate 
in at least one OCCAR Programme. Endowed with a legal personality, OCCAR 
manages defence collaborative programmes, which currently comprise eight, 
including the A400M tactical and strategic airlifter, the BOXER multi role armoured 
vehicle, and TIGER new generation helicopter.19 Hailed at the time of its 
establishment as breathing new, much-needed life in EU defence market integration 
and liberalisation with the dominant arms producers in the lead, OCCAR’s impact has 
fallen short of such expectations (Mawdsley and Quille, 2003: 30-31; Hayward, 
1997:21). Smaller states have been reluctant to participate in programmes due to 
privileges conferred on large ones, existing members have lacked political 
commitment in undertaking collaborative procurement, and significant commercial 
openness has not materialised (Georgopolous, 2006: 210-12). 
Another intergovernmental cooperation mechanism not involving the Commission is 
the Letter of Intent Framework (LoI) Agreement concluded by the defence ministers 
of UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, in order to further restructuring of 
European defence industry. 20 The LoI has high potential, especially when it comes to 
harmonising military requirements, intellectual property rights, and security of supply 
and information provisions between the participating states. Yet, again, LoI is 
voluntary, to the point of lacking a monitoring and coordination mechanism, and 
appears to treat the defence markets in its remit as distinct rather than striving for 
consolidation (Georgopolous, 2006: 212). 
The Commission exercises procedural and substantive control over the export regime 
of dual-use products, an area that has grown in significance in recent years and has 
allowed the Commission to claim a greater role in defence procurement (see Chapter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See:	  http://www.occar-­‐ea.org/185	  19	  See:	  http://www.occar-­‐ea.org/programmes	  20	  Letter	  of	  Intent	  –	  Framework	  Agreement,	  23	  July	  2003.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.parliament.the-­‐stationery-­‐office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/694/694we15.htm	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V). In addition, through its Framework Programme21 for civil research funding, as 
well as the ‘European Research Area’, akin to an internal market for science and 
technology, the Commission has sponsored much strategic industry research, 
especially in the aerospace field. Although the Framework does not fund military 
projects, it currently includes the civilian security sector, such as crisis management 
and anti-terrorism, while the technological and scientific projects it finances may well 
have military applications. All of these sectors overlap with the defence field, and 
thus provide the Commission with another foothold in the defence procurement 
sphere. 
This overview is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it illustrates the historic 
resistance of EU governments to serious contemplation of a meaningful Community 
role in armaments issues or any restriction of Article 346 invocation. The number of 
institutions “bypassing” the EU bears testament to this. As has been described, this 
resistance remains entrenched, but has not blocked the Commission’s current 
regulatory instruments.  This, in turn, reinforces the questions posed earlier— namely, 
what has changed that allowed the Commission to question the extent of member 
states “essential security interests”? What finally led to the establishment of a 
functional armaments agency in the shape of the EDA that introduced defence 
procurement standards- even if they were voluntary - against which member states’ 
conduct could be judged?  In addition, as mentioned above, attempts at cooperation 
and relevant institutions have arisen. However sub-optimal the results, the perception 
regarding the need for these structures has been shared amongst governments at 
various points of the European project and originated in response to policy challenges, 
evolution of the EU itself, and external pressures from the wider international system. 
How these were reflected in the emergence of an institutionalised EDEM makes the 
study of this process all the more interesting.  
 
Hypotheses	  and	  Plan	  of	  Thesis	  
 
An examination of the available literature and official documentation, undertaken in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  See:	  http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/understand_en.html	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detail in the following chapter, suggests several factors that may have induced 
member states to pay the costs of defence procurement institutionalisation in the 
shape of the Code of Conduct and Defence Procurement Directive. Almost 
universally highlighted is the post-Cold War context of falling defence budgets on 
both sides of the Atlantic, resulting in shrinking national armaments markets and 
coupled with technological advances driving up unit-level prices of weapons.  In 
addition, much of the academic and policy literature, particularly materials dating to 
the 1990s and early 2000s, stress the imperative of providing political direction to 
defence industrial restructuring in Europe as a driver for procurement coordination. 
The technology and competitiveness gap vis-à-vis American companies is 
consistently invoked as a threat in need of such as response. Finally, existing literature 
suggests a strong institutional dimension in the causal processes leading to the Code 
of Conduct and Defence Procurement Directive, namely, the prominent role of EU 
supranational organisations, as well as the importance of the Union’s military 
dimension in general, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 
particular.22   
On the basis of the overview above, three hypotheses have been constructed—again, 
presented in detail in the following chapter—which provide plausible answers to the 
research question posed by this thesis. In the beginning of Chapter III, the thesis 
reviews the systemic context shaped by rapid technological development in the 
military sphere, declining defence budgets of the post-Cold War Transatlantic security 
environment, and increasing export dominance of US defence firms. These trends 
undermined the viability of national defence industrial bases in the EU and 
heightened deep concerns about security of military supply amongst its member 
states. In summary, it is argued that imperatives of industrial survival and security of 
supply in view of reliance on US-purchased weapons systems in turn exacerbated 
adaption pressure on governments for greater degrees of cooperation. Situated within 
this context, the first hypothesis argues that the post-Cold War “peace dividend” also 
led to defence industrial consolidation within the EU, creating powerful, export-
oriented transnational companies intent on preserving competitiveness and export 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been 
renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It will be referred to as such thenceforth and 
throughout this contribution in order to avoid confusion, even though all pre-Lisbon sources used here refer to it as 
CSDP.	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market share in the face of dwindling domestic budgets and increasingly harsh 
competition from US industry.  
These prime contractors, which are located in dominant arms-producing states, have 
then successfully lobbied both their national governments and supranational EU 
institutions for market competition and transparency measures. The national policy 
makers and EU officials have backed the Code of Conduct and Defence Procurement 
Directive on market liberalisation and industrial survival grounds. The second 
hypothesis states that supranational EU actors, particularly the European Commission, 
have played decisive policy entrepreneurship roles by consistently pushing for 
defence procurement integration. Buoyed by their powers granted through the Single 
European Act (SEA) and motivated by a desire to extend their institutional power, 
these supranational actors have skilfully forced the Directive through critical 
junctures, “escaping” the control of their principals. They have adeptly couched their 
proposals in terms that resonated with the dominant member states and industry. The 
third and final hypothesis argues that EDEM institutionalisation is an outcome of the 
EU’s development as an international security actor.  Specifically, the emergence of 
its military dimension, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), focused 
political attention on the need for efficient, cost-effective military equipment for its 
growing number of operations. Taken together, this has generated the vital rationale 
for an institutionalised defence equipment market—embodied in the establishment of 
the EDA—as well as providing a regularised intergovernmental decision-making 
forum and policy-making mechanism in which it could be formulated. In this 
scenario, policy initiative originated from the major arms-producing member states, 
namely the UK, Germany and France, each motivated by concerns over defence and 
security autonomy. However, they must contend with intergovernmental institutions, 
such as the CSDP bodies and the Council of Ministers, for decisive influence. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II provides a review of the relevant 
literature concerned with EU defence procurement, armaments cooperation, and 
defence industrial developments, highlighting its short-comings and identifying 
contributions. This chapter will also describe the identified hypotheses in detail, and, 
drawing upon existing scholarship on EU’s defence and security policy as well as 
broader IR work on inter-state military cooperation, use them to establish a theoretical 
framework within which each will be examined.  Chapters III, IV, and V will be 
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dedicated to examining each of the three identified hypotheses. Chapter VI will 
adjudicate between all hypotheses, and conclude by specifying the most 
comprehensive explanation for the institutionalisation of the EDEM yielded by this 
research.  
	  
Contribution	  
 
Although legal and economic scholarship has followed developments in the EDEM 
arena for some time, politically-oriented analyses from an IR perspective have only 
recently begun to emerge (Chapter II). However, much of this work has been largely 
descriptive in nature, insufficient in time-scale, or lacking in empirical detail, and has 
thus remained quite limited in scope (Chapter II). In seeking to fill this gap, this thesis 
deals with a very specific subject. Yet, examining the Directive and Code is 
ultimately about understanding more clearly why states accept the limitations 
institutionalised cooperation places on their sovereignty in such an inherently 
intergovernmental and seemingly “cooperation-averse” sphere as defence 
procurement. Answering this question provides greater insight into the conditions 
which facilitate such an outcome and the objectives states may seek to achieve by 
bringing it about. In particular, examining the institutionalisation of EDEM sheds 
light on the evolution of the Union’s armaments cooperation and the emergence of its 
defence industrial policy. Tracing the causal mechanisms that led to the Defence 
Procurement Directive also reveals the influence of and interaction between key 
actors in this process, such as transnational defence firms, dominant arms-producing 
member states, and EU organisations, both supranational as well as 
intergovernmental. In addition, the impact of the transatlantic defence market, NATO, 
and United States introduces external adaptation pressures into the analysis, which, 
together with the post-Cold War context of declining defence budgets and 
technological innovation, allows to observe whether and how systemic influences 
may have translated into intra-EU dynamics under study here.   
Thus, uncovering the influence of transnational EU defence firms in bringing about a 
more institutionalised EDEM could not only shed light on market-derived pressures 
for institutionalisation, but also enrich theoretical conceptualisations of the role 
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transnationally organised interests play in affecting intergovernmental cooperation 
and integration. Exploring the impact exerted by transnational EU defence industry 
would therefore add to the body of knowledge regarding the drivers behind defence 
integration, and enhance conceptualisations of non-state actors in multi-level 
decision-making of the EU. Detailing the role of the European Commission and its 
interaction with member states and intergovernmental players such as the EDA, 
would provide insights into the causal influence of supranational policy 
entrepreneurship on states’ acceptance of rules in a field ostensibly central to their 
sovereignty. Exploring this hypothesis would also add to the literature on the policy 
entrepreneurship activity of the European Commission and the role of supranational 
agents in “cultivated spillover,” more generally. As such, it would lead to a more 
nuanced understanding of constraints placed on dominant actors—member states— in 
the process of institutional development, and help discern whether and how these 
constraints related to “parties’ relative abilities to force others to act in ways contrary 
to their unconstrained preference” (Knight, 1992: 126).  Furthermore, if the 
Commission activity was, indeed, decisive, one could draw conclusions about the 
importance of prior institutionalisation and path dependence, as well as the 
mechanisms, timing and causal processes at work during “spillover.”  Such 
conclusions would be particularly enlightening as current neofunctionalist accounts of 
spillover through supranational agency do not envision this process being initiated in 
intergovernmental matters of high politics, while supranational competence is limited 
in the defence and security sphere.  
In addition, exploring the role of the EU’s developing military dimension in bringing 
about the beginnings of a common defence procurement policy could help elucidate 
the interaction between the ability of the CSDP institutional structure to reduce 
“returns to power”  and  importance of power capabilities of EU member states 
(Ikenberry, 2001:5-8, 36). If its autonomy from outcomes of inter-state bargaining 
could be demonstrated, this micro-level study could contribute to more convincing 
explanations of inter-state institutionalisation in the defence realm by introducing 
member states’ power distribution into the causal mix of institutionalist analyses 
(Menon, 2011).  A further shortcoming of institutionalist theories is a lack of attention 
to the influence of sustained inter-actor contestation over the nature of institutions or 
institutional development (Menon, 2011: 88).  This gap may be narrowed by 
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examining the latent conflict between the European Commission, the EDA, and 
member states over the form of defence procurement harmonisation during the 
development of the Code of Conduct and the Commission’s pursuit of a defence 
procurement directive (Georgopolous, 2007: 220).  
In fact, the struggle for supremacy between the Commission and the EDA constitues a 
central theme running through this thesis. Moreover, it is a tension that, far from 
being a theoretical construct superimposed upon a particular reading of European 
history, may be currently observed within the defence industrial issue area and 
constitutes an exciting case study of the nature and dynamics of European integration. 
Thus, the voluntary Code of Conduct as well as the entire Industry and Market (I&M) 
Directorate of the EDA tasked with EDEM issues were dissolved in March 2013 due 
to diminishing member states’ commitment. At the same time, the Commission has 
continued to strive for an ever greater slice of the defence market pie. In particular, it 
has established a Defence Task Force in 2011, and released a high-profile 
Communication in July 2013 as well as a July 2014 Roadmap for its implementation, 
which indicates its increasingly ambitious agenda in the defence industrial policy 
regime (Chapter VI).  
 
Sources	  and	  Methodology	  
 
This thesis relies on process tracing in order to examine the three hypotheses specified 
above. George and Bennett (2005) have been instrumental to developing process 
tracing as a fundamental qualitative method of within-case analysis, which is in turn 
crucial to the rigour of small-n studies in social science. Process tracing is a method 
which seeks to “identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal 
mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependent variable” (p. 206). In this undertaking, process tracers examine 
“diagnostic” evidence within the process under study, usually comprising a temporal 
sequence of events, and aim to support or weaken alternative hypotheses. This is done 
by looking for observable implications of hypothesised explanations, and gauging 
their “fit” to specified explanations (Bennett, 2010: 208).  
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As may be seen from this overview, process tracing is advantageous to this research 
for several reasons. Firstly, it allows for a rigorous, systematised examination of one 
case. As specified above, this thesis regards the EDA Code of Conduct and Defence 
Procurement as two manifestations of one phenomenon— that of EU defence 
procurement institutionalisation.  As this level of institutionalisation is unprecedented 
in this area, a comparative study is not feasible. Secondly, process-tracing is well 
suited for studying complex phenomena with non-linear causality, entailing 
interaction among multiple variables and actors across a number of analytical levels, 
as defence procurement institutionalisation does (George and Bennett, 2005: 212). 
Inter-variable interaction and non-linear causality exist within each hypothesis as 
well. Such causal complexity has been suggested by preliminary research, and 
verified subsequently through interviews with policy-makers. Finally, given the early 
state of development characterising existing work on EDEM and the relative novelty 
of the phenomena under examination, this project is one of theory development, 
rather than theory testing. This makes within-case analysis through process tracing 
both useful and necessary.  
However, rather than investigating a single decision process which translates initial 
conditions into outcomes, the macro-level sequence of events which have given rise 
to the first trappings of EU integration in defence procurement, in the shape of 
Defence Procurement Directive and Code of Conduct, will be studied inductively. 
This is done through examination of the hypothesised causal processes, plausibly 
leading to the same observed outcome (Collier, 2011). Extensive prior knowledge of 
the subject is central to a convincing process-tracing exercise (Checkel, 2008), as is 
the imperative to consider alternative hypotheses, evaluate and collect data 
meticulously and systematically, and be attentive to biases in the evidence. Prior to 
formulating the hypotheses presented in this thesis, a wide array of literature, official 
documentation, and media reports haven been examined. Special attention has been 
paid to hypothesising specific causal mechanisms, intervening variables, and 
independent variables, as well as stating precisely which evidence would verify a 
given hypothesis and how. This is presented as part of the analytical framework in 
Chapter II. Furthermore, throughout the verification of hypotheses, which focus on 
the EU (and its member states’) defence capability objectives, transnational industrial 
actors, and EU institutions and structures, the influence of dominant member states 
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and particular individuals in policy-making roles has been sought and highlighted. 
Although the perspectives of smaller member states and defence firms have been 
sought where feasible, the focus of the primary research conducted for this thesis has 
been on the dominant arms-producing states in the EU—Britain, France, and German. 
This is partly due to resource and time constraints characterising this project, but also 
because, in the field of armaments cooperation, states with a large share of weapons 
systems production and R&D capabilities are able to exert considerable influence on 
the development and implementation of new policy initiatives. 
The point of departure for exploring the working hypotheses described above was an 
examination of empirical insights offered by the existing scholarship on the subject, 
particularly research by Moerth (2003), as well economically and policy-oriented 
work, which is usually descriptive in nature. Taken together with legal analyses of the 
subject, as well as publicly available official documentation, this literature has 
allowed me to establish a plausible sequence of events, beginning in late 1990s and 
culminating 2009, with the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive. This has 
also solidified an initial understanding of potential causal relationships, establishing a 
valid “starting point” to guard against “infinite regress”, and allowed to specify 
critical junctures in the causal processes, that are key to hypothesis verification.  
A significant amount of data underpinning this qualitative study is quantitative, and 
includes state-level defence spending and technological innovation trends readily 
available through databases of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and specialised defence 
industry journals such as Jane’s Defence Weekly, Defence News, and Space and 
Defence Weekly. More recently, the EDA has also begun to publish defence 
expenditure data, gathered from its participating member states, that includes specific 
information on multinational procurement. Industrial lobbying has been tracked 
through interviews, the firms’ and defence industrial associations’ press releases, and 
triangulated through other media sources, the work of relevant think-tanks, such as 
the EU Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) and Bonn International Centre for 
Conversion (BICC), and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well 
as reports produced by non-governmental organisations concerned with the 
accountability and policymaking influence of defence firms. 
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A sequence of official documents emanating from the European Commission, 
European Parliament and European Court of Justice constitutes a considerable body 
of relatively detailed primary material, revealing clear instances of policy initiative by 
these supranational organisations.  This thesis draws on the collection of detailed 
reporting by specialised Brussels-based media outlets such as Europolitics and 
EurActiv, as well as minutes from meetings of European Parliament’s Security and 
Defence (SEDE) Sub-Committee, assembled by the Information Security Information 
Service, Europe (ISIS-Europe). In addition to interviews, member states’ concern 
regarding threats posed to their defence industry has been traced through policy 
proposals and official statements, including in the settings of the Council of the EU 
and EDA policy processes.  
 As suggested above, formal documents alone are not sufficient to study the complex 
dynamics of EDEM’s emergence comprehensively. Defence policy, including its 
industrial dimension, is somewhat less transparent than other policy areas due to its 
intimate connection to national security. Furthermore, in its current incarnation, 
EDEM represents the culmination of processes and the codification of debates that 
have been taking place for some time, and across a variety of different loci. Process 
tracing in this policy arena would therefore be difficult without extensive interviews 
with experts, policy-makers and officials involved. Therefore, field research, namely 
via semi-structured interviews, in member state capitals as well as in Brussels has 
formed an integral part of this project. Key institutions approached in this regard 
included European Commission’s Internal Market Services and Enterprise and 
Industry Directorates General, the EU Council General Secretariat, the EDA, the  EU 
Military Staff, EU Military Committee, as well as the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection Committee and Sub-Committee on Security and Defence of the European 
Parliament. In addition, the three dominant arms-producing member states’ permanent 
representations to the EU as well as their ministries of defence, and specifically 
armaments directorates or equivalent departments, have been contacted. The senior 
Brussels-based lobbyists of the EU’s largest transnational defence firms have also 
been interviewed.  In all cases, interviews have been conducted with decision-makers 
who were professionally active at the time of the research period. To supplement 
these sources, where possible, this thesis includes informal documents, statements and 
minutes, as well as public statements of politicians, cross-referencing them with 
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academic and policy literature.  
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CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK – THREE DRIVERS 
OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY REGIME 
 
The previous chapter had set out the puzzle to be addressed by this thesis, namely, 
why EU-level defence procurement rules are emerging in the context of the European 
Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) that place unprecedented constraints on member 
states’ autonomy in this field. A research objective was then identified, which on one 
level seeks to uncover the causal process leading to the emergence of the Defence 
Procurement Directive and the Code of Conduct as the most tangible aspects of 
EDEM today. However, the fundamental research question posed by this thesis is 
why member states have acquiesced to the Directive in particular, given its binding 
constraints and the existence of the voluntary, intergovernmental Code they could 
ostensibly control. The main purpose of this chapter is to formulate a framework for 
analysis to be applied to the research presented in the rest of this thesis. This is 
achieved by presenting three hypotheses which have been constructed on the basis of 
existing literature and available empirical material. Each hypothesis provides an 
alternative account of the forces behind member states’ acceptance of greater 
limitations on their freedom of manoeuvre in favour of an institutionalised EU-wide 
defence equipment market. 
First, however, this chapter will review the scholarship that has emerged to date on 
the subject of European cooperation and integration in the sphere of armaments and 
defence market matters. This literature will be supplemented by an examination of 
publicly available policy documents, and subjected to a critical appraisal. In 
particular, the contribution it is able to make to the research question undertaken here 
will be assessed, and this material will also inform a detailed presentation of the 
hypotheses introduced in Chapter I. The description of each hypothesis will consist of 
a theoretical context, followed by its empirical justification and manifestations. 
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Finally, an organising framework—in the form of the policymaking cycle— which is 
used to order the research that follows in the remainder of this thesis will be 
introduced.  
	  
Armaments	  Cooperation-­‐	  Political,	  Legal,	  and	  Economic	  Dimensions	  
 
Until recently, literature on European defence procurement matters  has been 
dominated by legal and economic contributions, alongside a stream of policy-oriented 
work. Although analyses of the industrial, legislative, and power-projection 
dimensions of EU armaments cooperation continue to be prominent, theoretically- 
and conceptually-oriented scholarship focusing not only on European armaments 
cooperation in general, but the defence market in particular, has also emerged in 
recent years.  These contributions have chiefly fallen in one of two strands – a focus 
on the dynamics and impact of EU organisations or an examination of the interaction 
and convergence between member states. In particular, studies of intergovernmental 
armaments cooperation between European states, both within and outside the EU 
context, have been carried out by Krotz (2011), DeVore (2012), and Weiss (Weiss 
and Devore, 2013). Krotz examines Franco-German relations in the field of defence 
and security from the Cold War era of the 1970s until the beginning of the 21st 
century. He uses the two states’ co-development of the Tiger attack helicopter (or 
Eurocopter Tiger, as it is now known) in order to demonstrate the effect of 
institutionalised and “constructed” relations between states on their “national interests 
and security policies” (Krotz, 2011: 4). Krotz argues that this influence is exerted 
even in such unlikely—from an IR theory perspective—policy areas and contexts as 
“cutting-edge advanced weapons production involving enormous financial and 
technological resources, in response to security threats of truly existential 
dimensions” (2011: 3). Much of his analysis is thus concerned with constructing a 
theoretical model and elucidating specific pathways by which particular types of 
inter-state cooperation influence state interests.  
 
DeVore and Weiss employ an international political economy (IPE), state-level 
approach to “answer the hitherto unexplored question of what factors drive 
government decisions on international armaments collaboration” (2013: 498). To 
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achieve this, they examine the choice faced by British and French governments 
regarding whether to collaborate “in the domain of combat aircraft” versus 
“autonomously producing,” or purchasing it “off the shelf” from foreign suppliers 
(2013: 498). DeVore and Weiss’ more specific aims consist in explaining why “the 
UK has more consistently pursued efficiency gains through collaboration, while 
France has privileged continued national autonomy” (2013: 498). Secondarily, they 
seek to “ascertain who—governments or large defence contractors—sits in the 
proverbial cockpit when it comes to deciding whether to build aircraft collaboratively 
or on a national basis (2013: 499).  Relying on the “Varieties of Capitalism” 
approach, they argue that differences in the Franco-British approaches to armaments 
collaboration may be attributed to divergent “institutional structures of the states’ 
political economies” (p. 499). Thus, the French Etatist system provides greater 
opportunities for interest groups to influence the policymaking process, while 
Britain’s “liberal market economy deprives defence contractors of such supportive 
organisations” (2013: 499). 
DeVore, in his single-authored contribution, aims to rectify what he sees as the error 
shared by all “prior analyses” of European armaments organisations, and namely their 
chronologically and geographically myopic focus. This discrimination in favour of 
only “recent organisations of a European character” has led, “not unnaturally,”  to 
“developments in this sector being explained in terms of broader trends in European 
integration,” as well as to predictions of “the emergence  cohesive defence-industrial 
base and common defence market regulated by the EU” (DeVore, 2012: 2).  Such 
forecasts, according to DeVore, are unfounded since “European States’ participation 
in international armaments organisations is neither a recent phenomenon nor one that 
has historically been rooted in broader processes of European integration” (DeVore, 
2012: 3). Demonstrating that, “in fact, European States have worked to create and 
improve international armaments organisations on a continuous basis since 1949” 
leads De Vore to conclude that the European armaments domain will be more akin to 
a “polycentric architecture” that includes both EU and NATO contexts rather than a 
“simple ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Brusselisation’” (DeVore, 2012: 3,6).  
Several scholars have also paid particular attention to the interaction between the EU 
and national levels. In this context, the emergence of an EU defence procurement 
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policy space has been analysed through an IR lens by Moerth (2000, 2003, 2004), 
Mawdsley (2002; 2003; 2008), Batora (2008), Britz (2004, 2010), and Hoeffler 
(2012), while the most recent—and most relevant to this thesis—contribution to date 
has come from Blauberger and Weiss (2013). Moerth diligently traces the progressive 
institutionalisation of EU cooperation in the field of armaments. She employs the 
sociological institutionalist emphasis on the conceptualisation of the armaments issue 
within different organisational fields in the EU, namely, the internal market field and 
the defence field. The interaction and competition between them has driven 
armaments policy formation forward and shaped its substance, resulting in the 
emergence of a new, “independent” field of armaments built on both market and 
defence elements, yet subject to continuing contestation.   
 
Mawdsley’s 2008 contribution begins with the premise that “the establishment of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) in July 2004 and the European Commission’s 2007 
draft directive on defence procurement clearly show that the EU has not only become 
the focus point for discussion of European intergovernmental armaments cooperation, 
but also that there is growing institutionalisation and regulation at EU level” (p.  367).  
Within this context Mawdsley examines the preferences and impact of small member 
states on EU armaments cooperation, beginning with the Cold War period. Her main 
concern, however, is analysing the nature and likelihood of small states’ “traditional 
tactics” of securing influence within armaments organisations— that is, “demanding 
equality of membership,…using protectionist tactics to preserve the indigenous 
defence industry and using their home markets as a method of gaining advantages for 
their firms”—in the context of the EDA’s work and the Commission’s efforts to 
involve itself in defence procurement (p. 367; 380). Mawdsley concludes that any 
resulting supranational provisions would likely “erode” the “protectionist measures 
utilised by small states” (p. 381). The reason for this projection is that the extension of 
internal market principles into the defence industrial area would entail economic 
liberalisation and necessitate building coalitions with “key strategic firms” – measures 
that harm the interests of “failing” small industry in “small states” (p. 380).   
Batora focuses his analysis on the EDA as “one of the key elements…bring(ing) 
about more coherence and integration in defence cooperation” within the EU (2009: 
1075).  He views the Agency as a key “standard-setter potentially fostering 
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isomorphic adaptation processes in the member state defence establishments” (p. 
1093). His specific focus is on the “ambiguities” and “competing visions” regarding 
the purpose, goals, and institutional arrangements of the Agency (p. 1076). Thus, 
Batora highlights the competing institutional logics which lie at the heart of the 
Agency’s social structure and operate on several parameters. Firstly, the role of the 
EDA  has tended to tread the unclear middle between acting as “an information 
provider among sovereign defence establishments” and “regulating the pooling of 
defence resources among the member states” (p. 1079). Secondly, the EDA is 
“struggling” regarding its relationship with NATO as a result of competing 
Europeanist and Euro-Atlanticist logics, as well as being caught between working 
towards a “Europeanised defence market” and striving for a liberalised (global) one 
(p. 1079-1080). The repeated collision of these competing logics has shaped the 
functioning of the EDA and has produced an “intergovernmental agency with 
severely limited powers heavily dependent on the willingness of the member to 
support particular initiatives” (p. 1084). The overall effectiveness of the Agency thus 
depends on the extent to which “the logic of pooled defence resources championed by 
the EDA will in fact supplant the logic of defence sovereignty” (p. 1093).  Batora 
concludes that the equilibrium that will ultimately result  from these collisions of 
institutional logics will not only continue to shape the EDA itself but will also 
structure “its role in the formation of the political order of European defence” as a 
whole (p. 1094).  
Britz (2010) builds on the analytical categorisation offered by the Europeanisation 
approach to account for the development of a “European defence industry market” (p. 
182). Using the case study of Swedish defence industrial policy, she demonstrates the 
importance of the free market idea and its manifestation in private ownership of state 
assets—or marketisation—in the interaction between member states’ domestic 
industrial policy restructuring and the creation of an EU defence industrial policy. The 
resulting process of Europeanisation, in this case, policy cross-loading between the 
two levels, has shaped the structural core of the emerging EU defence industry policy. 
In particular, Britz argues that the privatisation of hitherto publicly owned defence 
industry in Sweden and the extension of (civilian) public procurement rules to this 
area was the result of “economic (EU) integration brought about by the common 
market” (p. 180). By “supporting efforts to increase efficiency in the European 
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defence industry market” the Swedish government has furthered the development of 
an EU defence industrial policy, according to Britz, and thereby become an agent of 
its Europeanisation through marketisation (p.181).  Thus, “the development of 
Swedish defense industry policy became part of the development of European defense 
industry policy,” albeit with the former rapidly progressing in the direction of 
“marketisation,” while the development of the latter has somewhat stagnated (p. 181).  
Hoeffler, similarly to DeVore and Weiss, adopts a political economy lens to explain 
EU governments’ adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive (Hoeffler, 2012). In 
particular, she relies on the concept of economic patriotism to argue that this 
development stemmed from shifts within the domestic industrial policies of major 
arms producing member states (Hoeffler, 2012: 438).  Defining the term as 
“economic choices which seek to discriminate in favour of particular social groups, 
firms, or sectors understood by the decision-makers as “insiders” because of their 
territorial status,” Hoeffler asserts that a shift towards a “liberal conception of 
economic patriotism at the European level” meant that arms producing member states 
came to regard the Commission’s vision of a procurement harmonisation as a “way to 
expand market opportunities for their insiders” – that is, nationally based defence 
firms (Hoeffler, 2012: 445-446). Thus, EU-level institutionalisation embodied by the 
Defence Procurement Directive stemmed from governments’ recognition that the EU 
could function as a “new level of economic patriotism in defence procurement” aimed 
at “expanding markets on a global scale” for European firms” (Hoeffler, 2012: 447). 
Yet, Hoeffler identifies the persistence of “national lines” of organisation and 
“nationally defined loyalties” within a large section of so-called “European” defence 
firms as one key limitation of any future European defence industrial policy (Hoeffler, 
2012: 447). Finally, Blauberger and Weiss draw attention to the role of the 
Commission as a “strategic” policy entrepreneur in “pushing and pulling member 
states towards” the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive (Blauberger and 
Weiss, 2013: 1121-1122).  Arguing that this represents a customary entrepreneurship 
tactic of the Commission, they employ a specific  conception of policy 
entrepreneurship by equating it with credibly threatening national governments with 
“uncontrolled integration through [ECJ] case law” while at the same time offering 
“positive incentives and promises,” such as reduced legal uncertainty and regulation 
on terms favourable to them (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1124).  While Hoeffler 
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also makes this link, albeit more specifically as a justification for the 2008 French 
Presidency’s support for the Directive, Blauberger and Weiss place it at the core of 
their argument (Hoeffler, 2012: 445). 
Since the Directive on Defence Procurement is a legal instrument, it would make 
sense that legal scholarship has followed developments in this field for some time and 
in considerable detail (Trybus, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), with growing attention paid 
to the emergence of Community legislation (Georgopolous, 2008, 2010, Heuninckx, 
2008a; 2008b. Indeed, the relatively new, but widening field of EU security law 
covers perhaps the most topically and empirically relevant material for this thesis, as 
the scholars in this tradition focus specifically on the progress and potential of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, the EDA and its Code of Conduct, and the 
interaction between them (Georgopolous, 2005, 2006; Koutrakos, 2011). While it has 
largely focused on legal implications, applicability, and interpretation—with the 
exception of Martin Trybus’ 2006 work on the EDA— this literature has also paid 
close attention to the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European 
Commission in extending their influence into defence procurement.  
A considerable body of analysis dealing with economic and industrial aspects of 
defence procurement within the EU has also taken shape. It examines the material 
costs and inefficiencies arising from the continued fragmentation of EU defence 
procurement framework, and highlights the benefits of an integrated market (Hartley, 
2003, 2008). A prominent strand in this argument points to an increasing 
competitiveness gap between the fragmented European industry and its US 
counterpart (Hartley 2006, James, 2008, Callum and Guay, 2002).   The resulting 
economic rationale for defence procurement harmonisation is frequently linked to a 
description of the effects that transnational industrial consolidation within the EU 
could have on promoting regulatory and political integration as a response to 
economic pressures (Schmitt, 2000; Taylor, 1990). Other “unifying” forces include 
post-Cold War economic trends, all of which might push governments toward 
common approaches to defence procurement. Moreover, the literature’s emphasis on 
the increasing “competitiveness gap” between EU and US industry is used to argue 
that the latter might undermine or even threaten the economic viability of the 
European defence industry. A related body of work also decries the fragmentation of 
defence procurement within the EU, both as an economic burden and a serious 
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obstacle to an effective CSDP (Keohane, 2002; Aalto, et. al., 2008; Briani, 
et.al.,2013). In this context, output by think tanks such as the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Centre for European Reform (CER) has advocated 
more efficient armaments collaboration and capability generation in the EU, weighing 
existing procurement harmonisation instruments against this goal (Valasek, 2008; 
Giegerich and Nicoll, 2012). This literature also accentuates the macro, or systemic, 
post-Cold War developments, and primarily the combination of steadily decreasing 
defence budgets, constantly increasing costs of military equipment, and rapid 
technological innovation of weapons systems. This body of work, most of it driven by 
an explicit policy perspective, such as promoting increased pooling and sharing of EU 
military capabilities, relies on these trends and arguments to highlight the need for EU 
defence procurement harmonisation and development of a fully-fledged armaments 
policy in order to optimise scarce defence budgets and bolster the EU’s global 
security “actorness.”  
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All the literature reviewed above is useful in providing a starting point for the 
research to be undertaken here, while the analyses focusing specifically on EU 
armaments and defence industrial cooperation are particularly valuable in informing 
the empirical work and its conceptual framework that will follow in the remainder of 
this thesis. Thus, Moerth and Britz, for instance, are helpful in providing an 
empirically enriched “map” of the earlier, pre-CSDP discussions, debates, and 
initiatives in the defence industrial arena, and especially in tracing the 
intergovernmental-supranational tension within it to the beginnings of the European 
Union as such (as opposed to the European Community) during the early 1990s. 
Barrinha’s account constitutes a useful survey of EU policymakers’ statements 
regarding the utility of defence procurement harmonisation as they may have viewed 
it (2010). More importantly, the literature cited above, in conjunction with publicly 
available policy documents, forms the foundation upon which the conceptual 
framework of this thesis will be constructed. In particular, this material helps identify 
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and order the forces that have been decisive in pushing EU member states to accept 
the confinement imposed by the beginning stages of an institutionalised EDEM.  
 
Interacting Variables 
A number of sources reviewed above provide a categorisation of the actors and policy 
dynamics comprising EU defence procurement, as well as a systematic overview of 
their interaction. This is not surprising, since, as emphasised above, defence 
procurement involves economic and industrial dimensions in addition to political and 
military elements. Specifically, Callum and Guay identify a combination of internal 
and external factors which shaped the restructuring of the EU’s defence industry 
throughout the 1990s (2002). They argue that the attitudes of EU governments 
towards supporting cross-border industrial mergers were considerably softened by 
their realisation that the transatlantic “technological gap” exhibited no intention of 
closing, having been starkly exposed by NATO’s Kosovo bombing campaign. 
According to this logic, the combination of such awareness and the EU’s development 
as a defence and security actor ostensibly prompted the EU member states to facilitate 
industrial consolidation.  Thus, Callum and Guay argue that at the turn of the 21st 
century, the Commission had “revived” its “interest” in the defence industrial area, at 
the same time as the EU’s defence industry was becoming more politically assertive, 
and the goal of a “serious CSDP” was providing the impetus for launching 
multilateral weapons acquisition programmes (Callum and Guay, 2002: 770-772).  
Similarly, Mawdsley has listed defence firms, EU member states, and the European 
Commission, which “has long aspired to a role in defense industrial policy 
regulation,” as the major actors of an emerging defence industrial policy (Mawdsley, 
2002, 2003).  She observes that the “spur of the development of CSDP” had 
highlighted the need for greater intra-EU armaments cooperation (Mawdsley, 2002: 
10). Thus, it has contributed to the renewed burst of wind behind the Commission’s 
sails in its second attempt at carving out “an enhanced role in defence-industrial 
policy making” for itself (Mawdsley, 2003: 22).  One manifestation of such 
rejuvenation was the Commission’s strategy of “championing” the EU’s largest 
defence firms (Mawdsley, 2003: 22). Similarly to Georgopolous, she believes that 
such a combination of policy actors and dimensions  resulted in an ambiguous 
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institutional “home” of the defence equipment market, uncomfortably situated 
“between” Pillars One and Two (Mawdsley, 2003; Georgopolous, 2007: 219). After 
all, as the European Parliament had noted, any prospective EU armaments policy 
would comprise “an essential element of the gradual development of a common 
defence policy” wile being “linked to both the CFSP and Community policies,” such 
as industry, trade, and regions (European Parliament, 1999: Amendment 7). 
In addition, Moerth and Britz distinguish between the defence and market 
organisational fields on the basis of  issues, actors, and policy dynamics (Morth, 
2003: 87; Moerth an Britz, 2004: 963).  The defence field is characterised by the 
dynamics of the post-Cold War quest for military interoperability, and focused on 
issues associated with the CSDP and Petersberg tasks.  Its prime actors are those 
associated with the EU’s “second pillar,” and the Western European Union (WEU).  
The drivers of the market field, in contrast, comprise internal market dynamics, 
dominated by industry and the EU’s supranational actors.  The issues of concern to 
such actors are those associated with the European armaments market and the defence 
firms. Finally, Georgopolous provides an account of the “political/security, economic 
and industrial background of the European defence market,” which constitutes the 
“particularities” of this field (Georgopolous, 2007: 200).  Moreover, he asserts that 
“all the relevant actors” are now aware of the crucial importance of a “healthy 
European defence industrial base,” as a prerequisite for the CSDP’s ability to “attain 
its objectives,” (Georgopolous, 2007: 219). Finally, Georgopolous shares with Moerth 
an interactive, and even competitive conceptualisation of EDEM’s emergence. 
Specifically, he believes the European Commission and the European Defence 
Agency to be engaged in a  “‘refined institutional game of chess,’” each pursuing 
“inherently antagonistic” initiatives and determined to dominate the policy space 
(Georgopolous, 2007: 220-221). 
The documents emanating from the European Commission and Parliament, as well as 
the specialist media and the more policy-oriented output produced by think tanks also 
all point to the crucial importance of “a more integrated defence market” for the 
competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry as well as credibility of the CSDP 
(Keohane, 2002: 15,39).  Thus, the defence industry information platform TendersInfo 
presented the opening up of member states’ defence markets through the Code of 
Conduct and the as yet proposed Defence Procurement Directive as a response to 
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pressures emanating from a combination of budgetary constraints and the growing 
requirement for increasingly sophisticated military equipment, but went into no further 
detail (TendersInfo, 2008; 2009). Another, more nuanced, argument invoked obstacles 
to interoperability between EU militaries posed by governments’ entrenched insistence 
on national purchasing practices and domestic firms (O’Donell, 2011: 212-213).  In 
addition, the Commission’s 2003 Communication Towards an EU Defence 
Equipment Policy predicates the survival of a European defence industrial base on 
continuing EU-wide consolidation, which is hampered by legal and regulatory 
fragmentation (European Commission, 2003: 6).  The document also traces its own 
origin to “period of transformation” in the EU’s institutional framework, as evidenced 
by the inception of the CSDP, asserting that a “strengthened” defence market would 
“greatly improve” the Union’s ability to fulfil the Petersberg tasks (European 
Commission, 2003: 3). The Green Paper on Defence Procurement issued by the EC 
echoes this argument, concluding that a “truly European [defence equipment] market” 
would go a long way towards strengthening the competitiveness of industry and 
developing military capabilities “under the CSDP” (European Commission, 2005: 
3,4). The Commission’s report on the results of the stakeholder consultation process 
initiated by the Green Paper also speaks rather confidently of member states’ 
increasing reliance on the EU “framework”—“in connection with the development of 
the CSDP”— for defence capability generation and improved competitiveness of the 
defence technological and industrial base (European Commission, 2005: 1). 
Conversely, the documents warn that continued defence market fragmentation and 
protectionism, if left unabated, would fundamentally undermine the CSDP and 
industrial competitiveness. Emphasis on market fragmentation and legal uncertainty 
as obstacles to defence industrial growth and “autonomous development of 
capabilities needed for the CSDP,” are also at the core of the justification for binding 
rules offered within the directive proposal and the accompanying Communication 
(European Commission, 2007c: 5; European Commission, 2007b). Finally, a number 
of Commission Communications also highlight the establishment of the EDA as an 
indication of member states’ renewed commitment to addressing market 
fragmentation, defence spending inefficiencies, and CSDP capability shortfalls  
(European Commission, 2007b: 3; European Commission, 2007a: 9; European 
Commission, 2004: 8; European Commission, 2005: 1).  
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Discreet but Inter-Connected Roles of Industrial, Supranational, and State-Level 
Players 
These as well as additional sources that will be reviewed below, also specify whether 
and how certain groups of actors and policy dynamics may have been dominant 
within the interacting factors driving EDEM institutionalisation. Thus, observers of 
defence industry have suggested that the intra-EU defence industrial cross-border 
consolidation process, although incomplete, has nevertheless generated pressure on 
member states’ governments to “act more European instead of national” (Moerth, 
2003: 86; Keohane, 2002: 39). As a result, some have concluded that  the defence 
industry may even constitute “a proponent of even deeper cooperation between 
European defence industry policies” (Crollen, 2003: 96). In fact, the European 
Defence Industrial Group (EDIG), which, before its incorporation into the Aerospace 
and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), represented the  national 
defence industry associations of the Western European Armaments Group member 
states, had been heavily involved in the Commission’s earlier attempts to introduce 
internal market rules into the EU’s defence procurement practices. Specifically, EDIG 
representatives produced a series of position papers during the period 1995—1999, 
seeking to provide input into the Commission’s agenda. Commission officials 
subsequently met with EDIG representatives to discuss the issues raised in the papers, 
and agreed to “tackle the various sensitive issues leading to the establishment of a 
European Armaments Market where defence industry will survive to remain 
competitive and capable of catering to the European Armaments needs” (EDIG, 1995: 
2, as cited in Moerth, 2003: 71).  The Group also called on member state governments 
to “harmonise their operational requirements to enable common procurements” (ibid). 
Viewed from this perspective, early efforts to construct an integrated defence market 
may also be viewed as an extension of the EU-wide liberalisation process, which may 
be traced back to the creation of the internal market and member states’ deregulation 
of domestic high-technology industries (Moerth, 2003: 85).  
One analysis suggested that it may even be industry, rather than governments, that is 
“steering European cooperation on armaments” and even “driving…the 
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implementation of a common defence” (Schmitt, 2000: 5). As a result, the 
transnational merger activity of the EU’s defence industry may lead to “increased 
political integration” as member states attempt to “take back” the policy initiative by 
reforming national regulatory frameworks in order to accommodate industrial 
restructuring already underway (Moerth and Britz, 2004: 967). For instance, a report 
presented to DG IA in 1997 speaks of the “industry-led drive for more cost-efficiency 
by transnational specialisation” (Moerth, 2000: 182). Finally, a more direct 
characterisation of industrial involvement concerned “active lobbying for improved 
conditions in the European defence market,” while a report by the European Union 
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) highlighted the “remarkable readiness” of 
industry to “consider the Commission as a serious interlocutor” in defence industrial 
matters, (Mawdsley, 2003: 13; EUISS, 2005: 48). 
Mawdsley has also emphasised the Commission’s “long-harboured ambitions to 
manage the defence market” as well as the competition it faces in this undertaking 
from the EDA (2008: 380). She has attributed the Commission’s “emboldened” 
enthusiasm in pursuing this claim to “recent ECJ judgments,” condemning the 
“abuse” of Article 346, as well as “legal advice” suggesting “that the Commission 
could legitimately enforce single market legislation on defence procurement (2008: 
380-381).  Echoing Mawdsley, Blauberger and Weiss specifically highlight the 
Commission’s increasing emphasis on “greater legal certainty” that may be traced 
back to the Green paper on Defence Procurement issued by the Commission in 2004, 
which sought stakeholders’ views on potential community involvement in EDEM 
issues (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1128).  The critical element came in the guise of 
the ECJ’s April 2008 Commission v Italy ruling (Case C-337/05). As already 
described in Chapter I, the Italian government’s decision to procure civilian-use 
helicopters through non-competitive tender resulted in its referral to the Court by the 
European Commission. The Italian government’s argument that the closed 
procurement could be justified through Article 346 since the helicopters could 
potentially be used for military purposes was not recognized by the ECJ. 
Consequently, after the “full-blown defeat of Italy, …member states had to fear that 
… defence procurement would become largely subject to the EU’s general rules on 
public procurement” (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1130).  This, in turn, enabled the 
Commission to change member states’ “opportunity structure” by combining this 
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“credible threat” with an offer of a “regulatory ‘middle ground’” represented by its 
proposed Defence Procurement Directive in a feat of “deliberate judicial politics” 
(Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1130).  
Highlighting the defence and security forces underpinning EDEM institutionalisation, 
Crollen’s overview of policy developments deemed to represent “deeper integration 
of the European defence industry policies” includes proposals for a European Joint 
Air Transport Command and European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency  
(EASRA), a forerunner of the EDA eventually established in 2004 (Crollen, 2003: 
92). Indeed, a focus on the EDA is prominent within this strand of literature. Britz has 
argued that the creation of the EDA has in fact formalised the encroachment of 
“internal market principles” into policy areas which intersect with defence 
procurement, such as arms exports and security research, by unifying the industrial 
and defence policy areas while bringing them into the EU’s institutional structure.  
She has also attributed the creation of the Agency itself to a focus on military 
capability generation precipitated by the increasing number of CSDP missions as well 
as the need to push the creation European defence market forward, in the process 
advancing the consensus on the need for a “common regulatory framework for 
defence procurement (Britz, 2010: 178).  
 
Literature Assessment and Critique 
Notwithstanding their high empirical value, both legal scholarship and the economic 
and industrial literature are situated within different paradigms than the research 
undertaken here, and as such seek to answer different questions from those posed in 
this thesis. As explained above, legal analyses are concerned with the content of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, its compatibility with the Code of Conduct, as well 
as the evolution of EU law that it represents. Heuninckx’s work is dedicated to 
elucidating the legal governance within collaborative defence procurement, wherein 
states co-fund the development and production of military equipment they wish to 
purchase (2008a,b). Defence economists focus on the economic implications of an 
integrated defence equipment market, and seek to examine the (in)efficiencies and 
dynamics of such a structure, rather than its emergence. Both strands of literature treat 
the political aspects of this policy sphere as secondary, and as such cannot answer the 
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research question guiding this thesis.  
Contributions in the IR and political science traditions concerned with 
intergovernmental armaments cooperation and weapons programme collaboration, 
such as those by Krotz (2011), DeVore (2012), and DeVore and Weiss, do provide a 
longer-range empirical studies that focus more specifically on the defence industrial 
dimension and supranational rule-making within it. Yet, these aspects lie at the core 
of the inquiry undertaken here, but are not paid sufficient attention in these analyses, 
due to their very nature. This thesis, moreover, focuses on one specific area of 
armaments policy—defence procurement—that has been contested between state-
level, supranational, non-state, and transnational actors.  
However, in a number of instances, the work presented above that does concentrate 
more specifically on the emergence of an EU defence industrial policy and market is 
simply not recent enough to take note of EDEM institutionalisation as conceptualised 
in this thesis – namely, through the Defence Procurement Directive and the Code of 
Conduct. Furthermore, a significant proportion of these as well as the chronologically 
suitable analyses are by and large of a descriptive nature, focusing on the how versus 
the why. Thus, Moerth (2003; 2004) is concerned with how the competing defence 
and market frames may be in fact increasingly intertwined, while Britz (2010) 
demonstrates how Sweden’s approach to the defence industrial field has been 
“uploaded” to the EU level. Rather than focusing on actors and causality, she is also 
focused on tracing the emergence and impact of the free market idea on EDEM 
construction. Finally, by its very nature, Barrinha’s discourse analysis is meant to 
illustrate rather than explain.  In addition to their emphasis on the how versus the why 
questions, the accounts of European defence industrial integration reviewed above 
focus on one set of actors—either industry, national governments, or EU 
organisations—while taking insufficient account others.  Hoeffler (2012), for 
instance, provides a convincing narrative of “economic patriotism” but does not take 
into account the influence of supranational actors within the defence industrial policy 
regime, or, indeed, paint a full picture of the complex and contradictory relationship 
between the dominant arms producing member states and the transnational defence 
firms that are headquartered within them. Blauberger and Weiss consciously only 
concentrate on a very particular legislative “stick and carrot” policy entrepreneurship 
tactic employed by the European Commission as the most suitable explanation for the 
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approval of the Defence Procurement Directive (2013).  
Although such analytical specificity may represent a deliberate choice of the authors, 
usually stemming from their particular theoretical and conceptual foci, the logical and 
empirical justification for adopting this focus is not always accurate or immediately 
convincing. Thus, Blauberger and Weiss put forth a precise and nuanced account of 
the Commission’s legislative “scaremongering.” Yet, a missing link within their 
argument would be the demonstration of member states’ belief in the credibility of the 
threat posed by the potentially unbridled ECJ activism. After all, following the 
adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, they would have to be referred to the 
Court by aggrieved contract bidders, which is far from a certain outcome considering 
how highly defence industrial actors prise their relationship with governments. 
Furthermore, legal sources have argued for interpreting the implications of the 
“Italian helicopter” judgements with caution, as “after all, [Article 346] will remain 
in place and Member States will still be able to derogate from the new directive on the 
basis of the provision,” while the “success” of the legislative instrument “will depend 
upon the willingness of both the European Commission and individual bidders to 
challenge [this] continued reliance” (Trybus, 2009: 990; Teare and Nelson, 2012: 7). 
Thus, it will be important to assess the claims made by Blauberger and Weiss against 
these insights through further empirical research.   
 In addition, Hoeffler argues that the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive 
was made possible by member states’ adoption of a “liberal” type of economic 
patriotism, leading them to accept the Commission’s portrayal of the legislature as a 
“tool to enhance their competitiveness,” while “arms-producing states promoted the 
directive as a way to expand market opportunities for their insiders” (2012: 445). 
However, as emphasised by Blauberger and Weiss, Hoeffler’s argument that national 
governments “actively liberalised their industrial policies ‘in anticipation of future 
market constraints,’” is empirically inconsistent (2013: 1132). Firstly, it does not 
account for member states’ apparently swift about-face in supporting the Directive 
throughout the 2008 negotiations, when 16 national submissions to the Commission’s 
Green Paper consultation process in 2005 “largely favoured procurement rules that 
were close to the [intergovernmental] status quo,” and opposed the Commission’s 
involvement (2013: 1132). In addition, major domestic (defence) industrial policy re-
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orientation that would have produced such an economically liberal conceptualisation 
of economic patriotism, occurred in only a minority of member states, and hardly 
made EU secondary legislation inevitable (2013: 1132). In fact, according to some 
assessments, even the UK, which has been consistently noted for its embrace of free 
markets including in defence, has actually “shifted from competition to protection” in 
its defence market orientation, as marked by its 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy 
(DIS) and at the very same time as the “EU was formulating its defence industrial 
policy,” (Hartley, 2008: 11; The Economist, 2006).  
This observation indicates the general difficulties associated with applying IPE 
approaches, including that employed by DeVore and Weiss, to studies of defence 
market evolution (2013). Simply put, the political economy lens is just not political 
enough in this case. Specifically, these frameworks do not adequately take into 
account the national sovereignty concerns which permeate the defence industrial 
policy field (Chapter I). Similarly, insufficient attention is paid to member states’ 
deeply entrenched security of supply considerations, which are subordinated—
mistakenly—to the pursuit of gains from economic liberalisation within IPE schemes 
of national policy preferences. Finally, as suggested above, such approaches tend to 
disregard the complexity and inconsistency of both industrial interests and 
government-industry relations when it comes to defence procurement matters, and the 
significant extent to which these are shaped by the “national lines” Hoeffler mentions. 
For instance, it could also be the case that although the large transnational defence 
firms “normally should be expected to cope with market forces,” they also “depend 
on government planning and decision-making,” while the member states with small 
defence industries “prefer to keep their defence procurement options open,” in order 
to be able to purchase defence equipment “off the shelf” (van Eekelen, 2005: 23).  
In order to obtain an accurate and nuanced understanding of such tensions, this thesis 
aims to provide a puzzle-driven and empirically-rich account of EDEM 
institutionalisation which is rooted in the complexity characterising the defence 
procurement policy field and the interactions of the various actors within it. This 
entails building an explanation “from the ground up,” by incorporating the empirical 
insights of all sets of literature described above, as well as exploring the respective 
roles of interacting policy actors highlighted within them, although without adopting 
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any one theoretical orientation. Building on this foundation, this research posits actor-
focused causal mechanisms which are hypothesised to have resulted in the extension 
of binding EU-level rules into the hitherto intergovernmental, member states-
dominated defence industrial policy arena. As a result, relative causal importance of 
transnational economic interests, supranational policy entrepreneurs and state-level 
security concerns and power differentials in bringing about inter-state 
institutionalisation and furthering EU integration is considered. Specifically, three 
hypotheses have been formulated which set out discrete causal processes culminating 
in the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive within the emerging EDEM 
structure also featuring the EDA’s voluntary Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement. Each hypothesis assesses the role of a particular group of actors in 
bringing this about– namely, transnational defence firms, the supranational European 
Commission, and dominant arms-producing member states in the context of the EU’s 
defence and security dimension. Each line of inquiry presented below is thus mainly 
concerned with specifying why member states’ historic resistance to EU-level defence 
procurement rules has been overcome in each hypothesised scenario. However, 
secondary questions are addressed as well, such as what has motivated or initiated 
each set of adaptation pressures and how have they developed.   
 
Hypotheses	  Construction	  
 
Influence of Market Imperatives and Non-State Actors: Transnational Defence 
Industry 
  
As demonstrated above, one factor consistently highlighted in the available literature 
is the imperative of the EU’s defence industrial competitiveness and its obstruction 
due to the fragmentation of the defence equipment market.  The literature review has 
also indicated that European defence firms have consistently called for a favourable 
pan-European political environment in the face of challenges before them. 
Considering the structural influence of defence firms in particular, it is sensible to 
explore the extent to which they lobbied EU governments to bring down defence trade 
barriers under an EU aegis (Chapter I). Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
 
	   62	  
H1: Transnational defence firms and industry associations, created by industrial 
consolidation within the EU, have lobbied member state governments to agree to 
harmonisation measures.  
 
 Theoretical Context 
 
The adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) and the completion of the single 
market has resulted in a rapid proliferation of literature analysing interest 
intermediation and influence on supranationally-mandated economic liberalisation 
and integration. Not quite the global players that its American and Japanese rivals 
were, the European transnational industry viewed the fragmented EU market as the 
largest obstacle to its competitiveness. In contrast, a consolidated internal European 
market was not only viewed as a prerequisite to international competitiveness, but 
would also serve as a bulwark against unbridled external competition. These 
companies have therefore pushed for the adoption of the SEA by national 
governments, buoyed by the transfer of a number of regulatory powers to the 
Commission and the industrial implications of the internal market throughout the 
1990s (Bieler, 2012: 207; van Apeldoorn, 2001: 71).  
 
A modified neofunctionalist conceptualisation of institutional change envisions 
subnational and transnational actors as drivers of institutionalisation, provided that 
they make effective use of policy opportunity structures opened up by supranational 
bodies, while each actor may nevertheless pursue its own utility-maximising agenda 
(Buethe, 2007: 177).  These approaches have advanced the argument that firms seek 
to affect decisions at the national, as well as supranational, levels, which they can 
reach simultaneously and independently of each other (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1998, Mattli, 1999). Thus, Greenwood has distinguished between the so-called 
national route pursued by interest groups and what he terms the European route. The 
former mode of representation is indirect and characterises areas of intergovernmental 
decision-making, while the latter, direct route prevails in instances of supranational 
decision-making  (2003).  The national route, therefore, includes lobbying of 
permanent representatives, individual members of Council working groups, and 
national governments (Mazey and Richardson, 2006).  
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Despite the complexity of EU policy-making involving sub- and supranational as well 
as national authority structures, arenas and access venues, EU-level representations of 
member-state governments and their “institutionalised meeting platform,” the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), continue to be major targets 
of industrial lobbying activity, since the final decision-making authority in a number 
of policy areas continues to rest with the member states (Saurugger, 2009: 105; 119). 
Such national routes, for example, were the primary pressure pathways of car 
manufacturers during the European End of Life Automobile Directive process and 
negotiations over EU’s greenhouse gas emissions regulations (Bernhagen and 
Mitchell, 2009: 161).  Moreover, the national route constitutes a “tried and tested 
access strategy” for interest groups, particularly when these are national champions, 
as is the case with the largest transnational defence firms examined here (Greenwood, 
2003: 32; Saurugger, 2009: 119).   
Where national interests are at stake, as is obviously the case with defence 
procurement, business interests are likely to lobby national governments in order to 
exert influence on the positions of national civil service officials and ministers within 
the deliberations of the EU technical committees (Bennett, 1999: 241). Authors 
examining defence industrial lobbing in favour of consolidation-enhancing EU-wide 
policies during the 1990s have found that firms preferred to “work through their 
national governments to affect Council decision-making” (Hayward, 1994: 362; 
McLauchlin, et.al., 1993: 198). Such was the case during the negotiation process of 
EU-wide defence export control regime, with industry lobbying aimed at national 
channels in order to influence Council decisions (Hayward, 1994: 361). In addition, 
scholars of EU integration seeking to specify “spillover” mechanisms have pointed 
specifically to the influence of transnational actors such as EADS23 on the 
development of CSDP, to the extent that their decisions may represent “cement which 
will make permanent, or irreversible, the watershed decisions on defence integration” 
(Collester, 2001: 386). The national route does, nevertheless, contain pitfalls, 
particularly where QMV is concerned. Thus, it is the majority of  member states that 
must be “won over” through lobbying, as a sole focus on national governments does 
not guarantee success considering that “member states frequently trade one issue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  From	  1	  January	  2014,	  the	  EADS	  has	  been	  restyled	  and	  restructured	  as	  the	  Airbus	  Group.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  time	  period	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  older	  designation	  of	  EADS	  is	  used.	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against another between themselves” (Saurugger, 2009: 119). 
 
As a “gatekeeper of the legislative process,” it is only natural for the Commission to 
become a major “target” for industrial lobbying (Bouwen, 2009: 32-33). The 
Commission’s prominent role during the policy agenda-setting stage has resulted in 
its preponderance as the “the strategic choice of ‘early lobbying’” (Bouwen, 2009: 
20).  At the same time, in drafting legislative proposals, the Commission often finds 
itself at a disadvantage with respect to information and must thus rely on “external 
resources to obtain the necessary information” (Bouwen, 2009: 20).  As a result, the 
value of a European lobbying option for interest groups lies in the opportunity to 
secure an advantageous position that allows for changes to the later legislative 
proposals to be “made much more easily” (Bouwen, 2009: 20). However, rather that 
being a mere “target” of interest group lobbying, the European Commission may be 
said to be involved in an “exchange relationship” with private interests (Bouwen, 
2002: 368). In return for access to policy formulation, it requires expert knowledge 
and legitimacy which key stakeholders are able to provide and which are “crucial” for 
its ability to “draft  (effective) legislative proposals” and reinforce its own bargaining 
power in  the “inter-institutional decision-making process” (Bouwen, 2002; Bouwen, 
2009: 22).  
 
Empirical Justification 
 
Steadily decreasing defence spending and investment into research and development 
resulted in defence industrial consolidation within the EU. Although its pace has been 
much slower and its result considerably more limited than that in the United States, 
the merger and acquisition process that did occur in the EU has created several 
powerful transnational defence companies, such as EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, and 
Finmeccanica (see Table I below). As a result of contracting home markets and 
increasing defence equipment prices, these “prime-contractors” were also becoming 
increasingly export-oriented (see Figure I below). Nevertheless, pursuing “outside 
business” tends to be a volatile undertaking, and transnational defence firms in the 
EU, just like their counterparts elsewhere, require political stability to operate 
profitably. This, in turn, relies on removing uncertainty form the business 
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environment. In the case of the EU, reduced uncertainty is a product of not only 
economic, but also political integration. 
 
 
Largest Arms Producing Firms (excluding China), 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced from the European Commission, 2007: 72 
 
 
Common procurement rules are particularly essential to defence industrial future 
planning, while viability of transnational defence manufacturers depends in large part 
on their ability to invest in the research and development necessary for efficient 
production of weapons systems and platforms. However, their industrial 
competitiveness in international export markets is greatly hampered by the small size 
and fragmentation of EU national defence markets, which has resulted in duplication 
while keeping output low and unit-level research and development costs high, as well 
as preventing gains from economies of scale, learning and scope (Hartley, 2007: 
1172).  Moreover, internationalised ownership systems have not displaced persistently 
national purchasing structures and practices in the EU, especially in the naval and 
armoured vehicle sectors, further encumbering firms’ business operations (Guay, 
1998; Schmitt, 2004, 2005) 
 
Table	  1	  Largest	  Arms	  Producing	  Firms	  (Excluding	  China),	  2004	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 Reproduced from Raptis, 2014 
 
 
In addition, fierce competition from the efficient, and consolidated, US defence firms 
in both external and European markets has brought EU defence primes face to face 
with the need to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of European defence 
industry, if it was to maintain vital export market share and profits. Such a scenario 
made the traditional model of trade barriers and fragmented national defence 
industrial bases in Europe economically unviable or at least questionable. Greater 
competition and transparency in EU procurement would lead to the much-needed 
increase in production scale of economies stemming from greater market access, 
higher order volumes, and therefore lower unit costs leading to enhanced 
competitiveness. Such concerns appear frequently in media outlets, specialised 
sources such as Jane’s Defence Weekly, and more analytical publications like The 
Economist. In fact, the message that defence firms have consistently articulated 
throughout the late 1990s and 2000s is one of almost “doomsday” consequences of 
American competition, with the very survival of European defence industry 
Figure	  1:	  Defence	  Exports	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threatened by market fragmentation and “political” obstacles to merger activity and 
business opportunities in other EU member states (The Economist, 1997a,b, 2003). 
For instance, on the eve of the creation of the EDA, EU defence industry executives 
were both worried that the Agency would fall victim to chronic disagreements among 
its members, and optimistic that it would help “ensure the independence of European 
companies and countries,” preventing them from becoming “vassal states to the 
United States (Timmons, 2004).  
 
Consequently, the transnational companies “produced” by defence industrial 
consolidation in the EU would have an interest in dismantled national barriers to 
weapons sales and harmonised defence procurement regulations. In order to advance 
these objectives, they would be expected to lobby the governments of member states 
in which they are headquartered for the enactment of harmonised defence 
procurement, competition, and transparency rules proposed by the Commission and 
the EDA. Firms would be employing the national route to influence Council officials, 
and would particularly lobby their national permanent representatives, particularly 
during the latter stages of the policy process. Furthermore, industry would have a 
ready ear in the intergovernmental EDA, steered by defence ministers of the member 
states, and with a direct mandate to improve the competitiveness of EU’s defence 
industry. Finally, regularised interaction with the European Commission is nearly 
certain, not least due to its institutionalised stakeholder consultation procedure, and 
because of the importance of influencing legislative proposals as early as possible, 
meaning while they are still under the Commission’s “control.”  In fact all major EU 
defence firms have maintained a representation in Brussels since the early 1990s, both 
collective and individual (Hayward, 1994: 359). Thus, lobbying activity would have 
been exercised individually, in concert, and through EU-level defence industrial 
associations, such as the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 
(ASD).  
 
However, differentiation in the scope of defence firms across the EU also means that 
industrial interests, and the objectives of governments tasked with promoting them, 
are not uniform. Indeed, the demands of transnational defence companies 
hypothesised here pertain to only a handful of firms, situated in the dominant arms-
producing states – that is, the UK, France and Germany. During the past decade, these 
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states, and particularly the UK, witnessed a shift toward defence sector privatisation 
(Eliassen, 2006: 9). The large transnational firms under consideration here are to a 
great extent products of these changes. Following economic considerations, 
privatised, competition-facing companies such as BAE Systems, Thales, EADS and 
Finnmeccanica would stand to reap the benefits of increased economies of scale and 
competition. The remainder, and majority, of EU defence industry, if it functions 
under state protection, ownership, and subsidies, would be harmed by increased 
competition and transparency measures imposed by the Code of Conduct and 
Directive (Hartley, 2007:1172). Such firms are likely to have preferred leaving Article 
346 firmly in place and its application unconstrained, to be used by “their” 
governments to channel procurement contacts to these national champions. However, 
as indicated above, this scenario constitutes only one layer of explanation, with small 
firms facing an even higher risk from US competition as well as a greater danger of 
“being swallowed up” by the larger US firms in any transatlantic development of 
defence systems and technologies (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006:113). In addition, with 
no “national champion” to protect, smaller member states may in fact favour globally 
liberalised defence markets, enabling them to purchase equipment from the United 
States. These fault lines and their implications are taken up in detail in the analysis of 
defence industrial influence which follows in the next chapter.  
 
Although, as has been emphasised above, the dominant defence firms in the EU have 
transnational structures and cross-border business activity, most of them are tied 
strongly to the country in which they are headquartered – politically, historically, and 
therefore, commercially. Thus, EADS, formed through a merger of French, German, 
and Spanish companies, is the only “official” pan-European defence firm, while BAE 
Systems’ strongest links are to the British Ministry of Defence, Thales’ to the French 
Direction Générale de L'armement (DGA) and Finneccanica’s to Italy’s Ministero 
della Difesa (MDD), not least because each government constitutes the respective 
company’s all-important core customer. Correspondingly, the partial denationalisation 
of defence industry has not dislodged the attachment of governments to their national 
champions – in the case of the dominant arms-producing states, these have become 
the headquarters of the “new” transnational firms, while small states remained 
“deeply attached” to their own sub-contractor-level defence production capabilities 
(Mawdsley, 2008: 368).  Each firm would therefore be strategically placed to exert 
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pressure on public authorities within “its” government. For instance, EADS has direct 
levers vis-à-vis a number of governments, with its multinational shareholders 
fulfilling the role of “spokesperson” in relations with their national governments 
(Joana and Smith, 2006: 83-85).  
 
On the other hand, it is crucial to understand that, while industrial pressure necessarily 
implies a degree of overcoming governments’ resistance, in the case of defence it is 
difficult to juxtapose policy-makers’ and firms’ interests neatly. Due to the 
importance of defence production to sovereignty assertion, security conceptualisation, 
as well as national economy and  domestic employment, governments of arms-
producing states would have already been acutely attuned to industrial concerns (see 
Chapter I). The status of the defence industry as a key provider of a core state 
functions—assertion of sovereignty and interests through armed force and territorial 
defence—has led to a “close identification of interests” between national defence 
industry and EU governments (Eliassen, 2006:4). Member states would thus “have an 
interest in their national champions being able to create export opportunities for their 
products, thereby decreasing capital investment at home and lowering the cost of 
maintaining indigenous capabilities” (Theim, 2011: 12). Special attention is paid to 
this nuanced relationship in Chapter III. 
 
Evidence necessary to substantiate this thesis consists of two strands. Firstly, it must 
be ascertained that the EU defence industrial landscape is indeed characterised by 
partial transnational consolidation amidst mostly second- and third-tier nationally-
based companies. In addition, industrial awareness of the nature and gravity of the 
threats posed by competition from US firms and continuing regulatory fragmentation 
of the EU defence industrial base would need to be demonstrated. Finally, it is crucial 
to demonstrate that major transnational industrial players have called for increased 
competition and regulatory harmonisation of defence procurement in the EU, as well 
as specify their access pathways to the Commission, Council, EDA and national 
ministries of defence (Bouwen, 2004). If the major industrial players indeed obtained 
what they demanded, then one would expect the provisions of the Defence 
Procurement Directive and the Code of Conduct to favour the concerns of defence 
industry. Similarly, where conflicts over these amongst the firms and national 
governments, the EDA, and European Commission arose, for the resulting 
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compromise to favour industry.  
 
Assessing interest group influence in the EU context has been notoriously challenging 
for scholars and researchers.  Nevertheless, promising strategies have been developed, 
such as projects designed around in-depth examination of one case with the help of 
process-tracing.  To assess interest group influence, their preferences are first 
examined, and their lobbying activities are then traced. The findings are juxtaposed 
against the reflection of interest group preferences in policy outcomes as well as the 
group’s assessment of its satisfaction with the results. This is an approach adopted by 
most studies of special interest influence within the EU (Moravcsik, 1998; Warleigh, 
2000; Michalowitz, 2007). Employed widely in studies of lobbying in the United 
States, an alternative method of influence measurement is that of “influence 
attribution,” which relies on interest groups’ appraisal of their own influence on 
policy outcomes as well as examination by experts (March, 1955; Dur, 2009:1224)., 
researchers on the EU have generally stayed away from “attributed influence” 
methodology, although, of course, exceptions do exist (Edgell and Thomson, 1999; 
Dur and De Bievre, 2007).  
The assessment of the defence primes’ lobbying efforts in favour of the Defence 
Procurement Directive presented in the next chapter, and the competitiveness boost it 
would ostensibly engender through greater market openness, employs a combination 
of the two approaches described above. In particular, as this discussion entails a 
single-case study, process tracing is used to first establish the interests of the EU’s  
transnational defence firms in the realisation of the Code’s and the Directive’s key 
aims, that  is,  harmonisation and market openness, ostensibly leading to a better 
competitive stance vis-à-vis the United States. The resulting industrial demands are 
then compared with member states’ attitudes towards cooperation and integration in 
the EDEM area. The second stage of substantiation entails tracing the defence primes’ 
political activities, involving a reconstruction of events and positions as well as 
industry’s accounts of “attributed,” or rather “claimed” influence.  In addition, several 
specific points of contention in the proposed legislation—namely, the potential risk to 
state investment in research and development (R&D) and restrictions on offset 
arrangements— are used to infer the presence and degree of industrial influence. 
These aspects of the Defence Procurement Directive are not only amongst its most 
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overt constraints on member states’ notions of sovereignty, but also crystallise the 
fault-lines between the preferences of member states, the European Commission, and 
transnational defence firms.  
 
Effective Policy Entrepreneurship by Supranational Agents 
 
 Theoretical Context 
 
Although defence firms would reap the benefits of a common EU defence 
procurement framework, it is nevertheless the European Commission that has 
prepared, advocated for, and initiated the Defence Procurement Directive. As has 
been suggested in the review of existing literature and policy documentation 
conducted above, it appears to have done so both opportunistically and strategically – 
dodging opposition, garnering support, and neutralising the “lead” of 
intergovernmental initiatives pursued within the EDA (Cram, 1994). It would seem 
that the European Commission, aided by the Court of Justice and European 
Parliament, has played the part of a policy entrepreneur in order to further integration 
in the defence procurement sphere, thereby extending its own institutional remit and 
fulfilling its mandate. 
In the EU policy context, the European Commission is widely regarded as the “pre-
eminent policy entrepreneur”  (Jabko, 2006; Daviter, 2007: 659). However, important 
constraints on the extent of its influence are also recognised, particularly tits need to 
secure “support  from other institutional actors,” such as the European Parliament, the 
European Court of Justice, and “influential”  member states (Tallberg, 2007: 204-205; 
Young, 2010: 53). Thus far, this pattern appears consistent with neo-functionalist 
explanations of the expansion in EC regulation, which emphasise the primary roles of 
supranational actors in such “political spillover” as well as a functional spillover of 
integration from one issue-area, in this case, internal market, to another, linked one- 
defence procurement (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995). In recent years, however, 
neofunctionalist approaches have been revised to present a wide-ranging account of 
European integration as dynamic and purposive, rather than deterministic 
(Stephenson, 2010: 1042). Insights from institutional and organisational approaches 
have been incorporated to provide more convincing and nuanced accounts of 
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supranationally-driven integration. In addition, the influence of the European 
Parliament and Court of Justice have also been recognised as essential in exerting 
integration pressure (Niemann, 2006:53). Supranational elites are still the prime 
movers of integration, but the causal importance of “cultivated spillover” via the 
Commission has been increased in neofunctionalist reinterpretations (Niemann, 2006: 
42). For instance, Stephenson has characterised the role of the European Commission 
as agent of functional spillover, “releasing” mediating its “sporadic, uneven, 
intermittent” integrative pressures (2010: 1042; 1044). He devised a typology of such 
agency, in which he distinguished policy entrepreneurship or leadership from other 
types of the Commission’s efforts to “see a policy through,” such as drawing up 
guidelines for member states, putting  forth revisions, initiating amended proposals,  
even shaming poor implementers into broader or deeper levels of policy integration 
(Stephenson, 2010: 1044).  
Policy entrepreneurship, rather than merely taking advantage of opportunities to 
advance autonomous organisational preferences, entails creating such opportunities 
by utilising organisational resources. Policy entrepreneurs constitute “well-placed 
actors” that are able, willing, and interested in “investing resources in identifying and 
exploiting opportunities to push a policy” (Kingdon, 1995; Rhinard, 2010: 40; Young, 
2010: 52). Generally, this could include developing and “framing” ideas, linking new 
policy proposals to existing deficiencies, building coalitions with critical interest 
groups, or manipulating decision-making procedures to increase the advantage of a 
particular outcome (Kingdon, 1984). The European Commission, more specifically, 
may exercise political entrepreneurship through “constructive, conciliatory, and 
flexible” behaviour, such as forming ties to strategically important interest groups in 
order to influence member states’ preferences, shaping the policy agenda to conform 
to its ideas, or overcoming opposition through “creative” means such as “finding” a 
new legal basis for its activity (Smith, 2004:209; Stephenson, 2010: 1046). Secondly, 
the Commission continuously seeks and amalgamates “new knowledge” in order to 
“improve policy instruments” or “steer policy in a new direction,” thereby advancing 
its own status and position in policymaking. In characterising the Commission as a 
“purposeful opportunist” Cram casts it as an organisation that is not adverse to relying 
on even a tenuous legal justification to expand its activities (Cram, 1994: 214). 
Stephenson’s conceptualisation of policy entrepreneurship and leadership entails 
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“offering solutions to ‘upgrade the common interest,’” while “satisfying” the basic 
preferences of the member states (Stephenson, 2010: 1045). In practice, this may 
translate into:  
“waiting, taking time to place new ideas of increased EC regulation in the 
European policy space, testing out the balance of forces, gradually creating 
a climate of opinion and coalition supportive of its ideas, refining those 
ideas to match the balance of forces and finally, making proposals at 
suitable times, or simply repeating them until accepted” (Thatcher, 
2006:315). 
Rousing support—and supporters—for a particular policy problem-solution 
construction by “directing issues towards the ‘right’ venue”  constitutes a key 
policy entrepreneurship tactic (Princen, 2011: 929).  Indeed, some scholars have 
argued that one of the most critical tools in the Commission’s entrepreneurial 
arsenal is perhaps its ability to build political coalitions in support of its proposals. 
Accomplished by mobilising and concentrating the various interests of diverse 
actors around particular framing of policy issues, the  importance and difficulty of 
building such coalitions increases with the “stakes” involved in the given proposal 
(Nylander, 2001: 290-292; Fligstein, 2001: 272). Analyses of the Commission’s 
policy framing activities have also drawn attention to its tendency to initiate policy 
proposals first and raise interests’ support for them later, building political support 
for its agenda despite tangible political opposition (Daviter, 2007: 658-659). The 
necessary support-garnering is typically carried out through “holding conferences 
and workshops with experts and interested groups, issuing Green Papers, 
commissioning studies and seeking to accommodate different points of view” 
(Thatcher, 2006: 315). Such a strategy is made possible by the dynamics of the EU 
policy formation processes, which mean that before a directive is proposed, its 
“sponsors” in the relevant Commission Directorate General (DG) gauge national 
positions by contacting those responsible for the given issue area in each of the 
member states. The DG also reaches out to a plethora of experts in the EU to garner 
support. Comments are sought from the rest of the Commission, the Council, 
business interests, and other stakeholders. Thus, negotiation, compromise, and 
interest intermediation take place throughout the policy formation process, leading 
Fligstein to the conclusion that “most of the political action therefore takes place 
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well before a directive reaches the Council” (Fligstein, 2001: 269). The resulting 
legislative measure is then issued in the context of “considerable momentum and 
well-developed agenda” (Ibid). 
As has been suggested above, the Commission is an active “framer” and “projector” 
of issues as “problems (urgently) requiring solutions.” Policy entrepreneurs engage in 
issue framing in order to ensure that issues receive attention and ultimately result in 
their desired outcomes.  Framing refers to an “interpretive construction of a policy 
problem that offers a rationale for change while also proscribing a course of action 
and particular solution” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1121; 1129; Rhinard, 2010: 37, 
39). Such a problem-solution structure forms the core of a policy frame (Kingdon, 
1995; Princen, 2011: 119). Thus, a policy frame provides a justification or “a call to 
arms…for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action” (Kingdon, 1995; Princen, 
2011: 119). The ultimate aim of framing, however, is not only to capture 
policymakers’ attention, but to “leave no doubt” to all relevant actors that the EU, and 
its community structures in particular, constitute the “proper venue for dealing with” 
the issue at hand, most optimally through “community action” in the form of 
legislation (Princen, 2011: 930).  
One tactic the Commission employs in this regard is linking issues to with “grand 
political visions or policies” that are perceived to already be “high on the agenda,” in 
an attempt make them “palatable” to veto players (Stephenson, 2010: 1045; Princen, 
2009).  This involves simplifying complex and technical issues, “desensitising” 
“controversial issues,” especially where notions of sovereignty are involved, and 
presenting “functional pressures” as “compelling” (Stephenson, 2010: 1046; Niemann 
and Schmitter, 2009: 57). Thus, Fligstein tells a compelling story of the 
Commission’s effort to complete the Single Market Programme through framing it in 
terms of competitiveness and innovation to mobilise transnational business interests, 
the European Parliament and national civil servants as agents of pressure on member 
states’ representatives (Fligstein, 2001: 264). Moerth’s work demonstrates how 
“rival” framing of attempts at an EU defence industrial policy by the Commission’s 
External Relations and Internal Market Directorates have shaped these early efforts 
(Moerth, 2003, 2000). Similarly, Smith demonstrates the Commission’s reliance on 
two policy entrepreneurship strategies in order to liberalise the EU public 
procurement sector by extending Single Market provisions to it (Smith, 2004: 211). 
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One tactic was to present an open single European public procurement market as a 
solution to the European Community’s economic woes of the late 1980s- not least 
through in-depth studies (ibid). The other strategy was the use of the Commission’s 
authority for an aggressive pursuit of infringement proceedings against member states 
in the ECJ, which in turn created the basis, and legal precedent, for further liberalising 
legislation (Smith, 2004: 212).  
The modes and dynamics of policy entrepreneurship described above will shape the 
second hypothesis advanced by this thesis and inform its substantiation. It is argued 
that the EU institutional configuration and evolution have exerted pressure for further 
institutionalisation by empowering the European Commission. Considering the 
Commission’s intrinsic desire to expand and safeguard its own powers as a policy 
actor, this development has then allowed it to push for measures that would further 
this objective—increasing economic liberalisation and promoting European 
integration (Stacey, 2011: 44). Moreover, even if member states had delegated powers 
to a supranational agent and intended to exercise tight control over its agenda, as 
principal-agent approaches would foresee, the latter may have “escaped” such bounds 
in a manner unforeseen by national governments (Moe, 1990; Menon and Kassim, 
2003). In other words, the European Commission has opportunistically pushed EDEM 
institutionalisation forward and, rather than serving as a mere “agent” or neutral 
arbiter in an inter-state bargain, has spearheaded this process. 
Scholars studying the role the European Commission in EU policy outcomes have 
emphasised the importance of timing to the ultimate success of its initiatives (Vahl, 
1997: 52; Rhinard, 2010:30). Such “policy windows” or “windows of opportunity” 
signify discernible instances when a constellation of circumstances allows 
supranational proposals to fall on favourable ground, and for policy entrepreneurship 
to be most effective (Kingdon, 1995; 2003). A window of opportunity opens when a 
particular problem is perceived as important amongst policymakers—for reasons 
ranging from ideological conviction to individuals’ career advancement—a viable 
solution appears available, and favourable political developments materialise. The 
overall effect is to elevate the particular issue to the top of the political agenda. As 
such, windows of opportunity are rare and tend to close quickly, making it essential 
for the Commission to advance policy initiatives while the relevant decision-makers 
have not run out of “patience” and their attention has not shifted (Pollack, 1997: 123). 
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However, there may be instances where policy windows could remain open long 
enough for “contestation over control of the policy agenda” to occur (Ackrill and 
Kay, 2011: 74). During this period, not only do purposive or strategic policy 
entrepreneurs construct policy problems and “sell” solutions to them, but 
policymakers can, for their part, “select the ideas appropriate for the policy window” 
(Ackrill and Kay, 2011: 78).  Both activities are, in fact, entrepreneurial (ibid).  Policy 
windows open for both predictable reasons and unforeseen events, such as attention-
focusing crises akin to the 9/11 terrorist attacks or food safety failures (Princen, 2011: 
118; Pollack and Shaffer, 2010). They may also be the products of political 
developments such as a change in government or bureaucratic administration, and 
thus in attendant policy priorities. The so-called policy entrepreneurs or frame 
entrepreneurs are able to recognise open windows of opportunity and exploit them to 
affect policy outcomes (Rhinard, 2010:40). Although Kingdon does not foresee a role 
for policy entrepreneurs in opening the policy windows directly, other scholars have 
argued that they may actually do so (Corbett, 2005). Therefore, a consideration of all 
of these dynamics leads to the hypothesis which states that: 
H2: The European Commission has secured member states’ agreement to an 
unprecedented measure of defence procurement integration through successful 
policy entrepreneurship.  
 
 Empir ical  Jus t i f ica t ion 
 
As emphasised above, defence procurement comprises industrial, economic, and 
technological aspects, which are characterised by a considerable degree of 
supranational institutionalisation within the European Union. In particular, the 
completion of the internal market through the SEA and ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Treaty on European Union, or TEU) by the end of 1993 were crucial in 
allowing the European Commission to gain a policy foothold in the hitherto taboo 
sphere of defence. The internal market established the free movement of persons, 
goods and services within the Union, while the TEU enshrined this principle in Treaty 
Law and endowed the European Commission with enforcement powers to ensure its 
implementation (Graves, 2000: 18-19). The Commission’s position was reinforced as 
it solidified its competence as regulator of dual-use military goods and services, 
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corporate mergers, and R&D, allowing it to claim a role in defence procurement 
regulation (Cornish, 1995: 55-57). The increasing importance of dual-use 
technologies, such as electronics, optics and IT in defence equipment have provided 
further justification for supranational inroads into this field.  
Aided by these developments, the  European Commission,  with the help of the EP 
and the ECJ,  may have taken defence procurement harmonisation forward through 
critical junctures independently of member state initiatives. Thus, the 2002 European 
Parliament request for a new defence industrial proposal from the Commission was 
followed in 2003 by a Commission Communication entitled Defence-Industrial and 
Market Issues- Towards and EU Equipment Policy. In this document, the 
Commission first set out its argument for a Community role in defence procurement, 
and outlined seven areas where it envisaged further initiatives (European 
Commission, 2003). The following year, in 2004, it launched an official consultation 
process with stakeholders, seeking to engage national defence ministries, industry and 
experts (European Commission, 2004). The results of the consultation were 
summarised in a 2005 Communication (European Commission, 2005).  Following the 
2006 publication of the Interpretive Communication emphasising a strict 
interpretation of Article 346 announced in the Green Paper, the Commission issued its 
Proposal for a Defence Procurement Directive a year later (European Commission, 
2006b, 2007b). Ensconced in the 2007 Defence Package, it was accompanied by two 
other initiatives: a largely procedural Directive on Intra-EU Defence Transfers and A 
Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry. With 
negotiations concluded by the end of 2008, the Defence Procurement Directive was 
approved by the European Parliament at first reading in January 2009, and adopted by 
the Council of the EU in July 2009.  
Similarly, the Internal Market Committee of the European Parliament has long 
advocated the injection of Single Market measures into the defence trade, authoring 
the report which was the basis of the Parliament’s vote in favour of the Directive. The 
Parliamentary Security and Defence Committee has also consistently called for 
rationalised defence procurement to support the EU’s military aspirations and 
growing international security role. Finally, the ECJ has castigated member states for 
blatant abuse of Article 346 in two unprecedented rulings, Commission v. Spain and, 
more significantly, Commission v. Italy (see Chapter I).  As described in the literature 
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review section presented above, the Commission may have relied heavily on these 
cases in its justification of Community instruments’ application to defence 
procurement in the official documentation listed above (Hoeffler, 2012; Blauberger 
and Weiss, 2013).  
Considering the obscurity into which the previous defence procurement initiatives of 
the European Commission and European Parliament descended, the  apparently 
steady progress towards the Directive, from a tentative proposal to its adoption by the 
Council, suggests purposeful manoeuvring on the part of EU’s supranational actors 
pressing for defence procurement integration (Cram, 1993). In particular, throughout 
the preparation stages, the Commission seems to have forged alliances with dominant 
industrial players to raise support for its involvement in the defence market, in order 
to overcome resistance from member states (Mawdsley, 2008: 380). The language of 
the policy documents reviewed above is also indicative of a certain issue urgency in 
the Commission’s perception.  For instance in the 2003 Communication, the 
fragmentation of the EU’s defence market is portrayed as harmful to the entire 
European project as well as detrimental to EU defence industry (Georgopolous, 2006: 
214). The Interpretive Communication of 2006 has also been viewed by legal scholars 
as the Commission’s “declaration of intent” to break from the unqualified use of the 
Article 346 derogation (Koutrakos, 2011). At each stage in the process described 
above, there would have been stakeholders – from member state governments, 
industry, and other EU institutions— for the Commission to “convince and convert.” 
Indeed, the UK and France initially opposed the proposed Directive, while the rest of 
the member states appeared at most unenthusiastic (Heuninckx, 2008b: 21). 
Opposition to the Commission’s involvement in any future arms market existed 
within member states as well, namely in the military and civil service (Trybus, 
2006:675).  Evidencing such cleavages will be a crucial component of substantiating 
this hypothesis. 
However, the role and impact of the Commission, while bolstered by Treaty 
arrangements, nevertheless remains firmly circumscribed in the field of defence trade 
and production. Thus, the Commission’s intent of including collaborative 
procurement in the scope of the Directive was rejected by member states, ensuring the 
exemption of major weapons systems from its remit. Moreover, although the 
Interpretive Communication implies confidence on the part of the Commission that its 
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view of Article 346 would be up held by the ECJ, the Court’s role in defence and 
security matters has been rather scant throughout the Directive’s negotiation process, 
even if this does appear to be changing in recent years (Georgopolous, 2005; Chapter 
VI).  
Thus, while one may trace Commission activity back to the mid-1990s, explanatory 
power would only be sufficient if its nature and independence from member states’, 
industrial, and intergovernmental organisations’ preferences could be identified 
(Moerth, 2003). Although such an undertaking is challenging, meticulous process 
tracing could demonstrate the primacy of supranational actors vis-à-vis the member 
states in bringing about EU defence procurement institutionalisation.  This involves 
deciphering policy entrepreneurship techniques described above within the 
Commission’s behavior, while examining national reactions to them and 
incorporating the dynamics generated by the Code of Conduct at each stage of the 
process that culminated in the Defence Procurement Directive. If decisive influence 
did indeed stem from the European Commission, one would also expect to see the 
resolution of any conflicts regarding the substance of its initiatives in a manner 
favourable to supranational preferences. Interaction with the EDA, where 
intergovernmental logics appear to reign supreme, will be used as a further indicator 
of supranational influence, while the possibility of forming coalitions with particular 
member states and defence firms is explored as its additional mode. Finally, it is 
important to specify why it is that the member states do not or cannot re-assert 
control, particularly in an area as sensitive as defence procurement (Moe, 1990; 
Kassim and Menon, 2003: 130). In fact, one national representative to the Council of 
Ministers recalled France and the UK being very influential in “guiding the 
Commission onto the ‘right path’” and making sure that “their” language was inserted 
into the final text of the Directive (Interview 3, 15 December, Member State 
Permanent Representation). 
 
 
Dominant Member States’ Defence Capability Improvement Goals in the EU Defence 
and Security Context 
   
As has been made clear in the beginning of this chapter, academic literature and 
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primary-source documentation cite the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) as a central factor in the emergence of EDEM—indeed, as a necessary 
underpinning of a credible security and defence policy. However, specific causal 
linkages between the two developments, which a robust explanation would require, 
have not explored systematically in this material (Wivel, 2005; Biscop, Giegerich, 
Howorth, 2009; Britz, 2010). Indeed, given its direct connection to power projection 
and defence policy, it would make sense that defence procurement institutionalisation 
would grow out of the EU’s development as a security actor. Therefore, the third and 
final hypothesis stems from the claim that states’ security concerns constitute the 
drivers of integration, particularly in the field as central to sovereignty and power 
projection as defence procurement.  
 
Theoretical Context 
In an inter-state context, even a highly institutionalised one like the EU, authority 
constructions “cannot dominate power asymmetries” (Krasner 1995-1996: 148). For 
this reason, when it comes to the EU defence and security field, realist and 
intergovernmentalist traditions in particular contend that "cooperation has been—and 
will likely continue to be—intergovernmental rather than supranational for the 
foreseeable future. Major EU foreign policy and defence decisions have been and will 
continue to be made in European capitals rather than in Brussels” (Jones, 2007:11). 
Viewed by structural realists as a product of a “unipolar world and a multipolar 
Europe,” EU’s security and defence cooperation in their telling of it has been and will 
also continue to be driven by the “Big Three” arms producing member states (Hyde-
Price, 2012: 34). For instance, several realist approaches to the evolution of the EU’s 
security and defence dimension have insisted that this enterprise has been steered by 
France and Britain as the EU’s two dominant states, which have converging interests 
in propping up CSDP as a tool for generating more robust crisis management 
capabilities (Art, 2005-2006; Jones, 2007). Thus, the balance that Germany, France, 
and the UK strike between their “sovereign rights” and the “needs” of CSDP will 
drive the development of the EU as a defence and security actor (ibid).  
Classical realism, however, views this phenomenon as a “negotiated and unfolding 
community of power” imbued with historically-derived meaning (Rynning, 2011: 32). 
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Further development of an EU defence and security policy—its institutionalisation—
is a product of  “restrained behaviour on the part of important states,” which realise 
that they would be worse off outside of the EU framework (Rynning, 2011: 32). In yet 
another modification, the neoclassical realist school of thought contends that, whereas 
CSDP arose from (structural) power dynamics, namely the ascendance European 
“poles” alongside the United States, it is shaped by the decisions of the various 
policymakers and institutions of Europe, which are in turn acting on the basis of their 
own complex histories, ambitions, and objectives (Rynning, 2011:33). Thus, such 
intervening variables as culture, ideology and nationalism, enable policy leaders to 
generate state power in pursuit of foreign and security policy goals (Dyson, 2010: 
123-124). Taking these arguments into account, one might therefore hypothesise that: 
H3: The development of the EU security and defence dimension has generated an 
interest in a common defence procurement framework on the part of the dominant 
arms producing member states, which then ensured the cooperation of other 
governments. 
 
 Empirical Justification 
 
The third and final hypothesis begins with the argument that the development of the 
EU’s military and security dimension has generated both the vital rationale for 
defence procurement harmonisation and a regularised intergovernmental decision-
making forum in which it could be formulated. The development of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the establishment of the EDA itself, and the 
publication of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 comprised the core of 
this process, bringing the notion of common EU security objectives into the Union’s 
structure, providing a systematised policy-making capacity in the field of defence, and 
focusing political attention on the need for an EU defence market. An institutionalised 
defence and security dimension has facilitated formal cooperation between previously 
non-intersecting actors and placed the potential and possibility of an integrated 
defence equipment market onto their agenda. Such high-level political leadership in 
foreign, security, and particularly defence matters was absent during previous 
attempts to harmonise defence procurement, and its absence has been highlighted by 
scholars as a fundamental reason for their failure (Moerth, 2003: 98-99; Guay, 1998: 
	   82	  
64). Moreover, the increased imperative to “buy American” defence equipment in the 
absence of competitive European alternatives would result in the EU’s dependence on 
US industry for advanced military technology, with “the risk that it would flow only 
one way: from Europe to the United States” (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006:113). After 
all, the reality is that American equipment comes with American restrictions and 
specifications on its use. 
 
In addition, the operational maturation of CSDP and concerted EU action in the 
context of NATO, as well as bilateral and multi-lateral military cooperation amongst 
member states, has generated pressure on EU governments to provide capabilities for 
the growing number of military missions in a sustainable manner. This necessitated 
not only autonomous armaments production but also an efficient defence equipment 
market. The increasing number of operations has also raised the imperative of 
interoperability, which requires equipping member states’ armed forces that 
participate in the missions with easily compatible equipment in a cost-effective 
manner (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006:114-115). Harmonisation of EU-level defence 
trade rules and creation of structures governing armaments market policies have 
therefore become increasingly critical to EU’s effectiveness as a security actor. In 
addition, the crux of the argument advanced here, and indeed the pressures, concerns 
and opportunities outlined above, pertain to the role of the three dominant arms-
producing member states. Specifically, the third hypothesis assumes that defence  
procurement institutionalisation is a product of the EU’s development as a defence 
and security actor, and as such is driven by the interests and policy objectives of the 
UK, France, and, to a lesser extent, Germany (Table	  2 and Figure 2, below). Using 
their dominance in this regard, the Big Three are able to secure the acquiescence of 
the other member states. Their influence within the EU’s security architecture stems 
from the dominant size of their militaries, defence budgets, arms production, military 
capabilities and contributions to EU operations. As such, Britain, France and 
Germany would also have the most to gain from a competitive defence industrial base 
to ease the burden and improve the effectiveness of these contributions. After all, 
defence equipment demand within the EU is shaped by the operational requirements 
of these states. As “owners” of the EU’s largest defence firms and able to deploy most 
significant military missions, they would also have much to lose from the transatlantic 
technological gap potentially leaving them dependent on American equipment for 
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their military operations. 
	   
Reproduced from Neuman, 113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Reproduced from European Commission, 2007 
 
 
 
Table	  2	  Arms	  Deliveries	  to	  the	  World,	  1996-­‐2006:	  Leading	  Suppliers	  Compared	  (in	  millions	  of	  constant	  2006	  US	  dollars)	  
Figure	  1	  Defence	  Procurement	  Expenditure 
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In contrast, smaller states with second-tier uncompetitive or commercially 
unattractive defence industrial capacities, which they maintain to ensure a measure of 
national autonomy and domestic employment, may struggle in the EDA’s vision of a 
competitiveness-driven EU-wide defence technological and industrial base 
(Mawdsley, 2008: 379). Therefore, this hypothesis argues that the EU’s dominant 
states would have seen value in the Code of Conduct and Defence Procurement 
Directive. In other words, it is the largest states that have shaped the defence market 
activity of the EDA, advanced procurement-related proposals in CSDP bodies, and 
once the Commission’s defence industrial agenda solidified, made sure that it was in 
line with their objectives. In particular, when the French then minister of defence 
heralded the creation of the EDA as Europe’s opportunity to “take control of its own 
destiny,” she was expressing traditional French Gaullist-inspired desire for European 
autonomy with France at its helm (Alliot-Marie, 2005; Guay, 1998:75). Since the 
French Council Presidency of 2008 also made EU defence and security policy, 
including defence procurement, a priority of its term, inquiry generated by this 
hypothesis will also need to pay particular attention to the influence exerted by this 
member state. 
 
 The EDA itself constitutes an outcome of the EU’s development as a security and 
defence actor, and as such forms a crucial component of the substantiation of this 
hypothesis. Initially discussed in the context of the un-ratified draft EU Constitutional 
Treaty, the proposed Agency was speedily divorced from that process and advanced 
separately within the Council and with notable support from British and French 
governments (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006:111). Successive European Council 
Presidencies have also invested in its role as an actor tasked with steering EU 
governments towards generating credible capabilities in support of CSDP and finding 
European, rather than national, solutions to capability shortfalls. Under this defence 
and security banner, the substance of EDA’s mandate is in large part industrial –  that 
is, strengthening the defence industrial and technological base and promoting  
research and development and research and technology investment (Hoeffler, 2012: 
442). Thus, the Agency’s Long Term Vision report, a sort of forward-looking 
declaration of intent, stresses that any European Defence Technological and Industrial 
Base (EDTIB) must provide “what our armed forces actually require and what export 
customers may be interested to buy,” meaning that such a defence industrial base can 
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only be EU-wide in character, rather than a collection of national frameworks.  A 
paramount purpose of the Agency’s work has also been to present the EDTIB as 
critical to “dependable supply of the European Armed Forces’ needs even in times of 
conflict,” as well as for “appropriate national sovereignty and EU autonomy (EDA, 
2006b). A competitive defence equipment market is a central component of this 
vision, as is a corresponding “reduction of reliance on non-European sources, (i.e. 
USA)” (EDA, 2006b). In this context, the EDA has brought member states’ defence 
ministers, armaments directors, the Council, Commission, and industry under one 
institutional roof and focused their minds on defence industrial objectives. The EDA 
may thus have been critical in endowing the EU with the fundament of an armaments 
policy. In particular, Agency’s policy-making activity and cooperative dynamics 
generated by its Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement may have paradoxically 
made it logical for member states to agree to the Defence Procurement Directive 
through a type of functional cross-fertilisation.  
 
If this hypothesis were to provide the most potent explanation of EDEM 
institutionalisation, one would expect to see the EU’s defence and security 
“infrastructure,” such as the EDA, EU Military Staff (EUMS), and EU Military 
Committee (EUMC) used as decision-making forums and deliberation loci for EDEM 
matters. Similarly, CSDP capability generation processes and multinational military 
deployments would likely feature prominently in arguments for defence procurement 
harmonisation measures. For instance, framing CSDP deficiencies in terms of defence 
procurement inefficiency and capability duplication constitutes one useful indicator in 
this regard. Furthermore, it must be demonstrated that national policy-makers not only 
consistently articulated “defence and security” justifications during such deliberation 
processes, but also shaped them so as to address these concerns. In addition, linkages 
between the EDA setting and the Community defence procurement policy-making 
process must be specified in detail. Distinguishing between the causal influence of 
member states and intergovernmental organisations as well as among the “large” and 
“small” member states will be crucial for testing this hypothesis. Finally, verification 
will require detailed examination of member states’ threat perception and policy 
objectives in this realm. 
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The	  Policy	  Cycle	  Framework	  as	  Ordering	  Mechanism	  
 
In Smith’s stage-based conceptualisation of institutionalisation employed by this 
thesis, the “clearest expression of institutional ends-means relationship is that of a 
policy process“ (Smith, 2004: 39).   In this framework, the policy process, also known 
as the policymaking process, functions primarily as an analytical device which is 
operationalised heuristically as a policy cycle (John, 1998: 23-27, 36;Young, 2010).  
Its increasing use as an analytical tool in IR, comparative politics, and studies of EU 
integration reflects the growing incorporation of “central concerns of policymaking” 
into these disciplines (Hurrell and Menon: 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Richardson, 
2006). In particular, examinations of “increasing institutionalisation of international 
cooperation,” and the role played by non-state actors within it, necessitate an 
understanding of the utility, desirability, form and substance of cooperation, as well as 
the actors its development would empower (Young, 2010: 48). 
 The policy cycle consists of successive stages of policymaking, which have been 
categorised as agenda-setting, as a result of which a particular issues come onto the 
political agenda, agenda shaping (or policy formulation), whereby a specific proposal 
for action emerges and alternatives are discarded, decision-making, or the actual 
agreement on a particular policy option, and policy implementation.  Policy cycles 
also include stages dedicated to policy evaluation and feedback of lessons learned, 
while some models feature additional “oversight or accountability” steps (Young, 
2010; Smith, 2004).  To return to Smith’s framework, once the policymaking process 
“reaches” the latter implementation or monitoring stages, it may “be also conceived as 
a system of governance” (2004: 39).  
The policy cycle has received its fair share of critique, with one line of contention 
pointing out that its stages need not be successive, but may occur simultaneously, as, 
for instance, a policy may be formulated before the political agenda is set  (Kingdon, 
2003: 205-206). Other scholars have taken issue with the policy cycle’s dismissal of 
the “reality” in which there are “multiple, asynchronous policy cycles” interacting and 
“operating at different levels of governance” (Young, 2010: 47; Richardson, 2006: 
24).  The study undertaken here employs the policy cycle model despite such 
disadvantages because it treats it as a “descriptive heuristic device to help organise a 
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historical policy narrative,” and specifically, the institutionalisation of the European 
Defence Equipment Market (Ackrill and Kay, 2011: 72). This means that it is not 
used as means to identify causality driving EDEM institutionalisation, but rather as a 
tool to organise and present the explanation for it.  The structure provided by the 
policy cycle is helpful in ordering the respective influence exerted by each set of 
actors identified through the hypotheses presented above.   
In particular, it is useful not only in light of the inherent complexity of EU 
policymaking, with its fluid institutional structures and its multiple levels of 
governance, but especially considering the “status” of the defence procurement 
domain “as an interface between industrial, technological, …defence” and security 
policies (Young, 2010: 46; Mawdsley, 2008: 368). This intricacy translates into multi-
layered interactions between the process and actors characterising each of the three 
hypotheses advanced in this thesis, and means that attempting to identify the “most 
important” amongst them in bringing about the approval of the Defence Procurement 
Directive would amount to unfortunate over-simplification. Elucidating the most 
influential set of actors—whether the transnational defence firms, the European 
Commission, or the dominant arms producing member states—at different stages of 
the policy process would, however, do justice to the empirical richness of the defence 
procurement issue area, and may be achieved with the help of the policy cycle 
heuristic.  Keeping in line with the research question posed by this thesis—namely, 
why have member states made the more costly move toward binding regulation in the 
shape of the Directive, having already enacted a soft cooperation mechanism 
represented by the Code?—only the first three stages of the policymaking process will 
be utilised here. Consequently, this investigation seeks to trace the process that led to 
member states’ acceptance of supranational regulation in defence procurement, rather 
than to understand its effectiveness and further evolution. Although the development 
of the defence industrial policy area in the EU following the adoption of the Defence 
Procurement Directive will be briefly taken up in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, it is not the primary concern of the analysis undertaken here.  
The first stage of the policy cycle is identified in the literature as agenda-setting.  It is 
during this stage that “struggles” between the various actors concerned with or 
interested in a particular issue area take place (Princen, 2009: 3-4). As a result of 
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“deciding what to decide” in this uncertain environment, a given set of issues attracts 
“serious consideration in a political system” (Young, 2010: 52; Princen, 2009: 19; 
Kingdon, 2003: 3).  A policy agenda may be considered as “set” once it has captured 
the attention of formal organisations and individual policymakers in the (emerging) 
policy regime (Page, 2006: 16; Princen, 2009: 20-21).  Several scholars have argued 
that the likelihood of an issue attracting political attention is partly a function of its 
inherent characteristics, such as (an increase in) the “severity of the problem,” or may 
stem from its “emotional appeal”  (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 26; Page, 2006: 216). 
However, such aspects of issues by no means guarantee their advancement “higher 
up” the political agenda and, indeed, must usually be presented or “framed” in a 
politically resonant manner by policy entrepreneurs in order to achieve this objective 
(Tallberg, 2003: 5; Kingdon, 2003: 204-205).  
The second stage of the cycle heuristic has been subjected to a number of terms, the 
most widespread of which are policy formulation, agenda shaping, and alternative-
specification (Young, 2010: 53; Tallberg, 2003; Stephenson, 2010: 1040; Barzelay 
and Gallego, 2006: 539). This analytical category aims to encapsulate the period 
during which “specific proposals for action” are advanced and policy alternatives are 
narrowed and discarded. It involves the “emphasising and de-emphasising” of 
existing issues on the policy agenda as well as the explicit “barring” of them from it 
(Tallberg, 2003: 5). At this time, policy entrepreneurs may engage in “mediating and 
brokering” in order to resolve issue conflicts and “establish cooperative relationships 
(Stephenson, 2010: 1046). Considering the complexity and “fluidity” of the EU 
policymaking process, the agenda shaping stage is “relatively open,” involving a 
number of actors drawn from within member states, transnational networks, and the 
EU’s supranational organisations and intergovernmental bodies (Richardson, 2000: 
1013). Nevertheless, in fields where it possesses the “sole right of initiative,” the 
Commission constitutes the “pivotal actor” during the policy formulation stage, 
allowing it to have an impact on decision-making as well, despite its relatively limited 
formal powers (Young, 2010: 55).  It may be said, then, that although the policy 
entrepreneur is typically associated with the agenda-setting stage, it remains “active” 
during periods of policy formulation and, as will be demonstrated below, is able to 
influence decision-making.  
As its name indicates, the decision-making policy stage features actors selecting a 
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particular course of action and includes the (micro)process by which this occurs. This 
would entail veto players’ acquiescence to the outcome, and, usually, its formalisation 
in an agreement, treaty, or legislation. One mode of decision-making in the EU policy 
context concerns the delegation of responsibility to the European Commission, and is 
rooted in principal-agent analyses of decision-making authority delegation to 
executive bodies. For instance, this is the case when specialised agencies such as the 
European Food Safety Authority or European Medicines Evaluation Authority 
provide expert advice to the Commission, which then takes formal decisions. 
Analyses focus on the factors driving the delegation process—whether it is efficiency 
or normative notions of appropriateness—as well as the dynamics characterising it. It 
is during the decision-making stage that the interaction between the principle and 
agent acquires particular analytical importance. In situations when the Commission 
has been delegated (a degree of) decision-making authority, it is important to remain 
attentive to the freedoms and constraints granted to it by the “principals’ preferences.” 
Consequently, the member states’ ability to sanction or, alternatively, promote, the 
actions of the agent is a key characteristic of the decision-making policy stage 
(Pollack, 2003).  
Decision-making in the context of an EU policy cycle also involves “decision-taking” 
in the Council of the European Union. Under the qualified majority voting (QMV) 
procedure, the bargaining power of various member states becomes an important 
feature of the decision-making stage, helping answer questions such as, when are 
national delegations likely to be in the winning majority and how do their preferences 
on the one hand and voting weight on the other impact that?  However, Council 
decision-making often operates by consensus amongst officials, rather than through 
voting by ministers, so that even instances of QMV tend to be underpinned by 
consensual dynamics (Haege, 2008).  Therefore, bargaining models, as developed in 
studies of inter-state negotiations, have been applied to Council decision-taking in 
order to elucidate the process by which agreement is reached – be it through exiting 
the decision-making trap with side payments and package deals, or via deliberation 
and arguing (Pollack, 2010). A key characteristic in this setting is also the impact of 
the Council Presidency, and, ultimately, the member state holding it. As will be 
explained more fully below, the ability of the Council Presidency to shape the 
decision-making agenda and “exploit superior information about the positions of 
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other member states,” may allow it to influence the outcome in accordance with the 
preferences of “its” member state (Tallberg, 2006;  R. Thomson, 2008).  It should be 
noted at this point that this more narrow “decision agenda” is not to be conflated with 
the broader policy agenda of the agenda-setting stage (Kingdon, 2003: 4). The former 
comprises issues that are “up for active decision-making,” while the latter refers, as 
explained above, to a set of issues that are “discussed by policymakers” (Princen, 
2009: 22).  
While, as an agency of the Council in the defence and security policy area, the EDA 
and its policy outcomes fall under “sole” decision-making by the Council, the 
Defence Procurement Directive has been subjected to the co-decision procedure 
shared between the Council and European Parliament. This process, crucially, also 
involves the European Commission (Wallace, 2010). In fact, as Ackrill and Kay 
argue, the role of policy entrepreneurs may extend well beyond that of “selling ideas 
to decision-makes,” so that these actors could also be “involved directly in decision-
making” (Ackrill and Kay, 2011: 74). Thus, policy entrepreneurs may be 
policymakers at the same time (Ackrill and Kay, 2011: 78). Reaching agreement in 
the co-decision context, therefore, entails repeated and complex interactions between 
these organisations and actors within them.  
It was already acknowledged above that the conceptual boundaries between the policy 
cycle stages tend to be vague and arbitrary “in reality.”  The same may be said of the 
chronological distinctions between the successive policymaking periods. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of organising the “historical policy narrative” 
presented here and stemming from the characterisation described above, each stage 
within the policy cycle  has been taken to correspond in subsequent chapters to a 
particular chronologically delineated period within the Defence Procurement 
Directive’s policy “path.”  Thus, following the publication of the Communication 
Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy by the European Commission in 2003, it 
may safely be said that the issue of EU defence market fragmentation has captured the 
attention of policy makers and thus fulfilled the chief condition of the agenda-setting 
policy stage. As a consequence, the agenda-setting period “ends” with this landmark.  
Policy formulation, or agenda-shaping, is primarily characterised by discriminating 
between and discarding policy alternatives, so that one concrete policy proposal is 
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produced. Therefore, the following three chapters will treat the agenda-shaping stage 
as the period beginning approximately at the start of 2004.  From this time, 
stakeholder consultations on potential community involvement in defence 
procurement were carried out as well as alternative, intergovernmental modes of 
organising this field proposed—in the face of the EDA’s Code of Conduct—and 
ultimately discarded. This stage, then, “concludes” with the formulation of a specific 
policy proposal in the guise of the draft Directive on Defence Procurement submitted 
to Council by the European Commission in December 2007. This leads to the 
decision-making stage during which the provisions of legislative proposal were 
discussed and negotiated under the co-decision procedure, before the resulting 
legislation was submitted for Council approval at the very end of 2008 and adopted 
by Parliament in early January 2009.  
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CHAPTER III: EU’S 
TRANSNATIONAL DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY LOBBY AND THE 
“SINGLE MARKET OF DEFENCE” 
Introduction	  	  	  
Chapter I explained that the first decade of the 21st century witnessed significant 
changes in the nature of the EU’s defence industrial environment. In particular, the 
fundamentally altered systemic context precipitated by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and its sphere of influence has spurned reforms within the defence and security 
structures of the United States and its European Allies. In addition to strategic re-
alignment, such restructuring revolved around steadily decreasing defence budgets on 
both sides of the Atlantic (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 below). For the supply side of the 
armaments production equation, that is, defence industry, this meant shifting and 
dwindling demand for its equipment.  In the United States, the response was rapid and 
radical consolidation around just a handful of defence industrial behemoths.  
European merger activity, however, proceeded at a significantly slower pace and 
within national frameworks, remaining incomplete and uneven across the naval, 
aerospace, land, and electronics sectors. The result was a “loose coalition” of defence 
markets within the EU, encumbered by high degrees of state control, protectionism, 
and duplication, sustained by a patchwork of member states’ fragmented regulatory 
and bureaucratic regimes. Nevertheless, defence industrial consolidation in the EU 
has resulted in the emergence of four dominant defence firms—BAE Systems, EADS, 
Thales, and Finmeccanica (Schmitt, 2002). These primary suppliers—primes— 
shared characteristics such as production across the defence and security sectors, 
transnational structures encompassing a number of national markets, and designs on 
ever-bigger slices of the international defence sales pie – namely, strong interests in 
exporting their products outside of the relatively defence investment-poor European 
Union (Struys, 2004: 554). 
 
	   93	  
 Reproduced from IISS Military Balance, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reproduced from European Commission, 2007: 67 
Considering these developments, as well as the role of transnational industrial interest 
groups in bringing about the extension of Internal Market regime to hitherto “closed” 
or “protected” policy fields, it was hypothesised in Chapter II that: 
Figure	  2	  NATO	  ex-­‐US	  Defence	  Expenditure	  as	  %	  of	  GDP 
Figure	  3	  Total	  Defence	  Expenditure	  as	  %	  of	  GDP 
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Transnational defence firms and industry associations, created by industrial 
consolidation within the EU, have lobbied member state governments to agree to 
harmonisation measures.  
 
The objective of this chapter shall be to present and evaluate the evidence that exists 
in support of this claim. This will be carried out within the policy cycle framework 
elaborated in Chapter II, comprised of the agenda-setting, agenda-shaping, and 
decision-making stages. Substantively, this chapter proceeds by first elaborating upon 
levels of complexity within the “defence industrial” hypothesis centred around two 
aspects – the differing interests of large, transnational defence industrial firms and 
smaller, nationally based companies. Another crucial aspect that will be examined is 
the relationship between the primes and the governments within which they are 
headquartered, as an expression of the linkage between armaments manufactures and 
nation-states more generally. The chapter will then provide a detailed examination of 
the defence industrial environment within the EU, taking demand and supply factors 
in turn. This task will also further clarify the rationale for the hypothesis advanced 
above.  
By the time the European Commission released its 2003 Communication Towards an 
EU Defence Equipment Policy outlining potential community initiatives in the 
defence industrial sphere, EU defence industry was suffering from a serious 
“competitiveness deficit.” The lack of harmonised Union-wide equipment 
requirements and procurement standards has prevented the emergence of a cross-
border single market, forcing companies to position themselves towards a large 
number of differing national demands. This, in turn, left industry with small 
production volumes and thus large costs, stunting economies of scale, learning, and 
scope (Hartley, 2006:478). Furthermore, differing procurement structures and 
requirements deny EU defence firms the certainty needed for the long-term planning 
that is essential to innovation, alliance building, and R&D investment which lie the 
heart of profitable defence “business”  (James, 2005: 9).  Finally, EU governments 
continued to support industrial overcapacity, primarily in land and naval sectors, and 
enact protectionist policies, as a result of both concrete, short-term industrial policy 
reasons and more nebulous but equally powerful perceptions of national sovereignty 
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(Chapter I; Neuman, 2010:122).  These constraints were also frustrating EU 
industries’ efforts to secure opportunities in the international defence market, where 
their higher costs and lagging innovation helped their American rivals repeatedly out-
compete them (Hartley, 2003: 347-348; The Economist, 2003; Citi, 2014: 144). 
Opening up the protected markets of EU member states through open competition 
requirements and legal harmonisation would allow the EU’s defence giants to 
increase their demand within the European Union considerably. This would result in 
higher production runs, and thus lower unit costs, including R&D unit costs, leading 
to gains from economies of scale and learning (Chapter II). In the end, EU defence 
primes would be more competitive in export markets as well, able to sell their 
sophisticated defence equipment more cheaply beyond the EU. Consequently, primes 
such as BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales, would reap considerable 
benefits from greater market openness that an institutionalised European Defence 
Equipment Market (EDEM) could bring.  
 
Prime Contractors vs. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
As mentioned above, a distinction must be drawn between the interests of the EU’s 
transnational primary defence contractors, or primes, and the smaller, second-tier 
firms, “producing or assembling parts, components, and sub-systems into final 
military goods” (Struys, 2004: 556). Headquartered in the four member states with the 
highest defence spending—the UK, France, Germany, and Italy—the primes have 
developed extensive supply chains which required decades to establish due to the 
prohibitively high entry barriers in defence. 24 These networks include “second-tier 
suppliers” that are active across multiple jurisdictions within the EU. A number of 
such small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have traditionally relied on varying 
degrees of support and protection from national governments concerned with 
domestic industrial policy objectives such as maintaining employment, and, in the 
case of member states like Greece or Poland, staking their notions of security of 
(military equipment) supply on the survival of national defence industry (Interview 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  headquarters	  of	  BAE	  Systems	  is	  in	  London,	  that	  of	  Thales	  in	  Paris,	  while	  Finmeccanica	  is	  based	  in	  Rome,	  
and	  prior	  to	  its	  reorganisation	  as	  Airbus	  Group	  and	  HQ	  transfer	  to	  Blagnac,	  EADS	  was	  jointly	  headquartered	  in	  
Paris	  and	  Munich.	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26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry).   
 Shielding by governments was in large part made possible by the steady stream of 
national orders flowing from their governments’ widespread invocation of Article 346 
of the Lisbon Treaty, even though economically-speaking, many of the beneficiaries 
may not have been “worthwhile to sustain, to protect, or to convert” (Struys, 2004: 
561). However, the defence technological and industrial bases (DTIBs) of smaller 
member states comprise not only such proverbial “Portuguese SMEs that [could] 
never be part of Thales’ supply chain” in conditions of open competition, but also 
highly-specialised, high-technology firms, which, as a result may also be “vulnerable 
to fluctuations in military demand” (Struys, 2004: 556; Interview 26, 3 April, 
Industry). Furthermore, there are a number of “competitive” SMEs which despite 
“having zero customers at the European level,” nevertheless receive “many [orders] 
outside of Europe” (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State).  
When one speaks of “European defence industry”, therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between the varied, at times divergent, interests and cacophonous voices 
encompassed within this term (Interview 20, 5 March 2014, Industry). It is true that 
the key differentiating line may be drawn between the transnational prime contractors 
considered here and second-tier and third-tier SMEs further down the supply chain. 
The former would benefit from greater defence market openness and integration in 
the EU, while many of the latter rely on either entrenched relationships to prime 
contractors or state protection via offsets, subsidies, or guaranteed purchasing by 
home governments, making them fearful of potential supply-chain disruption and 
unfettered forces of competition. Yet, the full picture of defence industrial interests is 
both more nuanced and, in some ways, more simple. As one senior executive with an 
EU legislation portfolio at a transnational defence firm phrased it, although the 
“general view” within industry was that “market access and market openness are the 
right things to do,” firms also feared that “the balance of advantage would not be in 
their favour” in the new, more competitive conditions (Interview 8, 28 August 2013, 
Industry). The transnational companies with large cross-border order books would be 
likely to benefit from a situation where Article 346 is no longer used by governments 
to keep them out of export markets in favour of domestic suppliers. At the same time, 
the chances of the Treaty exemption being used “against” them— that is a scenario 
where “their” national government awards a defence contract to a competitor from 
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another member state rather than invoking Article 346— are comparatively lower. 
After all, even if the Treaty-based exemption may be a bothersome feature of doing 
business when it prevents firms from winning contracts, it is at the same time a 
historical source of support accorded to industry by governments and a key 
expression of the customer-supplier relationship.  
As a result, defence company executives based their attitudes towards a European 
defence equipment market on a calculation of whether the market-access benefits of a 
restricted use of Article 346 would outweigh the potential damage to their bottom line 
inflicted by diminished state support. These “balance of advantage” judgements are 
inherently subjective and variable, and as such, have resulted in inconsistent and 
somewhat contradictory positions within EU defence industry regarding the 
desirability of a single defence equipment market, particularly one with a 
supranational core. The elements of variability and inconsistency within industry’s 
interests would also shape the nature of EU defence firms’ influence upon the EDEM 
process and, as will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, are key to 
understanding this process. 
 
The Big Member States and “Their” Transnational Defence Firms 
Another layer of complexity in need of consideration is the “complex” relationship 
between the EU’s transnational defence primes and the member state governments in 
which they are headquartered (Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). As mentioned above, the status of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and, to a lesser extent, Italy as the four largest “defence spenders” in the EU is 
intertwined with the historical “national champion-like” status of their major defence 
industries, which contributed to the strong political ties between today’s BAE 
Systems, Thales, EADS, and Finmeccanica to their “home” ministries of defence. 
There are three reasons why understanding this interaction is not only essential for a 
comprehensive verification of the “industrial” hypothesis examined in this chapter, 
but is also crucial for the validity of this thesis as a whole. Firstly, it will help map out 
the “distance” between the preferences of member states and transnational defence 
firms. This will in turn enable an assessment of the relative success of defence firms’ 
lobbying efforts, which entails skilful nudging and convincing of decision-makers by 
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private actors to adopt policies that are beneficial to them (Coen and Richardson, 
2009).  Thus, a grasp the initial disposition of the policymakers—whether broadly 
sympathetic, disinterested, or hostile—is essential as it shapes the strategies and 
effectiveness of transnational interest groups (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry). 
Second, appreciating the nuanced relationship between the EU’s primes, that is, BAE 
Systems, EADS, Thales and Finmeccanica, and their “home” governments is key to 
understanding the relative importance the former accorded to national channels versus 
EU institutions as “lobbying targets” in the pursuit of a European defence equipment 
market. Finally, understanding this connection will provide insights into the nature of 
the balance between the oft-cited “internationalisation” or “denationalisation” of 
defence industry on the one hand versus the “close identification of [its] interests” 
with those of governments in which they are headquartered. The latter is a product, as 
per the central claim of this thesis, of the enduring linkage between defence industrial 
capability and notions of state sovereignty and reality of economic well-being 
(Eliassen and Sitter, 2006:4; Chapter I).  
As was explained above, the defence prime contractors of the EU do rely on an 
international supply chain. Moreover, with the advent of the 21st century, the 
“attention of their CEOs,” closely followed by the “content of their turnovers,” has 
begun to turn to the pursuit of business opportunities outside of Europe. This was 
particularly the case regarding the so-called emerging markets, and, for BAE 
Systems, the United States, as well  (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State 
Ministry of Defence; Interview 26, 3 April, Industry). Thus, BAE Systems’ US 
presence rivals that in the United Kingdom and across the EU (Bitzinger, 2003: 68). 
Thales makes a point of establishing a “home base” in states where it has acquired 
major operations (Bitzinger, 2003: 68; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry).  As will 
be demonstrated in the next section, defence primes of the EU have developed a 
variety of cross-border cooperation arrangements and “strategic alliances,” such as 
joint ventures, mergers and minority equity stakes (Dowdall, 2004: 542).  After all, 
transnational consolidation is what gave rise to “big defence industry” in the first 
place.  According to some assessments, this declining importance of European 
markets—internationalisation—has been coupled with a weakening relationship to the 
“home” governments as a result of denationalisation (Igekami, 2013).  
However, the narrative of an increasingly globalised defence industry only tells a part 
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of the story, and a deeper look indicates that transnational defence firms “remain 
wedded to their home countries,” and to the EU, in a number of linkages underneath 
the veneer of internationalisation (Dowdall, 2004: 452).  For instance, Finmeccanica 
has been encouraged by the Italian government in its active strategy in entering joint 
ventures as “a means of preserving its identity and sustaining Italian industrial and 
technological capabilities,” (James, 2002: 127). Thus, the “home government” 
remains the “key customer” that drives the political and regulatory agenda within 
which industry must operate, and the most important relationship of a company such 
as Thales, for all its global “home bases,” continues to be that with the Direction 
Générale de L’armement (DGA) (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; Interview 26, 
3 April, Industry). The interaction between the “headquarter governments” and 
transnational defence firms also extends beyond the merely historical, cultural, or 
habitual aspects and into material territory. For instance, German defence industry has 
been both a beneficiary and a key supporter of the German government’s strategy of 
“keeping German defence industry German,” such as via a 2003 legislation 
necessitating governmental approval of shares exceeding 25 per cent in German 
defence firms by foreign entities (Mulholland, 2005: 2-3).   
Similarly, since the 2006 release of its Defence Industrial Strategy and following a 
period of encouraging foreign competition in the UK, the British government has 
reverted to treating BAE Systems in a manner of a national champion, actively 
steering leading portions of multi-partner defence business towards the multinational 
(The Economist, 2006).  There is a “certain logic behind” this policy direction which, 
as rationalised by a former senior  defence official, fundamentally means that as a 
government, “you have to put a certain amount of business people’s way,” (Interview 
7, 9 August 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence). Such logic cuts to the heart of 
states’ insistence on “security of supply”— governments are not prepared to “trust the 
other side” to carry out the necessary “upgrade” work for their defence equipment in a 
manner and within the timeframe they may require, and must thus decide whether and 
what degree of “risk” they would accept in the “risks game” of entrusting their 
security of supply to another state,” (Interview 7, 9 August 2013, Member State 
Ministry of Defence). The “national champion bond” is also solidified through such 
ties as the “absolutely critical” investment into R&D by the “home government” and 
its purchase of newly-developed products from the home supplier— invaluable for 
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signalling their export readiness (Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry; Interview 
26, 3 April, Industry). As will be illustrated below, these elements of industry-
government relationship constitute the lifelines of the defence industry (Hartley, 
2003: 348-349). 
Inconvenient, Yet Crucial: Appreciating Inconsistencies and Contradictions 
Taken as a whole, then, any nuanced discussion of EU member states’ and defence 
primes’ “interests” must take into account these inherent inconsistencies. As in all its 
manifestations, globalisation in the defence industrial sphere entails costs as well as 
benefits, and thus far EU governments have not been fully willing to face the 
consequences of “opening national markets to foreign competitors” and allowing 
defence industry to be guided by “commercial logic rather than political 
requirements” in their decisions regarding the location “of industrial and 
technological activities,” (James, 2002: 131).  On a more fundamental level, there is a 
divergence of interest between the key state objective of maintaining domestic 
employment and the industrial goal of profit maximisation (Neal and Trevor, 2001: 
349). The competition pressures of global markets, where “downsizing and capacity 
retirement are a commercial necessity,” make this incompatibility that much more 
stark (ibid). This has led to a contradictory approach on the part of national 
governments, who on the one hand recognised that industrial consolidation bolstered 
by competition-enhancing regulation was essential to defence industrial 
competitiveness, but at the same time remained terrified that industrial capacity, and 
with it, domestic employment, industrial base, and the “national character” of its 
defence champions, would slip away to another member state (Fligstein, 2006). In the 
end, “interests” may be “different between member states and industry,” but, 
considering the continuing importance of “home government” support and 
investment, they also remain tightly intertwined (Interview 20, 5 March 2014, 
Industry).   
Such complexity has been part and parcel of the European post-Cold War defence 
industrial landscape, to which this chapter now turns. Understanding the interaction 
between the forces of demand and supply within the defence market sheds further 
light on the corresponding nuanced relationship between EU member states and 
transnational defence primes. This context also elucidates the pressures and 
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opportunities facing both industry and national governments, and as such, is critical to 
substantiating the claim of industrial lobbying presented here. Having demonstrated 
that any “internationalisation of arms production...[may be] driven by industry but [is] 
sanctioned by national governments,” the next phase of the analysis undertaken here 
will examine the post-Cold War defence procurement environment in detail (Dowdall, 
2004: 542). This step will also provide the empirical background giving rise to the 
hypothesis advanced above. 
	  
The	  EU	  Defence	  Industrial	  Landscape:	  Early	  1990s	  –	  Late	  2000s	  
 
Demand Factors 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has precipitated a transition within most EU 
member states’ strategic planning away from large-scale confrontation with a rival 
superpower and toward expeditionary warfare. With the USSR no longer posing an 
existential threat, and the likelihood of war on the European continent—at least as 
European societies and policymakers understood it—greatly diminished, EU 
governments began slashing their defence budgets.  In fact, already by the early 
1980s, the so-called “structural disarmament” was making itself felt, whereby, despite 
an overall increase in public expenditure, defence budgets could not keep apace with 
rates of equipment acquisition and replacement, buoyed by rising costs and 
sophistication levels of weapons systems technology (Struys, 2004: 552).  In addition, 
the logic of market economics of the 1980s demanded “value for money” and 
efficiency in the production and supply of defence equipment (Braddon, 2004: 500). 
Therefore, by the end of the decade, defence ministries across the EU began coming 
under fire for lax financial control processes within defence procurement procedures 
as well as “in-house defence services” (Braddon, 2004: 500). Reducing costs of 
defence equipment acquisition thus became an over-riding objective of ministries of 
defence across the EU, as with former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, for 
instance, refusing to entertain proposals for defence spending increases, despite the 
admonition of German armed forces’ General Inspector Harald Kujat that “the 
Bundeswehr is not …ready for interventions (abroad)” (Moens and Domisiewicz, 
2001: 13). Furthermore, during the early 1990s European leaders were finding that re-
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investing the “peace dividend” into the welfare-state elements of public spending was 
much more “electorally promising” and seemed to reflect the priorities of their 
publics (Liberti, 2011: 15). As one trade publication lamented, even when national 
defence industry was “crying for more funds,” it was being “ignored” in order to 
maintain social welfare programmes (Mulholland, 2005).  
This environment of relative  “defence austerity” also framed the policies employed 
by EU governments to steer the process of restructuring embarked upon by the EU 
defence industry (see Supply Side below).  One option under consideration within 
national capitals was allowing defence firms to chart their own rationalisation course 
by determining product lines, selecting alliance partners, and structuring mergers 
(Fligstein, 2006: 950). This “market-driven” solution would have also avoided the 
protectionism, fragmentation, and over-capacity resulting from national champions 
serving national markets, as well as the intractable political difficulties associated 
with implementing the “specialisation” model. In this scheme, different member 
states’ firms produced only certain weapons systems in a coordinated, previously 
agreed upon structure (Fligstein, 2006: 951). Yet, as mentioned above, the objective 
of defence industrial rationalisation uneasily co-existed in national policymaking 
machines with a “fear that all of their national defence capacity might end up in the 
hands of firms from other countries,” resulting in a loss “of control over defence 
production” (Fligstein, 2006: 950, 951). Consequently, the resulting process of 
defence industrial consolidation and rationalisation across the EU combined elements 
of state ownership, control of merger activity, and support of national champions with 
allowing the proverbial invisible hand some freedom of manoeuvre (Fligstein, 2006: 
953). 
However, this transition has proven far from seamless, complete, or irreversible. 
Although the governments of the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, have significantly 
divested themselves of defence industrial control since the late 1990s, the state has 
retained a key stake, including in EADS, Thales, and Finmeccanica which represent 
the most “market-dominated” aerospace sector when compared to naval and land 
systems (James, 2002: 132; Balis, 2013: 4). Amongst the dominant arms producing 
member states, Britain and Germany embarked on post-Cold War domestic defence 
industrial rationalisation before France.  Germany had allowed its industry to 
consolidate into Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA), following Daimler’s 1992 merger 
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with the American firm Chrysler, in a quasi cultivation of a national champion, while 
the UK followed a more “market-driven” approach. British firms were frequently 
subject to takeovers, and the government initially opposed the merger of its two 
largest suppliers, British Aerospace BAe and General Electric (GEC) (Moens and 
Domisiewicz, 2001: 5; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). However, while the 
UK government enjoyed highlighting the entirely private ownership of BAE Systems, 
it was also a much more active export supporter for its national champion than were 
its continental counterparts (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 352). On the whole, though, 
despite their considerable involvement, most EU governments had not provided much 
export support to their defence firms throughout the 1990s when compared to the 
United States.  This disparity had further exacerbated the competitiveness pressure 
felt by industry. The difficulties of winning global market share weighed heavily on 
both sides of the Atlantic, but the American burden was lightened by the considerably 
greater governmental support (Neal and Taylor, 2006: 352). Thus, high degrees of 
state involvement continued to obstruct further industrial consolidation, while 
European ministries of defence have found that large, Cold-War era “legacy” 
procurement projects were painfully difficult and costly to cancel (Neal and Taylor, 
2001: 349; Giegerich and Nicoll, 2008:101). 
 
Supply Factors 
How, then, have the EU’s defence suppliers responded to the demand conditions 
outlined above? The “collection of national fiefdoms” that was the European defence 
industry in the immediate post-Cold War period has found that its traditionally high 
reliance on national ministries of defence for revenue had become unsustainable in 
the 21st century (Callum and Guay, 2002: 757).  Important exceptions to the largely 
national character of European mergers and acquisitions were Thales and EADS 
(European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company).  The former grew out of a 
merger of Thomson-CSP and Dassault Electronique, with a subsequent acquisition of 
Aerospatiale’s satellite business and Britain’s Racal Electronics. Similarly, EADS 
was a result of the merger between France’s Aerospatiale and Matra, later to be joined 
by DASA and CASA of Spain. The closest entity to a “pan-European” defence 
company, EADS also owns Airbus of Germany (Guay, 2007).  BAE Systems 
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similarly originated in a national merger, namely, between British Aerospace, as it 
was formerly known, and GEC-Marconi. The resulting conglomerate spent the 2000s 
rapidly expanding into the US market as well as acquiring assets in Europe to become 
the EU’s largest defence company, and third largest in the world.  Finally, Italy’s 
Finmeccanica absorbed the country’s state defence assets and acquired the UK’s 
Westland (Giegerich and Nicoll, 2008: 108).   
The initial reaction of European firms to this situation may be categorised according 
to two patterns. The first was internal consolidation involving the acquisition of 
smaller domestic firms by national champions, such as that pursued by Germany’s 
Daimler-Benz. The second pattern involved the acquisition of the defence businesses 
of industries across the EU by the large defence firms, such as Thompson-CSF of 
France (now Thales) buying the Dutch company Phillips’ defence electronics 
division. However, the disparity between the rhetorical enthusiasm of EU 
governments for full-steam industrial rationalisation and their insistence on 
maintaining varying degrees of control over defence firms’ consolidation and 
business line decisions resulted in the managerial circles favouring the more 
politically acceptable and less bureaucratically burdensome model of partnering 
through joint ventures rather than merger activity (Fligstein, 2006: 953).  
Transnational structures were largely limited to joint ventures or multinational 
consortia, which left the firms’ national orientation and independence intact (Callum 
and Guay, 2002: 758).   
Thus, when cross-border industrial takeovers did occur, the purchased firm would 
often be left “intact” and managed as a separate entity (Fligstein, 2006: 953). The 
overall effect amounted to the preservation of the “original national firms” within the 
de facto consortia of transnational primes, reassuring governments that “their” 
national industry had not been swallowed up (Fligstein, 2006: 953). Another 
widespread mode of intra-industry arrangement which was conducive to “maintaining 
national identity” was the “strategic alliance,” in which firms acquired decisive shares 
in other firms as was the case with BAE Systems’ acquiring equity in the Swedish 
Saab (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 348). This mode of consolidation, in which a part of 
one firm was purchased by another, relied on “structural links” between the 
purchasing company and the “older national firm” (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 350). 
Rather than reducing the number of suppliers in the market, this model consolidated 
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“certain elements” of the two firms’ portfolios, which then worked together (Neal and 
Taylor, 2001: 350). 
The evolution of the EU defence industry has also been shaped by the strategies of its 
chief competitors – companies in the United States. In the aftermath of the Cold War, 
the US military and defence industry were also adapting to the disappearance of their 
strategic raison d'être in the face of the Soviet Union, but were doing so much more 
quickly, efficiently, and comprehensively than their European counterparts (Dowdall, 
2004: 545). Therefore, while the military procurement budget of the United States had 
declined throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration dealt with defence market 
overcapacity by actively pushing the American industry along its course of rapid 
rationalisation and consolidation, including, if deemed necessary, complete “exit” of 
some firms from the defence business. Moreover, the 1990s spawned the traditional 
US policy of governmental support to its defence industry in the form of export aids 
and R&D investment.  In the new millennium, policies of the first George W. Bush 
administration prioritised information superiority across the full spectrum of military 
operations and accordingly mandated a sustained upsurge in R&D spending 
(Mawdsley, 2003: 9; Hamre and Serfati, 2003). This has resulted in an industrial 
landscape characterised by a very small number of “giants” such as Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics that boasted lower costs and 
higher production volumes than their European competitors. They were also 
overtaking them in competition for governments’ increasingly scarce defence 
procurement funds – first in their “home” markets of EU member states and, soon, in 
the increasingly big-spending “rising powers” keen on expensive weapons 
programmes.  
Considering supply and demand factors together, then, indicates that the processes of 
European defence industrial consolidation and rationalisation have been uneven and 
incomplete. Re-structuring has occurred to a much greater extent in the aerospace 
sector than the land vehicle and naval sectors, which have remained hamstrung by 
overcapacity, duplication, and inefficiency (Hartley, 2011: 104-109). These sectors 
were also particularly fragmented along national lines, although, as Chapter I 
emphasised, inward national orientation towards 28 small markets and ownership 
structures became a persistent feature of EU’s defence industrial landscape as a 
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whole. It was already highlighted above that many of Europe’s second-tier defence 
suppliers, as well, have not consolidated into larger cross-border firms exacerbated 
the over-capacity and fragmentation (Guay, 2007).  
 
Agenda	  Setting:	  “Singing	  Happily	  about	  EDEM”	  and	  Bemoaning	  the	  
Transatlantic	  “Competitiveness	  Gap”	  
 
Taking into account the adverse market conditions described above points to the 
reasonable conclusion that reduction of barriers to cross-border business opportunities 
and harmonisation of procurement means within the EU, which the EDA’s Code of 
Conduct and the Commission’s Defence Procurement Directive aimed to achieve, 
would benefit industry through enhancing its competitiveness. Consequently, the 
EU’s transnational defence firms would stand to gain from these instruments and 
would thus have an interest in their approval and implementation. This section traces 
the primes’ efforts to achieve just that, garnering indicators of their success during 
each stage of the policy process – beginning at the agenda-setting stage, followed by 
agenda-shaping activity, and concluding with decision making.    
Throughout the early 2000s, a “fragile consensus” began to emerge amongst industry, 
and particularly amongst primes such as Thales, Finmeccanica, and EADS, that a 
more integrated EU defence market was necessary “for a transition to global 
markets,” (Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member 
State Ministry of Defence).  This recognition was voiced by Philippe Camus in 2001, 
the co-CEO of EADS, who spoke of the “absolute need” to have “common 
procurement in Europe,” (Michaels, 2001).  “Big companies” were “asking for one 
customer,” according to Mr. Camus, since “integration cuts costs and yields more 
sophisticated systems,” as such allowing European firms to “have more competitive 
products for export outside Europe,” (Michaels, 2001).  
 The meeting of minds amongst Europe’s major industrial players also included 
worries regarding the so-called “competitiveness gap” separating them from their 
American counterparts. It had become somewhat of a cliché to highlight the 
importance accorded by the British government to the UK’s “special relationship” 
with the United States.  In the defence industrial sphere, this was mirrored by 
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emphasising the focus of British firms, and particularly BAE Systems, on establishing 
a credible, lucrative presence in the United States.  Yet, from the early days of the 
George W. Bush administration it was becoming increasingly clear that transatlantic 
sharing of intelligence—and by implication, of high-tech information crucial to 21st 
century weapons systems—was less and less palatable to US policymakers (Moens 
and Domisiewicz, 2001: 11). Moreover, in the telling of the EU’s defence industry 
lobbyists, the rapidly widening Transatlantic divergence in competitiveness 
threatened to turn EU defence industry into no more than sub-contractors to the US 
behemoths, barring urgent remedial action (SDA, 2006:11). Considering that 
“building up [defence industrial] competence” required decades due to the high levels 
of technology involved, European defence firms were worried that “if governments 
kept buying only from the US,” they would be compelled to “close up shop and 
[would] not [be able to] open it again,” (Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry).  
On April 28, 2003, just over a month after the Commission issued its Communication 
European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues (COM(2003) 113), the official start 
of a process that culminated in the Defence Procurement Directive, the then-CEOs of 
EADS, BAE Systems, and Thales—three of the four primes considered here— 
published a collective open letter to the governments of EU member states. In the 
document, printed in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a 
London-based defence and security think-tank, the executives of the EU’s largest 
defence firms called on policy-makers to “quickly address the gap in resource and 
capability existing between the two sides of the Atlantic in order for Europe to be 
seen as a credible player on the international stage” (Ranque, et. al.: 2003: 7-8). A 
crucial component of this objective, according to the CEOs, was “aligning [national] 
defence investment spending” (Ranque, et. al.: 2003: 7-8).  The executives reiterated 
their concerns the following year in a public warning that “industry in Europe is under 
enormous competitive pressure from the United States,” which, if left untended, 
would lead to the “overtaking of indigenous defence technology” and a detrimental 
reliance on “foreign technologies (Jones and Larrabee, 2005: 63).  Competing with 
this “good friend,” that was “also a tough competitor” became increasingly more 
strenuous, especially since the US’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
were repeatedly strengthened, to the overall effect of barring EU firms from the 
American market (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry).  
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Although several industrialists, such as the Chairman of the Swedish national defence 
industrial association, called for conditioning freer EU market access for American 
firms upon reciprocal measures, most CEOs also advocated policies promoting 
defence industrial consolidation within the EU in order to reverse the competitiveness 
gap spiral  (European Report, 2005). The authors of the RUSI open letter viewed the 
establishment of a European Armaments and Strategic Research agency, first formally 
proposed by the Defence Working Group of the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
as the optimal way to achieve this. Such an Agency would then promote “joint 
[European]… development and acquisition” of military capabilities, which would be 
of “massive strategic importance for the future of the European defence industry” 
(Ranque, et.al., 2003: 7-8). 
In September 2004, anticipating the impending Green Paper on Defence Procurement 
issued by the Commission seeking stakeholders’ views on its proposed defence 
procurement reforms, Alexander Reinhardt, the then EADS defence spokesman, 
stated that the company “would welcome a freeing-up of procurement with open 
arms” (Chapman, 2004). He could also have spoken for EU transnational defence 
firms such as BAE Systems, Thales, and Finmeccanica when he added that the 
proposed measures would help the large industrial players with units across the EU to 
overcome persistent “burdens and barriers between national markets” (Chapman, 
2004). For him and the majority of EU’s defence industry his organisation 
encompassed, this entailed equally paramount objectives of reducing reliance on 
external—that is, American—sources for key defence technologies and improving 
competitiveness within a European defence market worthy of the name.  This 
objective, in turn, necessitated an EU-wide industrial scope and a common approach 
to defining defence industrial priorities based on sharing military assets and accepting 
a degree of inter-dependence. 
In sum, by the time the Commission had issued the Green Paper in 2005, launching 
its customary stakeholder consultation, the key players within industry and national 
ministries of defence were “singing happily about EDEM” (Interview 18, 10 February 
2014, Industry; Chapter IV).  Although it could be argued, as one senior executive 
retrospectively did, that these pronouncements amounted to little more than 
“rhetoric,” they  also reflected an acute awareness of the pressures weighing upon the 
EU’s defence industry as well as a need to address these issues through “more Europe 
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in defence,” (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). If this sounds somewhat 
nebulous, that it is because it was. Although EU governments may have “finally 
recognised” the magnitude of industry’s “struggles,” and the latter were excited at the 
prospect of greater market share in a “defence internal market,” the actual structure of 
such a market was left undefined, and its inevitable regulatory aspects seemingly 
ignored (Mulholland, 2005:1; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). 
Thus, a number of lobbyists from the big defence companies remarked that the 
consultative Green Paper was accompanied by “a lot of confusion” within industry 
and ministries of defence (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). Furthermore, 
they believed that this disorientation “ultimately played into the Commission’s hands” 
(Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry; Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry). 
Partly as a result of their general sense of complacency regarding the impregnability 
of the defence industrial sphere to supranational authority, several industry 
representatives lamented that governments had thus “abdicated responsibility” as the 
gatekeepers of integration (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry; Interview 8, 28 
August 2013, Industry; Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry).  
It is also important to remember that during this time the long-discussed European 
Defence Agency (EDA) was finally coming into being, and its Industry and Market 
(I&M) Directorate purported to take aim at the EU’s defence industrial fragmentation, 
over-capacity, and lack of competitiveness (Chapter V). During the preparatory work 
for the EDA’s establishment, the primes’ chief Brussels-based lobbyists seemed just 
as happy to hold a series of meetings with European Commission throughout 2003, as 
they were to provide input into the structure of the EDA (European Commission, 
2003: 4; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). Indeed, the head of the EADS 
Brussels office claimed to have designed “95 per cent” of the Agency’s organisation 
chart—not least as a result of “direct contact with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing," who had 
served as the president of the Convention on the Future of Europe. His counterpart in 
another firm considered here recalled making the—ultimately heeded—“explicit 
suggestion” that the Agency tackle the thorny, unresolved market and defence 
industrial issues in addition to those of armaments and defence capabilities 
(Luehmann, 2011:6; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). During the fractious 
discussions as to the remit, structure, and purpose of the EDA, this executive recalled 
that the period immediately following the EDA’s creation was one of “considerable 
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momentum” and it would have been “strange” to squander such an opportunity by 
ignoring “market issues” like the need for competitive procurement and R&D 
investment (Chapter V; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). 
 
Agenda	  Shaping	  
Calls for Binding EU-Wide Instruments 
In fact, during the latter part of 2004 and the first half of 2005, the EDA was rolling 
out the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, the big ticket item of its by then 
high-profile I&M Directorate (Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and Member 
State). The Code of Conduct, as well as the greater agenda of the I&M Directorate, 
represented a voluntary, member state-led approach to advancing the European 
defence equipment market. As Chapter V elaborates, the major arms producing 
member states of the EU, that is the UK, France, and Germany, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, favoured the intergovernmental path toward grater competition.  
Senior defence industry lobbyists, as well, were making positive noises, having been 
“very supportive” of both the EDA and the Code of Conduct, and “consulted widely” 
in the drafting process of the Code (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry; 
Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry; European Report, 2005). 
Other prominent voices within industry, however, also began to call for binding EU-
wide instruments to inject competition into the EU’s fragmented defence market. 
Jacques Cipriano, Vice President, European Affairs for France’s Groupe Safran, 
remarked that a “non-binding Code of Conduct will be no better than the current 
situation” at an informal meeting dedicated to the economic aspects of CSDP 
(Kangaroo Group, 2005: 2). Similarly, speaking on the eve of the signing of the 
EDA’s Code of Conduct in November 2005, Tom Enders, then EADS CEO and 
Chairman of AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), the 
EU-wide defence industry association through which much of the defence industrial 
lobbying was conducted, underscored the need for a binding rather than a voluntary 
competition regime (Agence France Presse, 2005b). Moreover, following the 
submission of the ASD’s response to the Green Paper consultation process, the 
Association’s Defence Director Gert Runde emphasised the organisation’s support for 
the Commission’s objectives as expressed in the document, “for obvious reasons— it 
	   111	  
will make our markets more transparent and open them up Europe-wide” 
(Europolitics, 2005). The long-serving former ASD Secretary General Roger 
Hawskworth also echoed the view that unified procurement procedures amongst 
member states would go a long way toward “simplifying life for industry” 
(Europolitics, 2005). 
In April 2006, presumably not seeing the desired progress towards this objective, 
EADS spokesman at the time Alexander Reinhardt ruefully lamented that EU 
“governments are ready to go for uniting their currencies- in fact they are ready to 
unite a great deal of their economic activities- but they are not ready for Europe-wide 
defence procurement” (Kanter, 2006). Furthermore, remarking with disapproval that 
the Code only covered 15 per cent of new equipment contracts, Thomas Diehl, 
president and CEO of the German defence engineering firm Diehl, rather grandiosely 
stated that, for this reason, “the single European defence and security market is a 
must” (Jones and Larrabee, 2005). This assertion was seconded in the October 2006 
statement by then-Director General of the Defence Manufacturers’ Association 
(DMA), the UK’s defence industrial grouping which has since been absorbed into the 
British defence association ADS. Specifically, the official insisted that his 
organisation supported  “initiatives to stop countries making too liberal a use of 
Article 346” and to make “open competition the rule” (Europolitics, 2006). Indeed, 
the executive remarked that the measures then underway in the EDA and the 
Commission, which at that time had as yet “limited” itself to issuing a non-binding 
Interpretive Communication, “fell short of compulsion” and must more actively 
“discourage countries from blatant protectionism” (Europolitics, 2006). 
 
Interaction with the European Commission: Courting or Clashing?  
 
It was stipulated in Chapter II that the EU’s defence primes would take a primarily 
“national” route when seeking the incorporation of their preferences into policy 
outcomes. Indeed, the “main interlocutors” of the primes’ Brussels-based lobbyists 
when it came to EDEM items were the dedicated departments of “their” national 
armaments directorates and procurement organisations within the ministries of 
defence, such as the DGA in France or the UK’s DE&S (Interview 18, 10 February 
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2014, Industry; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; Interview 20, 5 March 2014, 
Industry; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation).  
They have also attested to an extensive engagement with the European Commission 
as a “key decision-maker,” which had the capacity to shape their course of action. In 
fact, as will be highlighted in the next chapter, the Commission conducted extensive 
consultations with defence industry representatives, with more than a dozen meetings 
held in relation to its proposals (Luehmann, 2011:8; Industry 4, Interview). In fact, 
these deliberations would continue throughout the decision-making stage as the 
Commission officials and industry lobbyists discussed specific aspects of the 
proposed Directive (Luehmann, 2011:8; Interview 20, 5 March 2014, Industry). In 
comparison, the transnational defence firms appeared to regard relationships with 
both the EDA and national representations in Brussels as of secondary importance. 
Specifically, “information” on the significance of “various issues and points” the 
executives deemed “important” was exchanged, as one executive phrased it, but 
policy was not determined in these interactions (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; 
Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry).  
 
Yet, it soon became apparent that the defence market proposals advanced by the 
Commission did not necessarily enhance the interests of the transnational defence 
firms, as they conceived of them. In particular, one of the most prominent features of 
the primes’ behaviour during the agenda-shaping stage was their attempt to ameliorate 
potential risks from arguably the most contentious issue raised by the Commission’s 
proposals – that of offsets. Defence offsets are requirements placed by national 
governments on foreign defence suppliers, in which the former “compensate” the 
latter for the large expenditure by re-directing some benefits of the defence contract 
back into the purchasing country’s economy. Offsets have long been part and parcel 
of “doing business” in defence. Defence companies have come to rely on offset 
packages to gain an edge on their competitors and receive generous export credits 
from their home governments. At the same time, offset beneficiaries, both companies 
and governments, which view offsets as industrial policy tools, have relished the 
investment flowing through offset requirements. Therefore, offsets were, and remain, 
a particularly sensitive area for both industry and nation states. As inherently 
discriminatory instruments, they by nature violate the rules of the single market, and 
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have long elicited the ire of the European Commission. In December 2006, it issued 
the Interpretive Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the 
Field of Defence Procurement (COM(2006) 779 final), widely regarded by officials 
and industry executives interviewed for this project as the most definite signal sent by 
the Commission to date that it intended to bring the EDEM under community 
purview. The purpose of the document was to “set out [the Commission’s] views on 
the principles governing the application of Article 296 TEC and explain its 
understanding of the conditions for the application of the derogation” (European 
Commission, 2006b: 3). These principles did not, as the Commission made clear, 
include the request of offsets as part of member states “economic and industrial 
interests,” even if they are “connected with the production of and trade in arms, 
munitions and war material” (European Commission, 2006b: 7). 
Since an increasing share of their business is conducted across borders, one would 
expect that transnational EU primes would find the accompanying requests for offset 
projects burdensome, costly, and detrimental to competitiveness, especially as the 
bigger US companies may always offer bigger and better offset arrangements 
(Eriksson, et.al., 2007: 44-45). In fact, the foremost trade publication dedicated to 
defence offsets, Countertrade and Offset (CTO) has reported that several primes 
remain vehemently opposed to offset  (Shanson, 2007: 7). Yet, when it comes to the 
primes, one encounters negative views regarding restrictions on indirect offsets 
proposed by the Commission. While it may well be that defence firms viewed offsets 
as an unfortunate “fact of life,” the more accurate reason for this incongruity would be 
damage to the proverbial “level playing field.”  Specifically, EU firms would be 
disadvantaged in the fiercely competitive international markets where non-EU 
providers could freely offer sweeteners in the form of offsets.  Industry also viewed 
offset practices as a basic manifestation of the inherently “political” nature of the 
defence market, which, in their view, the Commission failed to appreciate by fixating 
on reigning in offsets (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry). Consequently, the 
“island of rules,” that the Commission appeared intent upon creating became 
increasingly maligned by lobbyists as incognizant of “real-life” factors (Interview 18, 
10 February 2014, Industry). As a result, CTO reported that many EU prime 
contractors were lobbying national governments to oppose such measures when they 
first got wind of the Commission’s intentions, citing as an example the UK Defence 
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Industries Council (DIC) organising a meeting with Ministry of Defence Officials to 
convey these requests (Shanson, 2006: 1-2). When the MoD response was one of 
support for the proposed prohibition on indirect offsets, the Defence Manufacturers’ 
Association (DMA) of the UK, as well as British Industry Offset Group, declared 
their intention to “force the MoD to re-think its stance”  (Shanson, 2006: 1-2).  
 
If You Cannot Kill Them, Join Them!25 
As the preceding analysis suggests, it became apparent that the Commission’s vision 
of an EDEM was not aligned to defence primes’ perception of a bright, competitive 
future. Specifically, the degree of openness that it entailed could not sufficiently 
assure industry of a favourable “balance of advantage.”  Thus, during the run-up to 
the release of the Defence Package in 2007, the prominent defence news outlet Jane’s 
Defence Weekly reported an EU industry official expressing scepticism that firms 
would in fact take advantage of the proposed Directive’s provision for complaining to 
the European Court of Justice, if they felt that they were unfairly excluded from 
contracting opportunities (Tigner, 2007). In a world where many firms’ main sources 
of revenue, influence, and R&D investment stemmed from ministries of defence and 
contractual relationships took decades to develop, bringing governments to court was 
not an easy or desirable option.  
 
As one senior industry association official ruefully reflected, despite frequent and 
pervasive calls for “more openness,” “nobody” within industry was “ready” for its 
implications (Interview 26, 3 April 2014, Industry). The story is in fact, more 
complex, and precisely for the reasons that lie at the heart of the theme explored in 
this chapter. Being compelled to face open tender rather than “arranging bilateral 
deals” with a secure and steady stream of contacts, would be anathema to the decades-
long modus operandi of even transnational “giants.” This idiosyncrasy was aptly 
articulated by Gert Runde, the ASD Defence Director, when he acknowledged that 
defence industry “had no illusions” about the [Article 346] exemption—most likely 
referring to the prospects of its abolition—and also, he “guessed,” “not any desire to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Similarity	  with	  the	  title	  of	  Blauberger	  and	  Weiss’s	  work	  (2013)	  is	  acknowledged.	  However,	  this	  phraseology	  was	  derived	  independently,	  primarily	  through	  interviews. 
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see [it] changed” (Shanson, 2005: 4-5). Rather than a pursing a “truly European” 
defence equipment market, the EU’s transnational defence firms were actually content 
to continue their “balancing act” within the fragmented status quo. This meant 
“developing common technology,” and then adapting it to the requirements of each 
small base of customers – with all the costs and complexities that this involved 
(Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Gates, 2004: 515). This game was to be played until 
“some [defence firms] went out of business,” (Interview 26, 3 April, Industry).  
At the same, it appears that as the Commission persevered in its defence market 
policy initiative, the realisation that it would eventually, and at least partially, succeed 
began to dawn upon defence primes’ Brussels-based lobbyists. Consequently, their 
behaviour increasingly coalesced around the lobbying version of the principle “if you 
cannot kill them, join them” (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry). Interview material 
indicates that the widely shared belief as to the inevitability of an “EC role in 
defence” elicited reactions ranging from the desire to “deal with it” while avoiding 
provocation to a determination to “minimise [the Commission’s] involvement”  
(Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; 
Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry;). Furthermore, from mid-2007, the 
favourable view industry held vis-à-vis the EDA appears to have grown intertwined 
with regretful proclamations of the Code’s of Conduct “uselessness,” as a “window 
dressing device” that was “totally at the mercy of national armaments directors,” 
(Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry).  As 
argued in Chapters IV and V, respectively, this change in attitude was to some extent 
brought about by the European Commission and in part constituted inevitable 
outcome of the structural tensions within the EDA itself. 
	  
	  
Decision-­‐Making:	  The	  Bottom	  Line?	  
 
However, even the dawning awareness of the “long games” played by the European 
Commission appears not to have prepared industry for the “huge shock” of witnessing 
the “first time ever that the Commission would have a Directive in defence” 
(Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). 
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In fact, as the chief EU representative of one of the primes examined in this thesis 
attested, the Directive “caught everyone by surprise… industry was not asking for it” 
(Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry). According to the perspective of another 
long-serving chief Brussels lobbyist of a transnational defence firm, “if you said at the 
beginning of 2003 that there would be a Defence Procurement Directive by 2009, 
there would have been huge disbelief” (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). 
Therefore, while defence firms’ EU representatives were, in the words of one former 
executive, “not the guys who went to the Commission and said, “do this! Do this!,” 
once it became apparent that the “Directive was in motion,” the lobbyists set about 
“shaping and influencing it” to ensure that “it is the best Directive possible,” 
(Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry; Interview 8, 28 August 2013, Industry). 
The ASD Chief Executive at the time also voiced the Association members’ 
eagerness to “play a part in shaping the proposal”, and in particular finding a balance 
between greater competition and “the retention of national industrial defence 
capability” (Cowan, 2007). Consequently, in the 2007 ASD Annual Report, the 
Defence Commission of the ASD identified as its paramount goal for the upcoming 
year the “encouragement of the implementation of appropriate and robust defence 
industry, cooperation and market policies at EU level” (ASD, 2007: 9). Under this 
overarching objective, “promoting the creation of a genuinely European defence 
equipment market” was highlighted as the first item (ASD, 2007: 9). 
 
Public Self-Attribution and Frustration Behind the Scenes 
 
Indeed, publicly available documentation appears to suggest a decisive role played by 
industry, and specifically ASD, in moulding the Defence Procurement Directive. 
Thus, the ASD president at the time, Allan Cook, listed in his introduction to the 
Association’s 2008 annual report the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive 
among ASD’ main achievements during that year. According to Cook, this outcome 
was a “reward” for “ASD’s intense lobbying efforts throughout the debate on the EU 
‘Defence Package’” (ASD, 2008: 2). The document went on to provide some detail of 
the ASD lobbying efforts. In particular, it commended its especially-created Co-
Decision Working Group for the tireless effort, as well as “considerable time and 
energy” it has dedicated to the legislative process of the Directive, working to ensure 
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that concerns of the industry were incorporated into the final version (ASD, 2008: 6).  
The annual report also asserted that the Defence Commission of the ASD was 
“actively engaged in the contribution and influencing of the relevant discussions 
among the Council and Parliament of the EU” (ASD, 2008: 9). In addition, the 
Association’s Rotorcraft Group, which includes the prime manufacturers and largest 
defence exporters was reported to have lobbied the European Parliament during the 
debate of the Defence Procurement Directive with gusto, resulting in “some major 
industry recommendations” having been ostensibly “recognised and taken into 
account” by MEPs (ASD, 2008: 25). One of the most significant of these concerns 
was the inclusion of a “remedies clause,” entitling any defence equipment supplier 
who believed itself to have been excluded from a contract award as a result of unfair 
competition practices to bring a case against the purchasing member state in the ECJ  
(Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament).  
 
In fact, according to the ASD annual report, its President and CEO of the Swedish 
defence firm Saab Technologies, Ake Svensson’s speech at the European Parliament 
in May 2008 was given “in support of this [lobbying] work.”  It appears that Svensson 
must have visited Parliament quite often during the Directive negotiation period. A 
month later he spoke at a “mini hearing” of the EP’s Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)—which was formally considering the 
proposed Directive in the co-decision procedure—on the risks and benefits of 
European defence market rationalisation. Although his presentation itself has not been 
made public, a summary of the event indicates that while Svensson underscored the 
importance of the proposed Defence Procurement Directive for decreasing defence 
market barriers within Europe, he cautioned that the Directive in its current form 
could have a negative impact on defence R&D and thus harm the European defence 
industrial base (European Parliament, 2008a: 2). ASD has also congratulated itself on 
the fruitful contacts it had established with the Slovenian and French Council 
Presidencies throughout 2008, claiming that the French Presidency has been 
“particularly attentive” to the views of industry on the Defence Procurement Directive 
(ASD, 2008: 6).  
 
The French Presidency, for its part, found a largely “favourable” and conciliatory 
attitude on the part of industry (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
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Representation). Behind the scenes, however, despite being “very involved in the 
process of the [Directive’s] adoption,” EU defence primes admitted that their 
objective of “influencing the European Commission” met with “little success” 
(Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry; Interview 8, 28 August 2013, Industry). 
The frequent visits of defence primes’ chief Brussels-based lobbyists to IMCO—and 
in the case of BAE Systems the meetings amounted to more than a dozen—were 
aimed at ensuring that the defence industry’s “special status” and “special 
relationship” with their home government would not be diminished, and Article 346 
left as intact as possible (Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament). 
Moreover, notwithstanding their stated wishes for “constructive” involvement, many 
lobbyists recalled a “very difficult, not constructive dialogue” throughout the debates 
on the Defence Procurement Directive, during which it was apparently “difficult to 
get the Commission to take industry on board” (Interview 10, 4 December 2013, 
Industry). One senior executive observed that while the Commission claimed to have 
“consulted” industry as an obligatory measure, it did not “really listen” to its position, 
and in fact, “there was no real dialogue,“ (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry). 
Finally, according to a long-serving lobbyist of one smaller defence firm who was 
initially positive regarding the Commission’s initiatives, with the Commission 
wielding the “hammer” of internal market legislation, it came to regard every 
“problem” it undertook to solve as a nail (Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry). 
 
Preference Attainment 
 
It came as little surprise, then, that several aspects of the Defence Procurement 
Directive in its final version were described by industry as “perverse” (Interview 8, 28 
August 2013, Industry). Industry’s more diplomatic version was that the resulting 
legislation left it with a “mixed feeling” (ASD, 2008: 9). Overall, many lobbyists felt 
that, frustratingly, the Commission and the Parliament failed to appreciate the 
difficulty of “internationalising and consolidating existing supply chains that take are 
decades to cultivate” and function as almost “insurmountable barriers to entry” into 
the defence market (Interview 1, 15 December 2011, Industry).  There were two 
specific aspects of the Directive, however, that ran directly counter to industrial 
interests – R&D investment and offsets. 
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  Research & Development and Spiral Development 
 
Alarm bells were sounded by then ASD Secretary General Francois Gayet who was 
worried that the Directive could discourage industry from investing into R&D by 
removing assurances that its national government would purchase the resulting 
technology. At the same time, governments would have little incentive to spend on 
domestic research and development, if it was likely that the equipment itself would be 
produced in other countries (EurActiv, 2009). Industry’s worries over the Directive’s 
adverse impact on R&D may also explain ASD President’s somewhat lukewarm 
assessment of the Directive as a step towards a more efficient and competitive 
European defence industry but one which must be taken “globally” for its benefits to 
be appreciated (ASD, 2008: 2-3).  Research and development is absolutely essential 
to the growth, competitiveness, and strategic planning of the defence industry—across 
the EU and worldwide. R&D is the bedrock of defence technological innovation, 
which itself is crucial to defence firms’ export performance. Defence research and 
development requires investment on a large and increasing scale due to the growing 
cost and development periods of military technology. It is largely funded from 
national budgets, with governments typically reimbursing firms for the costs of 
privately financed R&D. Across the EU, R&D is often co-funded between 
government spending and contributions from industry (James, 2004: 2). Since defence 
firms will only invest their private funds when they see a reasonably certain prospect 
of procurement, “publicly funded R&D is the lifeblood of the defence industrial and 
technological base (Williams, 2008:29-30). Moreover, the purchase of the developed 
equipment by the national government is viewed as a sort of “seal of approval” which 
is essential for export potential and constitutes a key expression of the customer-
supplier relationship the primes prised so highly  (Williams, 2008: 29-30; Interview 
18, 10 February 2014, Industry).  
 
The fear of EU primes described above is rooted in the risk that, while R&D activity 
is exempt from the Directive, the products that result from it, and into the 
development of which firms have invested, could lose to a foreign firm’s wares in 
competition. Such a scenario would, in turn, discourage governments from investing 
into “indigenous” R&D, when they may just as easily purchase off-the -shelf 
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equipment from third countries (Williams, 2008:30; O’Donnell, 2009: 4).  R&D 
investment was also at the core of the sombre prospects advanced by the European 
defence primes regarding their own future, particularly when it came to lagging 
behind their American competitors. At the time of the release of the Commission’s 
proposal for a defence directive, United States’ R&D investment outstripped the 
combined EU spending by a ratio of six to one, and this gap has only widened since 
then (EDA, 2007: 3). As indicated above, industry has been cognizant of the risks 
regarding R&D, so that one would expect companies to ensure that in final version of 
the Directive these aspects were mitigated as much as possible. Nevertheless, judging 
by the industry’s own reaction, this objective has not been achieved. Furthermore, the 
potentially adverse impact on R&D seems to have disappeared from the list of 
contentious points as the negotiations in Council and Parliament over the Directive’s 
provisions drew to a close (Europolitics, 2008e). That industry was not able to secure 
a favourable outcome on this crucial point casts some doubt over the extent of its 
influence in bringing about the Directive’s approval. After all, if it not only ignores 
but also potentially exacerbates defence firms’ competitiveness woes, can one 
credibly claim that they were key to the passage of legislation?  
 
In addition, the UK delegation had been unable to secure an exemption for one of the 
key concerns of BAE Systems, namely, the firm’s ability to provide defence 
equipment through spiral development. Spiral development refers to a procurement 
methodology employed in high technology fields, and particularly in defence, 
security, and space. In defence procurement, spiral development allows suppliers to 
deliver a capability that has been identified and requested by the purchasing 
government without specifying its “end state requirements,” as these may not yet be 
known or understood. Such a system is thus “designed to evolve” through “successive 
spirals or blocks” in response to technological breakthroughs, user feedback, and 
“lessons learned from the field” (Henning and Wade, 2005). Thus, spiral development 
entails not only an iterated interaction, but also an exclusive relationship between that 
particular supplier and the purchasing ministry of defence.  Within armaments 
acquisition, spiral development becomes part and parcel of the “producer-customer 
relationship,” as specific rules and modes of behaviour develop over time (Interview 
18, 10 February 2014, Industry). By subjecting various components and “future 
spirals” of this process to rules of competition, the proposed Defence Procurement 
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Directive could undermine industry’s ability to provide such opportunities and 
threatened to dismember the requisite customer-supplier silos. Thus, n a manifestation 
to the “close identification of interests” between transnational defence industry and 
the governments of the member state in which they are headquartered, the UK 
delegation “pushed very hard against the Commission and Parliament” on the issue of 
spiral development, so that it came to “dominate the negotiations for a considerable 
time,” despite the ultimately unsuccessful outcome (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, 
European Commission; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Chapter IV).  
Offsets 
 
A similarly problematic story may be told regarding the fate of offsets. The proposals 
of the Defence Package stood to make both direct and indirect offsets nearly 
impossible for industry to provide. When the Commission has at last officially 
revealed its position on offsets, it elicited a response from member states as well as 
industry that ranged from puzzlement to indignation and from incredulity to shock. In 
particular, Neil Rutter, then legal counsel to the Global Offset and Countertrade 
Association (GOCA), which includes all the EU primes, described his reaction as 
“rather shocked, really,” specifying that the Commission’s view of all offsets being 
illegal also appeared to contradict the EDA’s efforts  (Shanson, 2010: 3). What is 
more, in response to the Commission’s Guidance Note on Offsets, issued after the 
Directive’s approval, thirteen defence and security industry associations across the 
EU had written a letter to the European Commission, emphasising the benefits of 
offsets to much of the Union’s defence industry, particularly to SMEs (European 
Commission, 2010). The groups have also appealed to the Commission to adopt a 
“prudent and pragmatic attitude regarding offsets” not least by allowing the EDA to 
drive policy in an intergovernmental manner, reiterating that this area was “closely 
related to national sovereignty” (Shanson, 2010b: 4).  Yet, crucially, the national trade 
associations representing the largest EU defence firms considered here, as well as the 
Spanish defence association, neither signed the letter nor lent their support to the 
initiative. Brinley Salzmann, by that time serving as Director for Overseas Exports of 
the British  (Aerospace Defence and Security Industries) ADS, justified his 
Association’s reticence by highlighting the futility of the effort (Shanson, 2010b: 4).  
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He reportedly felt that the Commission’s position was entrenched, and therefore must 
be managed rather than opposed.  France’s Groupement des Industries Françaises 
Aéronautiques et Spatiales (GIFAS) initially seemed to appear supportive, but in the 
end concluded that French defence industry did not benefit from offsets, while the 
German Deutsches Kompensations Forum (DKF) was not even asked to sign the 
letter, as Germany has an official policy of opposition to offsets (Shanson, 2010b: 4).   
More than the precise calibration of industry’s interests regarding offsets, it is quite 
telling that the primes appeared so caught off guard by the Commission’s actions on 
the issue. Indeed, the Guidance Note on Offsets claims to merely clarify the 
Directive’s stipulations, since the provisions for sub-contracting within the Directive 
are designed to address offsets without naming them (European Commission, 2010: 
1-2). As the subjects of offsets had been repeatedly and intensively debated in 
Council discussions, this reaction on the part of industry seems at odds with the 
assertions of ASD annual reports regarding its “tireless lobbying effort” during this 
period. If this was indeed the case, then one must wonder how it is that industry 
appeared blindsided by the Commission’s position on offsets.  For instance, even if 
the primes did not subscribe to the letter of complaint mentioned earlier, they 
appeared to be in a reactive mode throughout the legislative process, rather than 
shaping it to fit their own objectives. Speaking during the final stages of negotiations 
over the Directive, the then European Commissioner for Enterprise Guenter 
Verheugen lamented that in discussions with the EU executive regarding offsets, 
industry’s message was the ambivalent ‘we don’t like that, but please don’t take it 
away from us!” (Europolitics, 2008d). In fact, as suggested throughout this chapter, 
this statement could well encompass the complexities and incongruities of the defence 
firms’ behaviour when it came to a more open, competitive defence equipment market 
in the EU.  
 
Industry’s View on the Adoption of the Directive: The Commission’s Tenacity, 
Member States’ Complacency, and Pre-Crisis Optimism 
 
Thus, the primes’ lobbyists attributed the ultimate approval of the Defence 
Procurement Directive to a number of factors other than their own influence. One 
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prominent narrative revolved around the quest for value for money. Specifically, it 
appeared that the preferences of finance ministries, who largely “understood that there 
was no alternative” to the Directive if public spending was to be curtailed, prevailed 
over the ostensibly parochial outlook of defence ministries (Interview 25, 19 March 
2014, Industry). Similarly, at the political level, it became clear that the duplication 
and overcapacity characterising the EU’s defence market for such a long time “was no 
longer acceptable or sustainable” (Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry). 
Consequently, the “complete lack of alternative,” coupled with the perception that 
“everyone’s back was truly against the wall,” was a widely held account amongst 
industry for the adoption of the legislative initiative. From the defence industrial 
perspective, moreover, these conditions were not sufficiently severe during earlier 
attempts to bring this policy field under supranational purview in 1996 and 1997 
(Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry).  
An equally powerful explanatory factor centred upon the “relentless march of the 
European state” with the European Commission at the helm (Interview 8, 28 August 
2013, Industry). One former industry association official characterised the actions of 
the Commission as “the competence maximiser … finding the weak spot” (Interview 
26, 3 April 2014, Industry).  Another executive likened the supranational body to a 
“tank,” which may move at an excruciatingly slow pace, but in the end always 
reaches its destination by e demolishing all obstacles on its path (Interview 25, 19 
March 2014, Industry). Moreover, a distinct perception emerged that in addition to 
“being inspired by a full liberal doctrine” the Commission was realising its long-held 
designs on the defence industrial policy area by utilising the issue of offsets and 
internal market regulation more generally as means to gain a “foothold,” “pave the 
way” and even deploy a “Trojan Horse” in this field (Interview 8, 28 August 2013, 
Industry; Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 31, 8 April 2014, Industry; 
Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry; Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS).  
According to this view, it was a matter of the busy-body desk officers within the 
Commission effectively spotting an opportunity to actualise its existing objective of 
extending supranational competence into yet another, hitherto inaccessible, field 
(Interview 26, 3 April, Industry).  In fact, a former long-serving chief Brussels 
lobbyist of one prime contractor attributed the speedy passage and the approval of the 
Directive to the “absolutely disgraceful failure” of member states’ governments to 
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appreciate the implications of the Commission’s “concentrated mind” (Interview 18, 
10 February 2014, Industry).  One illustration he gave of the effect the interaction 
between the Commission’s “long game” tactics and member states’ lack of 
attentiveness may have on policy outcomes was the Commission’s one-time intention 
of “abolishing” intra-EU arms export controls. This would have posed significant 
“technological leakage risks” and “seriously undermined Article 346 in relation to 
third states,” – as EU governments would have been unable to definitively satisfy the 
export control regulations accompanying their purchases of defence equipment from 
outside the EU (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). In this case, also, the 
member states were reportedly “slow to react” and firmly “say ‘no way!’” to the 
Commission’s plans. In the end, they managed to do just that, ensuring that the 
Directive which regulates inter-community armaments transfers, “only” addressed 
“process” and not “policy” of intra-EU defence equipment transfers (Interview 18, 10 
February 2014, Industry).   
Defence industry executives have also attributed the approval of the Defence 
Procurement Directive to a type of risk management technique employed by member 
states in an effort to stave off the Commission from further competence expansion. 
Such a risk entailed the Commission “forging a role for itself in arbitrating defence 
mergers between EU and ‘foreign’ defence firms” or securing greater “cessations of 
sovereignty” on sensitive aspects of European defence, such as the long-discussed 
permanent Operational Headquarters for CSDP missions (Interview; Industry 5; 
Interview 8, 28 August 2013, Industry).  This process also contributed to the 
perception held amongst defence firms that their interests were displaced in favour of 
larger political bargaining objectives amongst the member states during the 
negotiating stage of the Directive (Interview 8, 28 August 2013, Industry; Interview 
25, 19 March 2014, Industry). Such a begrudging assessment of the Commission’s 
role and motivations was also coupled with an almost regretful acknowledgement that 
the adoption and transposition of the Directive had not resolved the fundamental issue 
– that of altering the “national mind-set” of member states’ governments and 
compelling them “to buy from each other” rather than exploiting the regulations’ 
loopholes to continue awarding contracts to their domestic suppliers (Interview 26, 3 
April, Industry; Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; Interview 20, 5 March 2014, 
Industry). Finally, many lobbyists recalled a feeling of pre-financial crisis optimism in 
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the spirit of which the Defence Procurement Directive was “conceived and designed” 
– a marked contrast to the “harsh reality” that followed the profound downturn of 
2009 (Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry; Interview 20, 5 March 2014, Industry).  
One retired military officer who has conducted regular forum discussions with EU 
defence firms since 2007 also emphasised the resulting “loss of confidence and trust” 
felt by defence industry in a “full liberal doctrine” that is perceived as the 
Commission’s guiding philosophy and motivating force (Interview 22, 10 March 
2014, EUMS). As such, rather than incentivising more cooperation, the financial 
crisis had instead elicited more protectionism from member states (Interview 35, 25 
April 2014, EDA and Member State). It has also been observed that the economic 
downturn had brought with it the denigration of defence issues—both European and 
national—on the policymaking agendas of member states where it had been relatively 
prominent, such as France (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). This suggests that the resulting “change of posture” within member states’ 
economies may have affected their assessment of the Directive’s value and utility 
(Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry).  
	  
Conclusion	  
 
This chapter set out to test the validity of the claim that the first elements of an 
institutionalised European Defence Equipment Market have materialised as a result of 
concerted lobbying by transnational defence firms of the EU. Following the 
elaboration of this hypothesis in Chapter II, it was assumed that lobbying would be 
undertaken by national and pan-European trade associations, as well as by individual 
companies, that is, BAE Systems, EADS, Thales, and Finmeccanica. From a 
methodological perspective, process-tracing was employed to elucidate the influence 
of the defence primes throughout the policy-cycle stages, beginning with agenda-
setting, through to agenda-shaping, and culminating in decision-making.  
This analysis began by elaborating upon Post-Cold War defence market conditions—
both in the EU and globally—to demonstrate that industry would indeed benefit from 
harmonisation measures, and would thus have an incentive to see their 
implementation. The analysis then moved on to the entrenched idiosyncrasy of 
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member states’ complex relationship with “their” defence firms, wherein both parties 
desired the benefits of more open markets and greater competition, but in the case of 
national governments, could not could not come to terms with the risk of “losing” 
defence technological and industrial capabilities. Similarly, while the prime 
contractors “merrily sang the EDEM song,” they were not willing to abide by its 
principles if this entailed letting go of their cherished “special relationship” with the 
governments of their home markets (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry). 
Therefore, one of the most prominent themes highlighted by the preceding 
examination is the continuous “flitting” of industrial preferences between a voluntary, 
member-state controlled mechanism for EDEM construction and the imposition of 
binding, supranational rules. The primes’ support for an integrated defence market—
with the champion of pan-European defence production EADS as well as the EU-
wide industry association ASD voicing it most prominently—appears to have been 
more “in [vague] principle” rather than in not altogether comfortable fact.  
The overall conclusion which emerges from this chapter, then, is that while BAE 
Systems, Thales, EADS, and Finmeccanica have been successful in capturing 
policymakers’ attention during the EDEM agenda-setting stage, they have only 
partially shaped it to suit their preferences, and were not able to influence the 
decision-making stage of the Defence Procurement Directive to meet their objectives. 
Firstly, the EU’s defence primes had to contend with the agenda of the European 
Commission acting in its capacity as a Guardian of the Treaty and ensuring that 
integrationist measures it proposed are accepted by member states. In fact, a key 
feature of this chapter is the nearly resigned attitude of the large defence firms’ 
Brussels-based lobbyists regarding the involvement of the European Commission in 
EU defence procurement. Specifically, this outcome was viewed as an almost 
inevitable result, prompting the lobbying machinery to then dive into shaping the 
content and scope of the Directive to the best of its ability.  
Upon more detailed examination, it has become apparent that the EDEM of defence 
primes’ desires did not coincide with the agenda of the European Commission, nor, it 
seems, have the former realised the full implications of the latter’s programme until 
the negotiating process of the Defence Procurement Directive had reached an 
advanced stage. In an illustration of this conclusion, the Commission seems to have 
opted for a compromise excluding R&D activity from the Directive’s remit to placate 
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the twitchy member states, but insisted on “de-coupling” the final product from the 
development stage, and subjecting it to competition. This outcome was contrary to the 
interests of defence firms, and exemplifies a major risk of “national route” lobbying 
discussed in Chapter II – namely, that interest groups’ preferences will be “traded” 
between member states in the course of “political” negotiations. Yet, even though 
they appear to have been aware of this danger during the negotiation stage, companies 
were alarmed at the risk the Directive’s provisions posed to R&D investment across 
the EU when the legislation was approved. Given that research and development 
spending constitutes a lifeline of the defence industry, and that increasing it had been 
a key demand companies had consistently voiced along with greater market openness, 
one would expect them to have mitigated such a grave risk in a Directive they 
ostensibly helped bring about.  Another such aspect was the issue of offset 
arrangements, which the large, transnational firms were assumed to have opposed and 
sought to curtail with the help of the Directive.  While acknowledging that the actual 
number of research areas that would come under the Directive is relatively small, that 
the member states have retained significant amount of freedom in “combining” the 
research and production phases of armaments acquisition, and that some prominent 
voices in industry have indeed decried offsets, the fact that the primes were 
thoroughly taken aback when the implications of the Directive’s provisions became 
apparent, is another detraction from the story of lobbying success and decisive 
influence. Lobbying is based on consistent monitoring of the policy process, and it is 
difficult to make a case for it when the policy outcome is such a surprise.  
 
The preferences of industry for a softer, gentler approach with regard to offsets, for 
example, best led by the intergovernmental European Defence Agency, also bore no 
effect.  Here arises another tentative conclusion, which concerns the voluntary, 
intergovernmental component of EU defence market institutionalisation in the shape 
of the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. This trajectory has existed 
alongside the supranational, market-centred proposals of the European Commission, 
and industry’s behaviour in connection with it exhibited similarly incongruous 
characteristics as their attitude towards the Defence Procurement Directive.  At first, 
the defence firms appeared enthusiastic regarding the EDA and its EDEM-related 
plans, such as the Code of Conduct. Their Brussels-based lobbyists also spoke of 
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direct access to the highest levels of EDA leadership and recounted providing direct 
input into the work of the I&M Directorate in general, and the Code of Conduct in 
particular. At the same time, however, several executives remained cautious about the 
likely impact of the Code of Conduct on enhancing defence market competition, and 
began to call for legally binding liberalisation measures instead. Yet, when the 
Commission extended the reach of internal market rules to offset arrangements in 
defence contracting—effectively curbing this economically questionable but 
financially lucrative practice—industry resumed its calls for the primacy of the EDA 
in handling this sensitive issue on an intergovernmental basis.  
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter and described in greater detail in Chapter 
I, member states’ traditionally indiscriminate use of Article 346, allowing for 
derogation from the EU’s internal market open competition rules when national 
“essential security interests” are judged to be at risk, has often been singled out by 
industrial players as a key protectionist tactic and a major reason for the 
fragmentation of the EU’s defence equipment market. Following the logic of market 
liberalisation, then, industry would be expected to lobby for its curtailment by the 
only actor in the EU’s institutional structure capable of achieving this in an 
enforceable manner – the European Commission. However, the Treaty-based 
exemption also represented an important expression of defence firms’ complex yet 
intimate relationship with “their” government, or, more precisely, that of the member 
state in which they are headquartered. A fundamental component of this connection 
was governments’ routine use of Article 346 to channel business to nationally-based 
industry. At the same time, the competitiveness of Europe’s large transnational 
defence firms was not sufficient to provide them with the necessary assurances that a 
more “regulated” invocation of Article 346 would not be used “against” them. As a 
result, industry was simply unwilling to take the chance that “their” national 
government could award a defence contract to a competitor from another member 
stat, and as such was deeply wary of the binding curbs on its invocation promoted by 
the European Commission.  Dealing with protectionism, inefficiencies and cost over-
runs was therefore preferable to supranational controls on the “special” nature of 
defence business.  
In addition, the ultimate object of industrial desire appears to have been the 
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consolidation of defence equipment demand amongst member states, and the firms 
had initially viewed the Defence Procurement Directive as an intermediate step 
towards this objective. As one may discern from a more detailed scrutiny of their 
statements in support of an integrated defence market in the EU, and as had become 
apparent during interviews conducted for this thesis, defence firms believed that 
pooled demand, rather than greater competition – especially supranationally enforced 
competition—would generate economies of scale and spurn further industrial 
consolidation. At the same time, the persistent reluctance of governments to 
harmonise requirements and invest in joint projects was actually a source of “conflict” 
between governments’ and industry’s preferences (Interview 18, 10 February 2014, 
Industry).  In conclusion, industry did favour “harmonisation” of intra-EU defence 
procurement legislation, but as an ancillary measure to harmonisation of equipment 
requirements, increased defence spending, and, as one former executive responsible 
for EU relations at a European prime succinctly phrased it, “not through the Defence 
Procurement Directive” (Interview 10, 4 December 2013, Industry). 
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CHAPTER IV: THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION AS “PURPOSEFUL 
OPPORTUNIST” AND POLICY 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
Introduction	  
Having examined the means, rationale, and extent of the influence exerted by the 
EU’s transnational defence firms on the emergence of an institutionalised defence 
equipment market, this thesis now turns to the role played by the European 
Commission. The previous chapter has suggested that its impact may have been 
significant, and in this section it will be examined in much greater detail.  The 
rationale for extensive consideration of supranational influence was explored in 
Chapter II. It is worth reiterating here that, in pursuing its policy initiatives, the 
European Commission can draw on its mandate as “Guardian of the Treaty” 
reinforced by supranational law, independence in providing side-payments, cohesive 
action capability, and access to supposedly nonpartisan knowledge and expertise, in 
addition to its formal agenda-setting powers and institutional linkages (Vahl, 1997; 
Coleman and Tangermann, 1999). On the other hand, achieving this would require the 
support of a “stakeholder coalition” comprising influential member states and interest 
groups, as well as a favourable disposition of a majority in the European Parliament, 
since the “policy status quo” encountered by the Commission ranges from 
indifference to resistance on the part of governments, non-state actors, and EU 
institutions affected by its proposals (Rhinard, 2010: 37).  
Taking into account such nuances, in Chapter II it was hypothesised that: 
 
The European Commission has secured member states’ agreement to an 
unprecedented measure of defence procurement integration through successful 
policy entrepreneurship.  
 
	   131	  
The remainder of this chapter will examine the influence of the European 
Commission in advancing the European Defence Equipment Market by acting 
as a policy entrepreneur and caretaker in order to further integration in the 
defence procurement sphere, fulfil its mandate, and extend its own 
institutional remit. It proceeds by first outlining the policy “foothold” of the 
Commission within the previous, “unconsolidated” components of the defence 
industrial policy regime. It then examines the policy entrepreneurship 
techniques it had employed in order to bring about the approval of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, as well as the acceptance of its own role as a policy 
actor in the emerging defence industrial policy regime. In this context, the 
chapter will consider the interaction between the Commission and the EDA, 
while dealing with the parallels between the development of the Code of 
Conduct and the evolution of the Directive. The following discussion also 
pays particular attention to specifying the causal significance of the tactics and 
actions of the European Commission in this context, while following the 
policy cycle structure elaborated in Chapter II.  
 
Commission’s Policy Foothold - Research and Dual Use 
As Robert Regan, former Director of International Relations Group, at Defence 
Equipment and Support (DE&S) of the UK’s Ministry of Defence acknowledged, the 
European Commission had long had an issue with the “undoubted” abuse of Article 
346 (House of Lords, 2008:9). Although much has been made of the Commission 
lacking competence in defence matters as such, decades of EU integration have 
granted it powers in a number of intersecting policy fields. One of the most prominent 
aspects of this involvement has been research funding and coordination. During the 
latter half of the 1990s, the EC’s Directorate General for Science, Research and 
Development, as it was then known, had funded a series of projects and resulting 
publications as part of the European Cooperation on Science and Technology (COST) 
A10 Programme "Restructuring of Defence Industry and Conversion."26  Specific 
topics explored under this initiative included various aspects and mechanisms of this 
process, such as the shifting relationship between governments and arms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  See:	  http://www.cost.eu/media/publications?pub-­‐domain=all&pub-­‐year=*&pub-­‐action=A10	  
	   132	  
manufacturers and the perspectives of the military and publics.27 This was followed 
by the Commission’s objective of forging an EU-wide security research structure by 
funding projects through its Policy and Research in Security Programme (PRS) and 
Seventh Framework Programme for Community R&D (FP7).28 The Programme was 
officially launched in 2007, but the Commission’s activities in coordinating, 
initiating, and funding security research date back to the 2003 Preparatory Action in 
Security Research.29 Although research project funding has been technically restricted 
to civilian applications, the rise of “dual-use” technology has meant that the 
“distinction between civilian and military spin-offs of modern scientific research” has 
been increasingly difficult to make (Struys, 2004: 555).   
These developments have resulted in a gradual but increasing extension of the 
Commision’s remit into the EU’s military dimension.  In fact, in the prelude to the 
publication of the Green Paper on Defence Procurement launching the stakeholder 
consultation stage customary in EC legislative initiatives, Jonathan Todd, spokesman 
for the then Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, presented the need for 
the application of community competition rules to defence procurement as a natural 
result of the increasingly blurred distinction between “dual-use” and “pure” defence 
products (Chapman, 2004). In addition, the Commission, together with the European 
Court of Justice, has been carving out a progressively dominant role for itself in dual-
use export control and international air transport regulation, the latter allowing it to 
have a say in combat aircraft training in Europe, for instance (Micara, 2012; Schmitt, 
2000:8; Interview 23, 10 March 2014, EUMC). Thus, it could be argued, as a retired 
EU Military Staff senior officer did, that after controlling “money, markets, and the 
common currency” the “next logical step” for the European Commission would be an 
“internal market in defence” (Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS).  
	  
Agenda	  Setting	  
Recognising and Utilising a Window of Opportunity 
By the early 2000s, most EU governments had been resolutely slashing their defence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See:	  http://www.cost.eu/media/publications?pub-­‐domain=all&pub-­‐year=*&pub-­‐action=A10	  
28	  See:	  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/overview/index_en.htm	  29	  See:	  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/pasr_com(2004)_72_en.pdf	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budgets for more than a decade (Cordesman, 2002: 10; Chapter III). In parallel, rapid 
technological advancement has led to accelerating rises in defence equipment prices, 
which regularly outpaced inflation in the general economy and thus reduced the 
stretched defence expenditure even further (Hartley, 2003: 354). As a result, finance 
ministers across the EU were insisting on greater value for the 160 billion euros spent 
collectively on defence, and open tendering, leading to economies of scale, would be 
“the obvious way forward” to achieve this objective (Chapman, 2004; Chapter III). 
Superimposed upon this status quo was the notable, but fragmented and incomplete, 
consolidation within the EU defence industry coupled with the much more thorough 
defence industrial rationalisation process in the US. The powerful transnational 
defence industrial interests in the EU which the consolidation process brought forth 
found themselves under increasing pressure from their rivals across the Atlantic and 
began demanding harmonised EU policies to alleviate it  (Chapter III). 
 
Riding the Wave of the European Convention 
This was the context surrounding the Convention on the Future of Europe (known as 
the European Convention), which was established in 2001 following the Laeken 
European Council Declaration.  The European Commission would make skilled use 
of the window of opportunity that opened up as a result of the European Convention 
discussions, budgetary concerns, and the post-Cold War defence spending dynamics. 
The unofficial mission of the Convention was to advance the drafting of a European 
Union Constitution by generating ideas based on a focused reflection upon the future 
direction of the Union and all that this entailed. It comprised of representatives of 
Heads of State and Government, typically at foreign minister level, national 
parliamentarians, including those from the then candidate states, senior officials from 
the European Commission, and Members of the European Parliament. The forum also 
contained a Working Group on Defence, tasked with the future development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its place in the evolution of the 
EU as a whole. In addition to discussing issues of crisis management operations and 
military capability generation, the Group was asked “to consider whether forms of 
cooperation on armaments could be incorporated into the Treaty” and to “investigate 
the possibility of setting up an armaments agency” (Barnier, 2002: 8). Chairing the 
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defence group was current Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier, then 
Commissioner in charge of Regional Policy and the Reform of European Institutions.  
Barnier, who later attested to the Working Group discussions becoming dominated by 
arms procurement and cooperation issues, would become a staunch advocate and key 
architect of the “internal market of defence” upon assuming the Internal Market 
Commissionership in 2010 (Barnier, 2006).  
While the Convention was still in session, the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, as it was then 
known, adopted a Resolution on European Defence Industries, which was approved 
by Parliament in April 2002. Although the European Parliament “by default” tends to 
favour “integration, more Europe, and European rules,” it had also maintained a 
particular interest in the area of armaments cooperation dating back to the late 1970s 
(Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission). In particular, the so-called 
Kangaroo Group, which was founded in 1979 as an “informal group of friends in the 
European Parliament,” has focused its efforts on promoting the “application of the 
rules of the Internal Market in the field of security and defence,” especially under the 
term of MEP—and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence 
(SEDE)—Karl von Wogau as Secretary General from 2004 until 2009 (Interview 14, 
3 February 2014, European Parliament).30 The author of the motion of the 2002 
Resolution, Committee Chairman Elmar Brok, also participated in the European 
Convention as a representative of the European Parliament. His initiative called on the 
Commission to submit “an updated Action Plan” which would consider potential 
application of “the discipline of the Single Market…to the defence industries” (Brok, 
2001: 2). Brok presented his argument as a remedy for CSDP military capability 
shortfalls identified by the EU Foreign and Defence Ministers at the November 2001 
General Affairs Council meeting. Achieving these objectives was, according to the 
Resolution, vital for a CSDP worthy of its name, and establishing a European 
armaments agency had become an imperative within this context (European 
Parliament, 2002: 2). Support for such an agency was actually one of the most 
prominent results of the defence discussions undertaken in the European Convention, 
receiving wide support amongst member states, particularly from the UK, France and 
Germany. According to the statements of the Working Group on Defence members, 	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  Please	  See:	  http://www.kangaroogroup.eu/E/030_who_we_are_D.lasso	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officials of the Green Council Presidency of 2003 and the then European 
Commissioner for Enterprise Erkki Liikanen, this organisation was envisioned as the 
engine propelling defence procurement “de-fragmentation” in the EU (European 
Voice, 2003; Spinant, 2003a).  
Notably, when the Greek Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European 
Council urged the member states to create “in the course of 2004” an 
intergovernmental armaments agency the mandate of which would include “creating a 
competitive European defence industrial market,” the only role envisioned for the 
Commission was supporting the proposed agency’s research activities “where 
appropriate” (Council of the European Union, 2003b: 19). In contrast, Erkki Liikanen 
described the first of the Commission’s defence-related communications, the 
Defence-Industrial and Market Issues- Towards an EU Equipment Policy 
(COM(2003) 113 final) which outlined in more or less concrete terms various aspects 
of potential Community involvement in European defence procurement, as “just one 
part of a long haul towards convincing national governments to loosen their grips on 
parochial defence markets” (European Voice, 2003). Appearing four months after the 
European Convention finished its work, the Communication traced its “origin” to the 
dynamic generated by the Convention discussions and the “invitation” of the 
Parliament issued in the Brok Report (European Commission, 2003: 6). Liikanen also 
expressed confidence that this endeavour would include a “legislative instrument” by 
the end of that year (European Voice, 2003).  
Although a former defence ministry official insisted that “the Greek Presidency was 
always supportive of the Commission’s initiatives in the Internal Market,” a 
divergence between the Council’s and the Commission’s  “visions” and objectives  
was already making itself felt (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State 
3). This may be regarded as an early manifestation of a tension that will form a major 
theme of this thesis. Thus, it appears that from the outset there emerged two 
competing frameworks for the nascent EDEM – one intergovernmental and one 
supranational.  This divergence in visions also foreshadows the Commission’s 
subsequent strategy of striving for EDEM policy initiative, while initially refraining 
from antagonising the “intergovernmental camp,” but seizing the policy initiative 
when an opportune moment arose. 
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Reaching Out to Industry 
This period also witnessed the increasingly vociferous demands of EU’s transnational 
defence industry for dismantled market barriers and enhanced competitiveness 
(Chapter III). Thus, in another instance of taking advantage of a window of 
opportunity the European Commission convened  in 2001 the high-level European 
referred to as STAR 21, in order to “analyse the adequacy of the existing political and 
regulatory framework for aerospace in Europe, to highlight deficiencies and to make 
proposals for further improvement” (STAR 21, 2002: 4). Chaired by Erkki Liikanen, 
at the time already serving as Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society, 
the Group also included Commissioners for External Relations, Trade, Research, and 
Transport, as well as chairmen and CEOs of EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, and 
Finmeccanica. Carlos Westendorp, Chair of the European Parliament’s Industry 
Committee and Karl von Wogau took part as well, who upon becoming the Chairman 
of the Security and Defence Sub-Committee of the European Parliament in 2004, 
acted as a key proponent of both the Defence Procurement Directive and the EDA 
Code of Code. 
In contrast to a similar grouping working on the Bangemann Report, which developed 
into the 1997 EC Communication, the names of STAR 21 members were made public 
and the substance of the report was attributed to them. Moreover, the document was 
“hosted” on the Commission’s DG Enterprise and Industry website. Although STAR 
21’s mandate was broadly civilian, defence and military equipment issues soon came 
to dominate its agenda (Frost, 2002). Specifically, the Group regarded a “single 
European defence market” as crucial for industrial competitiveness, but one member 
admitted that the final report, which was presented to the Prodi Commission in July 
2002, would recommend a “softly-softly approach” due to the likely opposition of 
member states to any plans for internal market rules in the field (Frost, 2002). As 
such, the STAR 21 recommendations, careful to convey the message that the Group is 
“not trying to bring anything under anything”, that is, defence procurement under 
Community competence, called for the “harmonisation of arms procurement” and 
urged the member states to “work towards establishment of a European defence 
equipment market and an armament agency” without mentioning any supranational 
elements to this endeavour (STAR 21, 2002: 40) 
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The STAR 21 recommendations did not seem to generate much policy momentum, 
but the initiative provided the industry executives, Commission officials, and MEPs 
with an opportunity to forge contacts and exchange ideas. It had also brought such 
key actors in the policy process as Erkki Liikanen and Karl von Wogau face to face 
with defence industrial concerns and the benefits of an integrated defence equipment 
market. Indeed, throughout the legislative process that culminated in the Defence 
Procurement Directive, Commission officials would consistently address the concerns 
of industry in this regard and present the extension of the internal market to defence 
procurement as directly beneficial to defence firms.  During these early stages, 
Commission documents emphasised the positive effects of greater “predictability,” 
“consistency,” and regulatory “clarity” to industrial competiveness [European 
Commission, 2003: 10, 12). 
It may be convincingly argued, then, that the Commission capitalised on the work and 
aftermath of the European Convention which focused attention on the issue of an EU-
wide, open defence equipment market in the context of budgetary pressures and 
industrial imperatives. Furthermore, a shared understanding of the pressures exerted 
by the defence industrial status quo in the EU had begun to emerge. In addition, a 
cooperative EU-level response seemed both necessary and possible in light of the 
newly-created CSDP which appeared to be gaining momentum quickly and a 
European Union that was heading toward the federalist milestone of a common 
Constitution. That the Commission perceived a “window of opportunity” for defence 
market policy initiatives during the early 2000s was articulated in these very terms by 
Burkard Schmitt, at the time a strong advocate of harmonised defence procurement as 
a Research Fellow at the EU Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) (SDA, 2005:12). 
Schmitt would soon join the EC’s DG MARKT as part of the fledgling “defence 
team,” and become a central figure in implementing its defence agenda. The 
Commission’s Impact Assessment Study on the Application of Community Instruments 
to the Defence Market of 2007 also attested to the EC’s recognition of an increasing 
consensus that had emerged during the early 2000s as to the need for action in 
bringing about the European defence equipment market (European Commission, 
2007: 32). According to the Commission, the “politically determined” manner in 
which the member states established the European Defence Agency was indicative of 
this growing meeting of minds and enhanced political will (European Commission, 
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2007: 32).  In addition, one Commission official recalled a “changed atmosphere” in 
defence procurement in the past years that was conducive to “getting things done” 
(Tigner, 2007).  Other officials directly involved in the process remarked that the 
2003 Communication “came at a good moment for Europe,” amidst a “positive spirit” 
towards the European project and as one of cyclical “policy priority waves,” which 
rise during periods of a “common vision” and ultimately shape “how Europe 
happens” (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission; Interview 16, 6 
February 2014, European Commission). 
 On a more practical level, the “revival of the Commission’s interest in this area” 
beginning in approximately 2000 indicated that it had “identified procurement as an 
action” (Guay and Callum, 2001: 17-18; Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European 
Commission). According to one senior official, this “identification” was the result of  
“looking at what actions are possible,” and reflecting on “what can we, the European 
Commission, do [in the area of defence]? What are we, and what is defence?” 
(Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission; Interview 16, 6 February 
2014, European Commission). This, in turn, was followed in 2001-2002 by the 
recruitment of a “small group” of desk officers and officials, “with a very clear view” 
of “what they wanted” in this area, several of whom had participated in the European 
Convention and propelled to prominence the “argument regarding member states’ 
abuse of Article 346” (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission). 
Moreover, “the idea for a Directive was there,” perpetuated since the mid 1990s by a 
previous “generation” of “expert desk officers” (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, 
European Commission; Interview 2, 15 December, 2011, European Commission). 
Reflecting on the impact of this “first push” by a “small group within the 
Commission,” one of its participants ventured that, “this is how Europe is built—
through the determination and peer pressure of desk officers,” while a former senior 
EDA official remarked that the extent of individual desk officers’ policy influence 
seemed, in this case, “incredible” (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European 
Commission; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State).  
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Agenda	  Shaping	  
 
For the Commission, the period following the publication of the 2003 Communication 
was one of “taking up the flag” of policy initiative, and then moulding it 
intellectually, “playing with it, and pushing it forward” (Interview 19, 26 February 
2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European 
Commission).  With the release of the Communication, this “it” was “on the table, 
and changed the rules of the game” (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European 
Commission). From that point onwards, as one former senior official who had served 
both in the EDA and the national ministry of defence reflected, the Commission has 
“come forward more strongly than ever before” (Interview 19, 26 February 2014, 
EDA and Member State). Internally, a decision was then made in early 2006 to 
“really go for” a community instrument in defence procurement, and once the EDEM 
issue became an item on the Commission’s official  annual work programme for the 
coming year (2007), the wheels of internal bureaucracy were set in full motion 
(Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European Commission; Interview 17, 10 February 
2014, European Commission).  As it embarked on shaping the EDEM agenda, the 
Commission was aided by several factors. One was the fortuitous circumstance that, 
despite “broad opposition” from member states and some in industry, “nobody tried to 
kill” its proposals (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European Commission; Blauberger 
and Weiss, 2013: 1121).  
Commission officials were also encouraged by the “helpful” and “clearly supportive” 
disposition of the European Parliament, which, as argued above, “always wants more 
Europe,” and “most of all likes to gain power and competence” (Interview 16, 6 
February 2014, European Commission; European Commission, 2005: 8; Interview 40, 
28 May 2014, European Parliament). For instance, in its 2005 resolution endorsing 
the Commission’s Green Paper on Defence Procurement, the European Parliament 
stressed that rectifying the fragmentation of the EU’s defence equipment market 
would enhance industrial competitiveness, due to increased production runs. The 
Parliament also went to some lengths to make the case for opening the defence market 
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to competition, arguing that this measure was a “precondition for strengthening a 
financially viable EU armaments industry” and building an “autonomous and 
powerful industrial base” not only for more efficient procurement but also for 
“ensuring necessary defence capabilities (European Parliament, 2005: 7). Such 
advantages were reiterated by the author of the resolution, MEP Joachim Wuermeling 
at a Kangaroo Group meeting dedicated to the “economic aspects of a common 
European Defence Policy” on 1 June 2005 (Kangaroo Group, 2005: 2).  He also 
suggested that the “profile” of “his” resolution, then in its final drafting stages, should 
be kept “rather low,” in order to avoid the negative impact of public perceptions of a 
“militarisation” of Europe (Kangaroo Group, 2005: 2). This sentiment, according to 
the participants of the meeting was particularly widespread at the time, as exemplified 
by the French rejection of a European Constitution in a May 2005 referendum.  The 
consideration of optimal timing for releasing a report which agreed with the 
Commission  that “pressure should be placed on national defence procurement 
agencies” and that “armaments industry  should be subject to greater monitoring and 
control by the Commission”  indicates the sincerity of the Parliament’s wish to further 
the EDEM project and enhance the Commission’s role within it (European 
Parliament, 2005). The Wuermeling Report, as it came to be called,  was 
adopted by 392 votes to 77 (European Report, 2005b). In fact, MEPs initially pushed 
for a more far reaching Directive than proposed by the Commission, wanting it to 
apply to articles covered by Article 346, as well (European Report, 2005b). In 
November 2006, Parliament also adopted an own-initiative report authored by von 
Wogau, advocating for a common defence market as a means to bolster CSDP 
capabilities (Europolitcs, 2006a). The report followed a study, sponsored by von 
Wogau, that was conducted by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) 
examining the “costs of non-Europe in security and defence” (Europolitics, 2006a).  
 
Consulting and Waiting  
The Commission’s legislative initiatives typically involve a formal consultation 
process, in which the views of the stakeholders concerned with or affected by its 
proposals are sought. The ultimate purpose of issuing Green Papers, holding 
stakeholder workshops, organising conferences of experts and commissioning studies 
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is to enable the Commission to garner expertise and win allies in an inherently hostile 
environment while focusing attention on its priorities regarding particular issues 
(Thatcher, 2006: 315). The path leading to the Defence Procurement Directive was no 
exception - in order to prepare the September 2004 Green Paper which launched the 
consultation period on a potential community instrument in the defence equipment 
market, the Commission assembled two working parties comprised of member state 
and industry representatives (Palloni and Lizza, 2012: 297). Most national officials 
hailed from ministries of the economy, industry, and finance (Interview 34, 16 April 
2014, EDA and Member State). The majority of the three dominant arms’ producing 
member states’ delegations also included ministry of defence personnel, although the 
lead, at least during the agenda shaping stage, tended to be taken by the “economy 
and industry side,” as was the case in the French and German working groups 
(Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 19, 26 February 
2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation).  
The so-called Working Group of Member States’ Experts and Working Group of 
Industry Experts each met in three sessions from January until April 2004. The 
meetings were held within a few days of each other and aimed at “identifying 
characteristics and economic dimensions of armament contracts,” examining existing 
“defence procurement regulations at national, intergovernmental and Community 
level,” and, finally, discussing “the way forward for a Community instrument as 
regards defence procurement” (European Commission, 2007: 93-98). From October 
2003, the Commission also held the first of consultation meetings with member states 
in the Advisory Committee on Public Procurement (ACPP) context, which would be 
repeated during the period December 2006 – April 2007. Following each set of 
meetings, member states were prompted to submit comprehensive written 
contributions. In addition, the Commission held “numerous bilateral discussions” with 
member states and industry, the first (formally recorded) set of which took place 
during September 2006 –April 2007 for governments, and May 2006 – May 2007 for 
industry. The EDA and the Commission also met from July 2006 until April 2007 in 
various configurations, namely, in preparatory committee meetings, EDA-DG 
MARKT bilateral meetings, national armament directors meetings, and one Steering 
Board meeting, the highest-level of EDA decision making, which brings together 
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member states’ ministers of defence (European Commission, 2007: 93-98). Moreover, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that the six-month period leading up to the 
publication of the Proposal for Defence Procurement Directive in December 2007 
saw 30 more bilateral meetings between the Commission and national officials 
(Tigner, 2007). The majority of meetings with industry appear to have been with the 
large transnational defence firms, while the bilateral meetings with member states 
seem to have been particularly frequent. Amongst these, priority seems to have been 
given to the Big Three, and particularly Germany, with which the Commission met 
seven times during the September 2006 – April 2007 period, compared to four 
meetings with the UK, three with France and the Netherlands, and two with Italy. A 
Commission official attested to “preparing the defence community” through 
numerous meetings “over a number of years,” (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, 
European Commission).  
The key features of the consultation process were its intensity—as “countless 
meetings” were held— and its early commencement in the overall policy cycle, with 
the result that the entire endeavour had “taken years” (Interview 33, 15 April 2014, 
European Commission). As one ministry of defence official recalled, the Commission 
team “met with everybody,” and, from his perspective at least, was “surprisingly” 
willing “to be convinced” by the “ideas of stakeholders,” (Interview 32, 10 April 
2014, Member State Ministry of Defence). Another important aspect appears to have 
been the Commission’s willingness simply to wait for favourable responses to its 
proposals – itself an important policy entrepreneurship tool (Thatcher, 2006: 315). 
Thus, the Commission had originally set the deadline for the submission of 
stakeholder responses to the Green Paper for 23 January 2005. However, it decided to 
extend it when only two or three responses had been submitted by then. In fact, 
France was the only one of the member states with the greatest stake in a directive to 
have responded by the deadline (Shanson, 2005: 1). The French position, articulated 
by France’s NATO delegation Armaments Counsellor Alain Picq was one of 
“cautions support,” with a “preference” for a Commission communication clarifying 
the proper use of Article 346, as well as a non-binding intergovernmental instrument, 
which would “pave the way” for a Defence Procurement Directive in the long term 
(Europolitics, 2005a).  
As it were, the consultation deadline extension was “unofficial” and left the new 
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deadline vague, allotting the member states an additional two months, or “at least” 
until the end of March 2005 (Shanson, 2005: 1). Having received more than 20 
responses by the new deadline, the Commission had yet again pushed it forward, 
communicating to all stakeholders that it would “remain flexible” with the timing, as 
it waited for the more than 50 responses it desired (Shanson, 2005b: 4). Moreover, 
according to press reports, “no discernible trend” for or against the proposed measures 
had materialised by that time, and the remaining big member states had yet to submit 
their responses. In the end, the deadline was in fact extended until 15 September 
2005—a year after the publication of the Green Paper rather than the customary and 
originally announced four months— with 40 responses were submitted (EurActiv, 
2006; European Commission, 2005). Throughout the consultation process, both as 
part of the Green Paper and beyond it, the Commission was careful to “give the 
member states no reason to say no” to its proposals directly and definitively 
(Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission; European Commission, 
2005). Indeed, the juxtaposition of its representation of responses to the Green Paper 
with their actual content reveals a somewhat strategic use of information. Thus, 
according to the Commission, “almost all stakeholders supported a Community 
initiative in the field of defence procurement and ruled out the ‘no action’ option,” 
although, admittedly,  “the general picture with regard to a defence directive 
[specifically] is more complex” (European Commission, 2005: 5, 7). The actual 
responses of member states and industry, however, reveal at best a cautious reception 
of the Commission’s proposals, which envisions a defence procurement directive as a 
remote, vague possibility and is in fact closer to a veiled opposition than enthusiastic 
approval (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1133).   
For instance, the UK, in a non-paper released as a response to the Green Paper, 
articulated a position reportedly shared by a number EU governments that EU 
legislation on defence procurement “would be a cumbersome process that could take 
years” (House of Lords, 2005: paragraph 61). Therefore, transparency would 
“meanwhile” be best enhanced through a voluntary code of conduct administered by 
the EDA (ibid: paragraph 68). That the UK’s “meanwhile” was rather disingenuous is 
illustrated by the government’s justification for this position – that having a “member 
state controlled” EDA in the driving seat would “avoid the potential for confrontation 
over Commission competence in the area of defence procurement,” that is, effectively 
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keep the Commission away from the defence equipment market issues (House of 
Lords, 2005: paragraph 64). Yet, although nervousness on the part of “stakeholders” 
was pervasive, as was insistence that a directive could only be a long-term objective, 
only Germany raised a significant objection, and “only” in the 2007 consultation 
round, citing the existence of the EDA (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European 
Commission). As will be demonstrated below, the resulting “autonomy” to “keep 
working” as well as the fact that none of the big member states in particular had 
“killed” its proposal at the beginning proved fundamental to the Commission’s 
success in securing the passage of the Directive (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, 
European Commission; Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence; Chapter VI). Thus, the DG MARKT officials working on defence 
procurement enjoyed “almost complete freedom of manoeuvre” as a result of the 
largely disinterested Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, who was 
content to provide a high degree of flexibility as long as the “boat was not rocked” too 
violently (Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission; Interview 16, 6 
February 2014, European Commission). Indeed, in the material presented above there 
have been precious few public statements, speeches, or presentations made by 
McCreevy when compared to Industry and Enterprise Commissioner Guenter 
Verheugen, even though DG MARKT was the “lead Directorate” on the Defence 
Procurement Directive.  
 
Defining the Policy Problem and Providing the Solution 
The Commission had also engaged in what is regarded as part and parcel of policy 
entrepreneurship—namely issue framing via problem definition and prescription of 
solutions (Chapter II). This constitutes the continuation of the tactics it employed 
during the agenda-setting stage, and reflects the theoretical insights introduced in 
Chapter II, namely, that policy entrepreneurs may remain active throughout the entire 
policy cycle, and may rely on policy framing during any stage of it, not just agenda-
setting. Thus, similarly to other policy entrepreneurs, throughout this endeavour the 
European Commission had consistently connected its vision of the problem-solution 
landscape to the greater European good, while presenting itself as the best-placed and 
legitimate actor able to attain it (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1127). Considering the 
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Commission’s role as the steward of the internal market, wielding significant 
regulatory and executive powers, it is only natural that it would consistently portray 
its forays into the intergovernmental territory as a quest for efficiency, 
competitiveness and value for money. The Commission’s portrayal of the 2003 
“testing the waters” Communication as a “blueprint” to remedy the EU’s “fragmented 
market, with fragmented stakeholders” was already highlighted above (European 
Voice, 2003). However, this characterisation was reiterated and reinforced throughout 
all subsequent Commission documentation which materialised in the course of the 
policy formulation stage. Thus, with the publication of the consultative Green Paper, 
the Commission was ostensibly trying to “help Member States …get better value in 
[sic] the 30 billion euro plus EU market for defence,” while the proposal for the 
Defence Procurement Directive was introduced as a measure to “enhance openness 
and competitiveness of defence markets in the EU” (European Commission, 2004b: 
29; European Commission, 2007b: 6). An informative illustration of the this logic 
may also be found in the Commission’s Strategic Initiatives Work Programme for 
2007 which defined the “problem” precluding the formation of a European Defence 
Equipment Market as one of inter-member state defence market fragmentation, 
spilling over into disjointed research efforts and incompatible industrial bases 
(European Commission 2006: 53). The resulting poorly functioning market and 
procurement processes were in turn enabled by the “extensive use” of Article 346, 
which has led to “uncoordinated national procurement rules … in market segments 
which de jure fall under community rules” (European Commission 2006: 57, 
emphasis added).  
However, the Commission also took care to appeal to “defence audiences” by 
highlighting the role of the EDEM in strengthening CSDP capabilities. As a result, 
The Work Programme  approvingly mentioned the “increased emphasis on CSDP” 
that in the view of the Commission, “was paving the way for a progressively stronger 
framework for a European defence equipment policy” (European Commission 2006: 
53). In fact, the rhetoric of European security and defence in general and CSDP in 
particular was never absent from the Commission’s argumentation. Both the 2003 
Communication and the consultative Green Paper drew attention to the harm caused 
by defence market fragmentation to the ability of EU defence industry to meet the 
requirements of a viable CSDP (European Commission, 2003:6; European 
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Commission, 2004: 4). This argument, frequently reiterated by the Commission, 
emphasised the development of the CSDP as both evolving in the same direction as 
the Commission’s thinking and in dire need of added efficiency and credibility. 
Meanwhile, the status quo—duplication and fragmentation stemming from the 
indiscriminate invocation of Article 346— was cast as detrimental to member states 
efforts in the EU’s defence and security arena. In addition, the Interpretive 
Communication on the Application of Article 296 released by the Commission in 
2006 took a slightly different approach by emphasising the noxious impact of EU 
defence market fragmentation on the ability of member states to equip their national 
armed forces (European Commission, 2006b: 2). The document pointedly advised the 
member states to “take into account” the “ever-growing convergence of national 
interests” between them “when assessing whether the application of EU procurement 
rules…would undermine the essential interests of their security” (European 
Commission, 2006b: 7). The official Proposal for a Directive contained in the 
Defence Package opened with the assertion that “the creation of a European defence 
equipment market is a key factor in backing the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)” by developing the military capabilities it required (European 
Commission 2007b: 3, 11). This was also the focal argument of Commission officials 
when they presented their case during the hearings of the European Parliament’s Sub-
Committee on Defence and Security on 17 July 2007 (Europolitics, 2007a).  
Having defined the problem as one of market fragmentation and presented the 
solution as an integrated European defence equipment market in support of CSDP, the 
Commission concluded that “only an intervention at EU level,” one that goes beyond 
member states’ efforts and can therefore only mean Community involvement, “could 
build a single market in this sector” which would then enhance competitiveness, yield 
economies of scale, and focus research and development activity (European 
Commission, 2007: 53). As “the Guardian of the Treaty” it argued that it was the most 
appropriate actor, and in fact the “only possible actor” to provide policy solutions to 
the “widespread use of the exemption from EC law,” not least in the shape of a 
“specific Directive” (ibid). Furthermore, when unveiling the Interpretive 
Communication and looking ahead to future proposals, Commission officials 
presented these initiatives as urgent and unavoidable as well as being “so clearly 
based on European common sense” that it was difficult to see how member states 
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could object to their implementation (Ames, 2006a; Flight International, 2007a). In 
addition, the rationale for the proposed legislation was consistently portrayed as an 
important component of the Lisbon strategy “for growth and jobs” (Europolitics, 
2007a). The 2007 Defence Package featured a general communication on enhancing 
the competitiveness of the EU’s defence sector alongside the proposed Directives on 
Defence Procurement and Intra-EU Defence Transfers.31 Consequently, the 
Commission expressed confidence that “stakeholders would welcome Community 
action to overcome market fragmentation and increase competition in the defence 
markets” (European Commission, 2007: 57). 
In short, a conscious effort was exerted by the Commission to present the Directive as 
a logical solution to “an economic problem,” and one to be addressed through 
increased efficiency derived from the economies of scale (Mallinder, 2007). The 
regulatory instrument was also connected to the imperative of constructing a genuine 
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) to harness the EU’s 
competitive strength and alleviate the competitiveness pressure on its defence 
industry. According to the European Commission, such a “true industrial base,” when 
created, would be “more than [just] the sum of national industries” (Europolitics, 
2008d). Invariably, these objectives were linked to several “greater goods,” including 
the Lisbon Strategy and the development of a credible CSDP.  
Beneath this somewhat self-aggrandising rhetoric lay the more strategic objective of 
ensuring that the Commission’s EDEM proposals would be discussed via the 
“community method” of Pillar One. In the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, this would have 
eventually triggered a supranational decision-making process via qualified majority 
voting (QMV) at the final stage—considerably more favourable to the Commission’s 
aims given the “hostile terrain” of member states’ “suspicious” reactions to them 
(Georgopolous, 2008a: 1). The requirement for co-decision with the European 
Parliament also looked attractive in light of its increasingly favourable disposition to 
communitarising defence procurement. Moreover, framing the rationale for binding 
EU-level rules in defence procurement as an internal market issue would draw 
delegates from member states’ ministries of the economy, industry and finance into 
the Commission’s consultation process. They, in turn, espoused a staunchly liberal, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Please see: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/documents/index_en.htm	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free-market ethos and were committed to obtaining value for money in all areas of 
national administration, including defence procurement (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State 2). In addition, the Commission 
could draw upon decades’ worth of institutional “experience” with these national 
structures, whereas it was largely unfamiliar with ministries of defence as 
interlocutors. 
 
Grasping the Initiative and Managing Role Perception 
Downplaying Significance of Proposals  
 
Another tactic that may be discerned in the Commission’s policy caretaking arsenal 
was a sort of public relations campaign. It centred upon assuaging fears in national 
capitals as to any invasive supranational encroachment. Instead, Commission officials 
emphasised its function as a facilitator of necessary reforms, serving member states’ 
interest, but deferring to their authority. As recalled by the Enterprise and Industry 
Commissioner Guenter Verheugen, who oversaw the Defence Transfers Directive 
introduced together with the procurement measures in the Commission’s Defence 
Package, the “Commission was very wise not to …create the impression there is a 
question of new competences, new powers” (Mallinder, 2007).  This message could 
be traced to the early stages of the Commission’s activity in this field. At an event 
specifically dedicated to discussion of issues raised by the Commission’s 2004 Green 
Paper, (then) Defense News’ Brooks Tigner obliquely mused on the likelihood of the 
Commission taking no further action if the Green Paper agenda found no 
intergovernmental support.  In response, the Commission’s Defence Expert Sandra 
Mezzadri who oversaw these early initiatives, assured all those present that the 
Commission had “no hidden agenda,” and was merely setting out its “thinking” and 
launching a debate, but not providing any lasting solutions in the absence of “the 
required political backing” (SDA 2005: 12). Meanwhile, the Green Paper itself made 
frequent references to the working of the intergovernmental Council Working Party 
on Armaments Policy (POLARM), the Western European Armaments Group 
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(WEAG), and the [European Defence] Agency Establishment Team, in order to give 
credence to the subsidiarity principle and thus “move carefully” through the volatile 
terrain of member states’ reactions (European Commission 2004; van Eekelen 2005: 
54). 
In parallel, the Commission took pains to convey to the twitchy member states that it 
appreciated just how sensitive the issue of a defence equipment market was to them. 
This argument was concertedly reiterated, as, when following the release of the 
Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296, the Commission 
“stressed that it was not up to it to assess member states’ essential security interests, 
nor which military equipment they procured to protect those interests” (Europolitics, 
2006b). Commission officials also emphasised in a full-length article published in the 
trade publication Defence Management that it was only “natural” for the governments 
to want to “lead” the construction of an EU-wide defence market (Defence 
Management, 2008). The role of the Commission, the piece continued, was to support 
them in this endeavour by providing instruments to “make regulatory framework for 
defence more coherent and efficient” (ibid). Thus, the intention of the proposed 
Directive was to enable “the member states [to] then find it easier to resort less often 
to Article 346” with the help of the new “defence specific and more flexible rules” 
(Europolitics, 2007a). Consequently, in the Commission’s representation, the 
potential legislative instrument appeared as a useful tool “at the disposal of” member 
states which they “can” use to “enable them” to limit the use of Article 346 to 
exceptional cases (ibid; emphasis added).  
Commission officials also took care to describe their proposals as complementary to 
the work of the EDA. For instance, speaking at an EDA-organised conference on the 
development of the EDTIB, Guenter Verheugen, who, in addition to his post as 
Enterprise and Industry Director was also serving as the Commission Vice-President 
at the time, assured the audience that even though “much of the practical, daily work” 
involved in building a European defence technological and industrial base is the 
responsibility of the EDA, it is a multi-faceted endeavour and the Commission’s 
agenda “can also act as a catalyst in the process,” (Flight International, 2007a). It 
appeared that the Commission’s placating efforts were at least partially successful, 
when the EDA’s then Head of Industry and Market Directorate Ulf Hammarstroem 
felt comfortable enough to stress that the Commission “only” hoped to achieve less 
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use of Article 346, and that “once a government chose to invoke [it], a directive 
automatically did not apply” (Beatty, 2007a). Such apparent comity likely stemmed 
from an initial “sense” of camaraderie described by EDA officials in relation to their 
counterparts in the Commission also “working” on defence market issues (Interview 
36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and 
Member State).  
Pushing for Agenda Leadership 
Underneath the publicity, however, a less conciliatory picture may be found. Defence 
procurement legislation proposed by the Commission would of course involve if not 
new formal competences, then certainly imbue old ones with greater reach. In 
particular, the Commission stood to gain powers to initiate infringement proceedings 
against errant member states, potentially referring them to the European Court of 
Justice if they did not correct their ways.  In fact, the Green Paper raised the 
possibility of applying the proposed defence directive to collaborative defence 
procurement – now one of the legislation’s major exclusions—which would have 
authorised the Commission to scrutinise procurement activities of the EDA itself and 
every other contracting authority (Georgopolous, 2007:220). Such provisions, in 
effect, would unequivocally curtail member states’ decisions to apply Article 346, 
compelling them to consider Community-defined conditions when making the 
“choice” invoked by Hammarstroem.  
Despite its consistent and unwavering attestations to the contrary, careful scrutiny of 
the Commission’s proposals reveals that they were not in fact complementary to the 
EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. Rather, it remained persistently 
unclear how and whether the provisions of proposed Defence Procurement Directive 
and the Code of Conduct could co-exist (O’Donnell, 2009: 4).  After all, if a military 
equipment contract was judged by the member states as non-sensitive “enough” to be 
published for tender on the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) as part of the Code, then 
surely, the Commission would be able to question why it was too sensitive for the 
Directive? (Interview 2, 15 December, 2011, European Commission). Therefore, the 
Commission’s congenial narrative of the Directive addressing contracts where Article 
346 does not apply and the Code covering those which fall under the exemption is 
rather disingenuous. Again, as indicated above, the central issue in this debate was the 
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very determination of which contracts would merit the Article 346 exemption and 
which authority would prevail in that decision. 
The competition for institutional dominance between the Commission and the EDA, 
as well as the tension between their respective agendas and lines of responsibility 
have been consistently noted in the literature and specialised media (Georgopolous 
2007: 219; Bauer, 2005; O’Donnell, 2009: 4; Leonard, 2005). Thus, the remarkably 
swift and coordinated establishment of the EDA has been at least in part attributed to 
the nervous jolt the member states had felt as a result of the publication of the 
Commission’s 2003 Communication Defence-Industrial and Market Issues—Towards 
and EU Equipment Policy (Georgopolous, 2005; 2007: 119-220; Trybus, 2007). This 
claim would certainly provide a more nuanced explanation for why, although the EU 
Council had accepted “the thrust” of the Commission’s proposal, it had urgently 
tasked the EDA during its first year of existence with the “early assumption of its role 
of interlocutor with the Commission on current Commission initiatives” in the 
defence market (EDA, 2004). Furthermore, the EDA’s Code of Conduct followed on 
the heels of the EC’s consultative Green Paper on extending Community instruments 
into defence procurement. Indeed, according to the UK’s House of Lords European 
Union Committee, progress in finalising the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement was “partly prompted” by the publication of the Commission’s Green 
Paper, indicating its intent to pursue defence industrial matters further (House of 
Lords, 2006). In particular, the Agency was required to produce a parallel, 
complementary initiative, as well as providing input into the Commission’s 
consultation process (House of Lords 2005: paragraph 65). Nick Witney, the former 
(and first) Executive Director of the EDA, had by then already informed the UK’s 
Ministry of Defence that the EDA’s  message to the Commission would most likely 
be that “it will be a slog to get there,” “there” being a legally binding defence 
procurement regime (House of Lords, 2005: paragraph 67).  
It is helpful to recall that national governments have always been strongly attached to 
their historically unchallenged prerogative to invoke the Article 346 exemption 
whenever they chose. As will be demonstrated in Chapter V, most member states had 
therefore regarded the Code as the primary vehicle bringing the issue of an EU 
defence equipment market to the fore, while the Commission’s  proposals were only 
“an echo” of this agenda (House of Lords, 2008:6; Chapter V). As one former official 
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of a member state’s permanent representation to the EU attested, national 
governments “did not want the EC telling them what to do” in any aspect of defence, 
“full stop” (Interview 9, 14 November 2013, Member State Permanent 
Representation). Therefore, placing a restriction on this jealously guarded privilege, 
or as many capitals would view it, this right, at member states’ “disposal” that they 
then “can” use to limit their own freedom of manoeuvre would  require careful 
framing indeed.  
One episode illustrates this “unspoken tension” between the Commission and the 
EDA well (Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence). 
When the Code of Conduct was discussed in the Commission’s Impact Study, it was 
pronounced inadequate for addressing  defence market “problem” as the Commission 
had  described it.  Specifically, the document remarked that the effectiveness of the 
Code in its own field of application “remained to be seen” (2007: 39). The 
authors went on to note that to date (of publication of the Impact Assessment – 
December 2007), the Code had not resulted in a single inter-state contract award, 
while, as supported by an anonymous testimony of “one Member State,” there had 
already emerged a tendency to disregard its terms, in order to escape the sceptre of 
community rules (2007: 39). Although this trend became significantly more 
pronounced following the final stages of the Defence Procurement Directive 
negotiations—that is, the latter half of 2008—and particularly in the aftermath of the 
legislation’s approval, its causal significance for the research question posed here 
entitles it to some elaboration at this earlier stage, as well. Thus, the rather cryptic 
reference made by the Commission refers to the reluctance of member states’ defence 
contracting authorities to post contracts for competitive tender on the Electronic 
Bulletin Board  (EBB), which constitutes the central commitment under the Code of 
Conduct. As was indicated in Chapter IV, the EU’s major defence industrial players 
began to grow disillusioned with the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct during its 
second year of operation, July 2007 – July 2008 (Chapter IV).  
Chapter V will argue that this ineffectuality in fact stemmed from the fundamental 
institutional weakness and inherent structural tensions within an intergovernmental 
organisation such as the EDA itself  (Chapter V).  As has been highlighted in a 
number of interviews, however, the key factor in member states’ disappointing 
performance as far as the EBB itself was concerned was their “fear” that the 
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Commission would “scrutinise” the contracts they had opened to competition and 
attempt to subject them to the discipline of the Directive instead (Interview 32, 10 
April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA 
and Member State; Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 26, 
3 April, Industry). As explained in Chapter I, a member state’s decision to publicise a 
procurement opportunity on the EBB signifies that it is “covered” by the Article 346 
exemption.  In other words, the ministry of defence in question had exercised the 
Treaty-based right to exempt a tender from the open competition rules of the internal 
market as their application would have undermined the “essential interests of its 
security.” Yet, having also subscribed to the Code of Conduct, it had judged that this 
particular contract was not sensitive “enough” to merit non-competitive procurement, 
and could as a result be opened “to suppliers having a technological and/or industrial 
base in each other’s territories” (EDA, 2005: 1). The “fear” mentioned above 
stemmed from the possibility that the Commission would then “question” the 
legitimacy of opening contracts to competition via the Code, while keeping them 
“away” from the Directive on the grounds of “essential security interests” (Interivew 
2, 15 December, 2011, European Commission). The consequences of it then referring 
the “errant” member state to the ECJ, were this to follow, would be particularly 
serious, as the legal precedent of court sanction under the Defence Procurement 
Directive would significantly extend the reach of its application and limit the member 
states’ ability to exploit the loopholes within it.  
The rhetoric of the Commission described above thus marks the beginning of its 
tendency to highlight the limitations of the Code in order to argue that the “member 
states did not really want to” open markets voluntarily, giving the Commission a 
“reason to force their hand” by moving full steam with the Directive (Interview 19, 26 
February 2014, EDA and Member State). Yet, the Commission’s “taking initiative on 
industry and market issues” was not solely a product of its clever policy 
entrepreneurship strategy, but was enabled to a considerable extent by the “political 
frustrations” within the EDA, a lack of sustained commitment on the part of member 
states to the Agency’s development, and discord amongst them as to its ultimate 
purpose (Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 11, 6 
December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Chapter V).  Towards the end of 2007, then, it had become 
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apparent to EDA officials, at least, that the role of the EDA in the defence industrial 
sphere “was diminishing as the role of the Commission was increasing”  (Interview 
38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State). The “less and less” willingness of the 
Commission “to coordinate with the EDA” was combined with a marked acceleration 
in its pace of work during the second half of 2007, since, according to one former 
senior Agency official, the Commission had set a target for itself to achieve an 
“internal market of defence” by 2012 (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member 
State).  Other officials working for the EDA at the time spoke of “a turf war” which 
the Commission waged with the Agency (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and 
Member State 2). According to their views, it was a struggle which the EDA 
ultimately lost. Their rhetoric characterised this development as a “wresting” of 
policy initiative from the EDA’s I&M Directorate, and one recalled “really feeling” 
this “seizure” (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State 2; Interview 34, 
16 April 2014, EDA and Member State).  
 
Engaging with Defence Industry: Overtures and Uphill Battles 
In addition to carving out an increasing degree of policy initiative vis-à-vis the EDA, 
the European Commission also took pains to position its efforts as a push to boost the 
competitiveness of the EU’s defence industry by “liberating” it from the straightjacket 
of fragmented national regulation (European Commission, 2004: 3). According to this 
narrative, the Commission was attempting to “achieve better business opportunities 
for European companies which are suffering from heavy competition from outside 
[the EU]” as well as “to encourage the abandonment of traditional monopolistic 
schemes in member states” (Europolitics, 2006b). Commission officials also spoke of 
convincing “governments…to get their acts together and allow industry to broaden its 
options” (Ames, 2006a, 2006b). In addition, Charlie McCreevy, then Internal Market 
Commissioner, was quoted in Jane’s Defence Weekly, an influential trade publication, 
as calling on the EU governments “to put their foot on the gas” as “the future of 
Europe’s defence industry was at stake” (Anderson, 2006). Moreover, during the July 
2007 hearing of the Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), a 
DG Enterprise and Industry official  described the upcoming legislative proposals as a 
means “to roll out a genuine internal market for the defence industry” (Europolitics, 
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2007a). Finally, when the Proposal for a Defence Procurement Directive did 
materialise, it was accompanied by a Communication introducing a Strategy for a 
Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry, and described the 
Proposal as “an essential framework for the establishment of a more competitive and 
stronger defence industry” (European Commission, 2007c:6) 
Another strand within the “industry-friendly” argument advanced by the Commission 
focused on one of the core “grievances” of defence firms described above – that of 
market access to “third markets” in general and the United States in particular. Thus, 
the Commission assured that it was “looking at improvements” in security of 
information exchange in procurement, synergies between civil and defence markets, 
and access to non-EU markets (Europolitics, 2007b). In media interviews 
accompanying the release of the Proposal for a Defence Directive both McCreevy 
and Guenther Verheugen, Commissioner for Industry, spoke of their intention to 
“open up third markets,” while the Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive 
European Defence Industry pointedly remarked that the European defence industry is 
“effectively excluded from supplying the US market,” whilst the EU market has been 
welcoming to US firms (Europolitics, 2007b; European Commission, 2007c: 9).  
Keenly aware that “industry concerns” were “on everybody’s mind,” it is unsurprising 
that the Commission would attempt to portray its legislative proposals as an extension 
of the supranational helping hand to Europe’s struggling defence firms (Interview 16, 
6 February 2014, European Commission). Behind the scenes, however, the 
Commission’s resources were being directed at the “uphill struggle” involved in 
“helping industry understand,” that there “were opportunities for them,” in a more 
open market with greater competition (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European 
Commission). Such efforts were obstructed by frustrations on both sides. It was 
already emphasised in Chapter III that many amongst industry believed the 
Commission’s initiative to be misguided, inadequate, and even downright harmful. 
For their part, the officials at DG MARKT were irritated by the “cognitive deficit,” 
which kept the defence firms’ representatives  anchored to a blind defence of “their 
customer’s (that is, the home government’s) interests,” (Interview 16, 6 February 
2014, European Commission ).   
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 Compromises and Concessions 
The story told thus far has been one of the Commission moving steadily towards the 
achievement of its objective to extend internal market principles to the member state-
dominated field of defence procurement. However, there is another aspect to this 
process, as well. It is one of de-scaling ambitions and engaging in compromise. The 
experience of one senior official in the British Ministry of Defence who was familiar 
with the Directive negotiations, was that the “Commission was pretty good at 
learning,” and had “recognised where the political red lines were,” (Interview 11, 6 
December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence). Indeed, the Commission 
appeared consistently aware of the limitation of its powers throughout the policy 
process. In particular, even though the European Parliament had initially urged it to 
extend the provisions  of a community instrument to defence procurement undertaken 
even under the Article 346 exemption, the Commission settled on the field of 
application outside of the exemption by the time the official consultation period drew 
to a close, (European Report, 2005b). In another instance, during the fall of 2006 the 
Commission was still planning to issue separate legislative proposals for “non-
strategic” and “strategic” defence purchases. This would have amounted to dictating 
where member states could apply Article 346 as opposed to merely spelling out in 
which cases they would be legally challenged if they did so. Within a year, however, 
the Commission had found that this “was too complicated to do,” and instead decided 
to pursue “procurement rules that are flexible enough to be used for the majority of 
defence purchases and which make Article 346 more difficult to apply” (Tigner, 
2007).  
Consequently, by the Commission’s own admission, the draft Directive proposed in 
December 2007 was “less ambitious” than originally intended, due to a sobering 
assessment of opposition from the member states (Europolitics, 3 November 2008d). 
As the UK’s House of Lords Committee on the European Union seems to have 
understood, the main objective of the Commission’s proposals for a directive was to 
limit the use of Article 346, and it is one that stems from the recognition that the 
“dream” of removing the exemption altogether was unattainable (House of Lords 
2008: 9). Moreover, the initiative took the form of a directive rather than a much more 
forceful regulation considered at first because, as the Enterprise and Industry 
Commissioner acknowledged at the time, “it was clear that a draft regulation would 
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not pass the Council” (ibid). Yet, these concessions must be balanced against the 
Commission’s perception that, given the widespread opposition it encountered, 
securing the approval of a directive qualified as a victory in itself. Thus, its Impact 
Assessment Study attested to the abandonment of non-legislative policy options “early 
on” in the consultation process. What is more, lending credence to Blauberger and 
Weiss’ argument, the Commission hinted that it made the “choice” to engage 
seriously with the proposed directive “easier” for the “vast majority” of the national 
representatives when it conveyed to them that the status quo would mean increased 
legal challenges “for abuse of the [Article 346] exemption” (European Commission, 
2007: 36. Chapter II).  Nor, as will be highlighted below, has the Commission proved 
so eager to “close the deal” that it sacrificed all objectionable aspects of it.  
	  
Decision-­‐Making	  
Reaping the Benefits of Policy Entrepreneurship  
The co-decision voting procedure implies that once the Commission submits a 
legislative proposal, the pre-vote deliberations are carried out by the Council and 
Parliament aiming to agree upon a text. However, in recent years, in order to achieve 
an agreement on the first reading—essentially, after just one round of negotiations—it 
has been customary to involve the Commission in “trialogue” deliberations as well. 
Thus, the Commission remained involved in the Defence Directive negotiations even 
during the decision-making stage.  The “location” of the defence proposal in the First 
Pillar represents a measure of the Commission’s success in framing the EDEM 
agenda as an internal market issue. This venue was crucial to the eventual adoption of 
the Directive, not least due to the qualified majority voting (QMV) decision process 
and tendency to find compromise prevailing in the “Community method,” (Interview 
16, 6 February 2014, European Commission). Another causally decisive step the 
Commission took was purposefully timing the publication of the Directive Proposal 
in order to secure the highest chance of it coinciding with the French EU Council 
Presidency that commenced in July 2008 (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State 
Ministry of Defence ; Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Chapter V). Indeed, the view of some participants in the process was 
that the largely technical, “nitty-gritty” nature of discussions on the proposal during 
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the six months predating the French Presidency was a conscious stalling technique 
employed by the Commission towards this end (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member 
State Ministry of Defence). The Commission would have been well aware that the 
preceding Slovenian Presidency, representing as yet a new, small member state, 
lacked the capacity, influence, and experience needed to secure agreement.  
As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the Defence Directive Proposal 
was the product of the Commission’s dedication to “actively preparing the terrain” for 
EU legislation in defence procurement, through “discussions, consultations, and 
Communications,” so that even the 1996 and 1997 Communications were part of this 
“long game” (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European Commission; 32, 10 April 
2014, Member State Ministry of Defence ; Chapter I). This preparatory activity 
contributed to “all minds coalescing gradually around the need for a directive,” by the 
time the French Presidency took up the EDEM agenda (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation). In addition to such “ripe” conditions, the 
“many consultations” carried out by the Commission also contributed to the high 
substantive quality of the draft that reached the French Presidency (Interview 37, 20 
May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation). Therefore, the advanced 
standard of the draft was a major factor behind the surprisingly brief negotiating 
period over the proposed legislation (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). 
Throughout this preparatory work, as already indicated above, no member state put 
forth “specific obstacles” other than the issue of offsets, and even this barrier was not 
insurmountable for the Commission, as will be explained shortly (Interview 32, 10 
April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence).  Thus, according to one former 
senior EDA official, it appeared that the Commission “simply continued working 
because it did not face barriers and suddenly the member states found the Directive 
Proposal on their desks which they had to approve” (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State). Another EDA veteran characterised member states’ reaction 
to Commission activity as “let them come, we can fall back on our vast woods and 
country, like the Russians; we can suck them in and spit them out until they leave” 
(Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). This somewhat unorthodox reading was 
corroborated by a retired national MoD official, who had occupied a highly senior 
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post, when he expressed “confidence” that the Commission could have its 
“intellectual victory” for the time being, but it  “would have plenty to get on with—
such as pounding the member states over commodities, transport, boots, vests [that is, 
the defence equipment that would fall under the provisions of the Directive]—before 
it gets to the sensitive and complex stuff that really matters” (Interview 7, 9 August 
2013, Member State Ministry of Defence ).  
Unsurprisingly, the perspective of the Commission was rather different. Specifically, 
the dynamic of “if you cannot stop them, join them!” has taken hold among member 
states and industry in the course of the negotiations, who had eventually conceded 
that the Commission “was not the ultimate evil” (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, 
European Commission). The “intellectual leadership” it believed it exercised was 
amplified by the nature of its interlocutors. As highlighted above, many of the 
Commission’s “stakeholders” from the member states were officials from ministries 
of finance, economy, or industry. This composition was replicated within the 
Directive Proposal negotiating delegations of France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and 
Spain (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence). Their 
“liberal,” “transborder” ethos privileging free markets, as well as their penchant for 
“hard versus soft law” set the negotiating tone for a long time, since Ministry of 
Defence representatives, who were also included, did not become fully involved or 
assume leading roles until a late stage in the process (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, 
Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member 
State; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 19, 26 
February 2014, EDA and Member State). All these conditions contributed to the 
“strong resolve” and “political energy,” which the Commission deployed towards 
ensuring that the member states “found the consensus necessary to issue the 
Directive” (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation; 
Palloni and Lizza 2012: 2975). As during the agenda shaping stage, this endeavour 
entailed securing agreement, while preserving an advantageous balance between 
compromise and insistence on terms that would lead to an actual change in national 
behaviour.   
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Enjoying the Support of the European Parliament  
Considering the co-decision procedure guiding the Directive Proposal negotiations, it 
is during this time that the role of the European Parliament became most visible, 
requiring concerted analytical attention as well. As indicated throughout this chapter, 
the Parliament, had consistently advocated greater defence market integration in 
Europe for more than two decades. Although both bodies may be characterised as 
inherent proponents of “more Europe,” the Parliament and the Commission do not 
always pursue complimentary, or similar, objectives through EU legislation. Yet, 
even though this is not the norm within the legislative process, the Commission and 
the Parliament had proven strong allies as far as EDEM and the Defence Procurement 
Directive itself were concerned. The Parliament’s role in furthering and shaping the 
EDEM agenda has been highlighted throughout this chapter. This dynamic also 
characterised the decision-making period following the release of the Directive 
Proposal in mid-December of 2007. Thus, the interaction between the Commission, 
or more specifically DG MARKT, and the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
(IMCO) Committee of the Parliament under whose remit the proposed legislation fell, 
was marked by a “supportive climate,” “fruitful cooperation,” and a “constructive 
relationship” (Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament; Interview 17, 10 
February 2014, European Commission; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation).  IMCO continued to advance the goal of communitarising 
defence procurement—or rather as “much” of it as was feasible—throughout 2008. In 
particular, under the skilled rapporteurship of its Chair Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, 
the Committee set about introducing more than 500 amendments while aiming to 
“close as many loopholes which the member states could exploit as possible” 
(Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament ). In addition, obtaining the high-
profile Defence Package constituted a personal career ambition for Lambsdorff, who 
believed himself to be opportunely placed for dealing with this brief as a result of also 
serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee and supporting the overall aims of the 
Commission (Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament).  
In order to secure parliamentary majority in a legislative body that was as a whole 
ideologically wary of “ facilitating arms sales,” Lambsdorff presented the Directive as 
a means of benefiting tax payers and enhancing transparency (Interview 40, 28 May 
2014, European Parliament). During debates and in the “many, many” press releases 
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issued by the MEP’s office during this time, these aspects were repeatedly 
emphasised, while the “defence” aspects were played down (Interview 40, 28 May 
2014, European Parliament). This was a deliberate strategy, which may be traced back 
to the Kangaroo Group discussions described above, in order to avoid “giving the 
impression” to Parliament that “this was about the militarisation of the European 
Union” and making “life easier for arms manufacturers” (Interview 40, 28 May 2014, 
European Parliament). Thus, one of IMCO’s early working documents on the 
proposed Directive described the aim of the legislation as achieving “greater cost 
efficiency, thereby benefiting both national budgets and the arms industry” (European 
Parliament, 2008: 2). Comparatively, the statement that “providing the armed forces 
with the best possible equipment” is “just as important,” appeared to be more of an 
obligatory afterthought (European Parliament, 2008b:2). In contrast, in its opinion to 
IMCO, the EP’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) welcomed the 
initiative of the Commission to bring about a transparent and competitive EDEM, 
listing its benefits to Europe’s defence industry immediately after heralding its 
contribution to CSDP (European Parliament, 2008c: 3). It is a testament to IMCO’s 
framing efforts and Lambsdorff’s skill and determination as Rapporteur that the 
Defence Procurement Directive was adopted at the first reading with a 597 to 69 
majority and 33 abstentions. 
 
Compromising, Standing Firm, and Avoiding Deal-Breakers 
As already discussed above, a measure of skilful policy entrepreneurship and 
caretaking is the ability to strike the optimum balance between compromises offered 
to veto-players in order to secure their agreement, and safeguarding the interests and 
policy objectives of the entrepreneur itself. The Commission’s efforts to achieve this 
equilibrium continued throughout the decision-making stage of the policy process, 
and, as will be explained shortly, were in fact crucial to its conclusion. Firstly, 
although it was a contentious proposition for the Commission to adopt vis-à-vis 
several member states, in its final form the Directive was extended to cover sensitive 
non-military security procurement as well. This category included contracts related to 
border protection, police activities and crisis management operations (Europolitics, 
2009). Indeed, the UK and Germany were amongst the staunchest opponents of 
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extending the Directive’s provisions to the security sector, and had lobbied against it 
(European Report, 2008). To counteract this position, the Commission had reached 
out to member states with paramilitary forces, namely, gendarmeries, carabinieri, and 
Guardia Civil, in order to secure their support for the security clause (House of Lords 
2008: 9). Yet, although the QMV procedures should theoretically have ensured that 
this minority with the UK at the helm would not be able to attain its aim, the 
fundamental British concern in this matter—that the intelligence sector be shielded 
from the Directive’s provisions—was accommodated in the end with the help of an 
exemption (ibid).  
In order to address the contentious issue of offsets, the course of action upon which 
the Commission settled was to avoid their mention in the Directive text altogether. 
Even as 2008 was drawing to a close, and with it, the debates in Council and 
Parliament over the proposed Defence Procurement Directive, Enterprise and Industry 
Commissioner Guenter Verheugen lamented to the press that although he found offset 
arrangements “undesirable” there was “no legal solution” to their continued use 
(Europolitics, 2008d). According to the curious justification provided by the 
Commission, prohibiting offsets would mean that they had been accepted in the first 
place, which, given their inherently discriminatory nature from a trade perspective, 
was not the case. For this reason, neither could offsets be legitimised, as they 
contravened internal market rules. In reality, however, as the Commission itself has 
acknowledged, the true dilemma lay in the very likely opposition from a number of 
member states to stringent restrictions by the Commission, spelling “the end of the 
[Directive] proposal itself” (European Commission, 2007b: 48; Georgopolous, 2008b: 
2). Therefore, in the words of the Dutch Commissioner of Military Production Rini 
Goos as reported in the trade publication Countertrade and Offset, “no way [did] the 
European Commission dare to tackle the issue of offsets in a directive or in other 
legislation” (Shanson, 2010: 2). 
In order to resolve this conundrum, the Defence Procurement Directive instead 
defined subcontracting rules, focusing on transparency requirements. In particular, 
bidding companies were required to indicate if part of the work was to be 
subcontracted, while national contracting authorities could oblige contract holders to 
subcontract up to 30% of the main contract. These provisions were intended to make 
the recourse to offsets unnecessary by providing a legally-acceptable means of 
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channelling defence business opportunities to local industry, provided, of course, that 
this was done on a competitive basis. Thus, the purchasing government could not 
demand that the selection of subcontractor be based on national affiliation and could 
only require subcontracts which are directly relevant to the main contract. 
Consequently, these stipulations differed from offsets in three crucial ways – firstly, 
the purpose of offsetting is to steer defence business to the purchasing government’s 
domestic industry, meaning that the “national element” is key. Second, a large 
number of offset requirements are indirect, meaning that they do not pertain to the 
main defence contract. Finally, offset arrangements  usually far exceed the 30 per cent 
value level of the main contract stipulated by the Directive. Therefore, replacing the 
entrenched practice of offsets with its sub-contracting provisions amounted to 
restricting them in potentially fundamental ways. 
Consequently, following the approval of the Directive, these sub-contracting 
provisions have come under frequent criticism by industry and member state 
representatives (Jane’s Defence Weekly 2011a; 2011b; 2011c). The dissatisfaction 
appears to have stemmed from the Commission’s publication of the Guidance Note 
on Offsets in October 2010, that is, nearly two years after the Directive had been 
approved by the Council. The Note clearly states that “as restrictive measures 
infringing primary law, offset requirements can only be justified on the basis of one of 
the Treaty-based derogations, in particular Article 346 TFEU” (European 
Commission, 2010: 1). The document, which although not legally binding, is likely to 
be considered by the ECJ when deciding upon any case brought against member 
states under the Deference Procurement Directive, further adds that such derogations 
cannot be justified on the basis of “economic considerations” (European Commission, 
2010: 7).  This amounts to an effective prohibition of indirect civilian offsets at least, 
and just to dispel any doubts the Commission further declares that, unless justifiably 
covered by Article 346, member states’ defence contracting authorities may not 
request any type of offset whatsoever.  
The protestations of industry to the publication of the Guidance Note have already 
been documented in Chapter IV, but this indignant reaction followed from the 
member states, as well.  For instance, Dusan Svarc, Czech Republic’s Permanent 
Representative to the EU and Defence Advisor, recalled that the during working-level 
discussions of the Directive between the national delegations and the Commission, he 
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witnessed not only “strong interventions from several delegates” but also opposition 
to the Commission’s proposals from “the majority” and silence “from many” 
representatives (Shanson, 2011:1-2).  Thus, according to Svarc, the Commission’s 
views on offsets were met with “negativity” from the member states, with only a 
“couple of supporters” (ibid). A similar response followed from EDA officials, who, 
reportedly taken aback by the Commission’s tough stance, requested that the 
Commission permit the Agency to “deal with offsets” itself (Shanson, 2011:2).  
Nevertheless, the Commission had—once more—also proven willing to compromise 
on specific matters of political sensitivity to the member states, and, indeed, had 
quickly understood what these matters are. Specifically, it has conceded to the 
demands of the majority of member states in basing the Directive’s scope on the 
detailed list of items constituting “military equipment” produced by the Council in 
1958, rather than providing a general definition which would have made the 
Directive’s scope more flexible (Agence Europe, 2008b). Moreover the Commission 
had yielded ground to the UK’s demand for stringent, explicit security of information 
provisions, rather than just what the British delegation perceived to be vague and 
general references originally proposed (House of Lords, 2008:9). In addition, the UK 
was ultimately successful in securing a more restricted role for ECJ adjudication on 
what does and does not constitute member states’ legitimate security of information 
concerns than the Commission had initially advanced (ibid). The Commission also 
stepped away from its insistence on a threshold contract value of 137 000 euros for 
works and services, in favour of the 412 000 euros figure proposed by the French 
Council Presidency (Europolitics, 2008c; 2009). In fact, reflecting on the substantive 
result of the negotiations, one Commission official acknowledged that it perhaps had 
“given in too early” by “settling for exclusions that were too generic,” with the result 
that many “questions remained open and unresolved – a big oversight” (Interview 16, 
6 February 2014, European Commission). 
	  
Conclusion	  	  
This chapter has explored the role of the European Commission in bringing about the 
approval of the Defence Procurement Directive by both strategically and 
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opportunistically deploying  policy entrepreneurship techniques. Thus, its actions in 
this regard have been characterised as a “long game,” beginning in the mid-1990s 
with its two inconsequential communications on defence industrial matters, re-
launching its initiatives in the early 2000s, and ultimately succeeding in introducing 
legislation in 2009. However, to argue that this course constituted one clever, 
sustained strategy would be to read into this process a degree of continuity and 
foresight that was not necessarily present, or, indeed, realistic, considering the degree 
of complexity and contingency inherent in the EU policymaking process. Therefore, 
the picture of the Commission’s policy entrepreneurship that has emerged from the 
examination undertaken here features a significant degree of opportunism and 
circumstantiality. In particular, a small, but discerning and determined group of 
Commission individuals recognised a window of opportunity and subsequently took 
advantage of it to “re-launch” the EDEM programme in the early 2000s. In other 
words, the dynamics generated by the European Convention, a widespread awareness 
of downward pressures on member states’ defence budgets and noxious effects of 
defence market fragmentation on industrial competitiveness, as well as a general 
enthusiasm regarding the EU’s ability to “act” on the international arena coupled with 
the rapid development of CSDP—even if in mostly institutional terms—contributed 
to a sense that the EDEM “idea was having its time” (Ackrill and Kay, 2011).  
Such cognisance contributed to the European Commission’s ability to initiate an early 
and intensive consultation process with stakeholders from defence industry and 
member states, helping it, in turn, to begin building a coalition of supporters and 
justifying more decisive policy action in the future.  As such, both procedurally and 
substantively, the Commission attempted to minimise the opportunity it afforded the 
member states to say “no” to its rationale for extending internal market principles to 
defence procurement. The Commission also proved skilled at framing its policy 
initiatives as remedies for internal market problems stemming from defence market 
inefficiencies and budgetary constraints, arguing that, given its competencies and 
level of experience with “market issues,” the community level was the most suitable 
and best placed framework for addressing such pressing EU-wide concerns. On a 
more practical level, its framing efforts drew in “consultation partners” from member 
states’ ministries of economy, finance or industry, who, as opposed to “sovereignty-
conscious” ministries of defence, were inherently sympathetic to arguments revolving 
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around liberal markets, greater competition, and value for money. Other major policy 
entrepreneurship techniques which may be discerned in the Commission’s behaviour 
during the agenda-shaping stage include attempts to garner support from defence 
industrial actors, while downplaying the likely impact of the Defence Procurement 
Directive— and the extent of community influence in the EDEM that the legislative 
instrument would underpin—in interactions with member states’ governments. These 
tactics contributed to the “false sense of security” and “complacency” on the part of 
national administrations widely regarded by policy actors as crucial in making the 
Commission’s proposals so difficult to “kill” or reverse prior to their referral to 
Council for decision-making.  
Of course, not even all the determination and entrepreneurial skill in the world could 
guarantee member states’ approval of the Defence Procurement Directive, and the 
Commission was thus compelled to compromise on several significant issues of 
substance and scope—effectively affording the member states a number of 
considerable loopholes— in order to make its proposals more palatable to them. The 
thorny issue of offsets, moreover, was essentially avoided altogether until after the 
decision-making stage. In addition, it may initially have appeared that the European 
Commission resolutely seized the policy initiative away from the EDA, side-lining its 
alternative, intergovernmental approach to defence market integration through the 
voluntary Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. However, this characterisation 
represents only part of the story. As will be explored in the next chapter, the 
preponderance of supranational EU-level regulation was to a large extent enabled by 
the inherent fragility and contingency of member states’ commitment to the EDA in 
general, and the Code of Conduct in particular. Moreover, the Commission’s 
initiatives were in no small part aided by a widespread and keen awareness of defence 
budgetary pressures, worries regarding the widening transatlantic “competitiveness 
gap,” a shared understanding of the unsustainability of the status quo, and a 
sympathetic and supportive disposition of the Parliament. In fact, interview material 
has underlined the importance of policy actors’ acknowledgement that “something 
had to be done” in contributing to the survival of the Commission’s legislative 
agenda.  
Although the Commission was not formally included in the institutional decision-
making process guiding deliberations on the Defence Procurement Directive, it was a 
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de-facto party to the negotiations and continued to exercise influence at this stage, as 
well. Firstly, framing the EDEM as an “internal market issue” eventually activated the 
“community-friendly” Pillar One decision-making mechanism via the co-decision 
procedure culminating in qualified majority voting in Council. In addition, interview 
material conducted in the course of researching this chapter has indicated that 
Commission officials consciously submitted the Proposal for a Defence Procurement 
Directive in order for the intensive negotiating phase to coincide with the French 
Council Presidency of 2008. The Commission’s belief that this outcome would be 
conducive to “getting things done” stemmed, as will be explained in the next chapter, 
from the superior resources and extensive EU policymaking experience of the French 
Presidency, the “untested” Czech term that would follow it, and, most importantly, its 
support for a legislative instrument that had already been conveyed to the 
Commission.  Although the French Presidency steered the proposed Directive through 
the crucial decision-making phase, policy entrepreneurship exercised by the 
Commission contributed to a legislative proposal that was difficult to oppose, not 
least because member states’ concerns appeared to have been taken into account. 
Thus, in the words of one senior Commission official, these efforts amounted to 
“preparing the ground the entire time;…putting water into the soil bit by bit, then 
taking member states by the hand and helping them slide” into agreement (Interview 
17, 10 February 2014, European Commission). 
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CHAPTER V: THE COMMON 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
POLICY AS AN IMPETUS FOR A 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
EQUIPMENT MARKET? 
 
Introduction	  
 
As explained in Chapter II, the academic literature and primary documentation feature 
numerous references to the emergence of an EU security and defence policy as well as 
the need to equip “Europe’s armed forces” adequately and ensure the continued supply 
of modern military capabilities as key factors in the materialisation of the European 
Defence Equipment Market, or (EDEM) (Struys, 2004: 557; Wivel, 2005; Biscop, 
Giegerich, Howorth, 2009; Britz, 2010). The European Commission and, as will be 
demonstrated below, the EDA, have consistently presented defence industrial 
competitiveness— reliant on streamlined procurement processes— as a central 
component of EU’s security in general, and its defence dimension in particular. 
(Chapter IV). Moreover, Moerth (2003) has extensively detailed the existence of the “defence 
frame” for EU armaments cooperation, which revolved around an integrated defence 
procurement regime as an enabler of the member states’ individual defence capabilities as well 
as the EU’s nascent ability to project military force. Finally, according to Meyer and Strickman 
(2011) the development of the EU’s defence and security dimension could have served 
as the driver of defence procurement institutionalisation, because it was presented as a 
tool for enacting the necessary measures to reduce defence market ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency in the face of increasing pressure on defence budgets (Meyer and 
Strickman, 2011: 75-76). Of course, the states that found these issues to be most 
urgent, and have then taken the opportunity presented by CSDP to shape solutions 
according to their own priorities, are the largest defence spenders.  
 
However, as Chapter II had also argued, such statements offered no clear causal 
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pathways between the defence and security policy field and institutionalisation of the 
EDEM as embodied in the Commission’s Defence Procurement Directive and the 
Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement established by the EDA, and as such did 
not advance the central concern of this thesis (Chapter II).  Thus, the prevalence of 
such claims as well as the theoretical and logical threads connecting defence 
procurement institutionalisation and the EU’s development as a military actor merit a 
serious pursuit of this line of inquiry. This chapter will therefore endeavour to achieve 
just that, through the exploration of the third and final hypothesis advanced in this 
thesis, which posits that: 
 
H3: The Development of the EU security and defence dimension has generated an 
interest in a common defence procurement framework on the part of the dominant 
arms producing member states, which then ensured the cooperation of other 
governments. 
 
Therefore, this hypothesis does not envision an autonomous, primary role for 
supranational actors or transnational industrial interests. Rather, stemming from the 
intergovernmental structure of the EU’s defence and security apparatus, it is expected 
that member states consent to institutionalisation if and when this suits their 
objectives. Furthermore, as is apparent from the hypothesis above, the empirical focus 
of the following discussion is on the three dominant arms-producing member states, 
namely, the UK, France and, to a lesser extent, Germany. These “Big Three” have 
historically exerted superior influence in EU’s security architecture due to the 
relatively large size of their militaries, defence budgets, arms production, military 
capabilities and contributions to EU operations (Chapter II). As such, their operational 
requirements have shaped defence equipment demand across the EU and their 
comparatively well-resourced, extensive bureaucratic and civil service structures would be 
well-positioned to ensure that the terms of any defence procurement policy erected in 
Europe would be beneficial to them. 
 
Following the policy cycle heuristic, this chapter proceeds by first examining the 
emergence of defence procurement harmonisation as a military capability 
enhancement issue. As such, it traces the development of an intergovernmental vision 
of a European defence equipment market, as a manifestation of armaments, rather 
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than industrial, policy in the EU. The role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
will also be paid special attention in this discussion.  Arising from the EU’s 
development as a defence and security actor and tasked with finding European, rather 
than national, solutions to military capability shortfalls, it had also come to embody 
the growing connection between military and commercial aspects of defence 
procurement. In this context, it brought member states’ defence ministers, armaments 
directors, the Council, Commission, and industry under one institutional roof and 
focused their minds on defence industrial objectives. It could therefore be advanced 
that the intergovernmental EDA’s policy-making activity has paradoxically made it 
logical for member states to agree to the binding Defence Procurement Directive by 
concentrating attention on the issue of defence market fragmentation and drawing them into 
structured, iterated interaction that  was focused on EDEM.  This contention is also reinforced 
by the salience and continuity of  defence procurement harmonisation and standardisation 
within the intergovernmental armaments cooperation organisations reviewed in Chapter I.  
These arrangements reflected an approach to the issue of a European defence market  from the 
angle of enhancing military capabilities, and since the EDA is, in many ways, their 
“descendant,” it is important to explore the  development of the Code of Conduct and the 
approval of the Defence Procurement Directive through the lens of defence capability 
improvement. Finally, since member states constitute the primary policy actors in the 
intergovernmental armaments arena, their defence and security interests are accorded particular 
consideration in the discussion that follows, especially when it comes to the impact of the 
French Council Presidency of 2008. 
 
 
Agenda	   Setting	  	   -­‐	  Defence	  Economics	   and	   Capabilities	  
 
Post-Cold War Transformation— Rationale for “Managing” Defence Together 
 
The emergence of defence industrial rationalisation and efficient acquisition processes 
onto the policy-making agenda in the EU may be traced back to member states’ 
expansive restructuring and modernisation programmes of their militaries, prodded by 
the need to align them to the demands of the post-Cold War security context. These 
increasingly centred upon expeditionary warfare, necessitating smaller, specialised, 
	   171	  
rapidly deployable armed forces. The restructuring process, as is well documented and 
frequently emphasised, has varied greatly when it comes to its level of completion, 
success or uniformity across the European Union (Giegerich and Nicoll, 2008: 100-
101). It is widely known that the Central and Eastern European member states, still 
stocked with Soviet-era defence equipment, faced capability shortfalls that were 
considerably more severe than those of the older NATO members (Behr and Siwiecki, 
2004). 
 
 However, it is important to appreciate that “old” defence “heavyweights” such as 
Germany and France entered the post-bipolar international era with notable 
obstructions within military reform programmes of their own, which have proven 
quite persistent. For instance, Germany’s White Paper on Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr released in 2006 testifies to consistent defence spending 
cutbacks in the country “since 1991, due to the changes in the security environment in 
Europe and German reunification,” such that the contemporary defence budget “is 
some 3 billion euros below the ceiling of 1991” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 
62). Although the document extols the benefits of the funds thus “released,” it 
acknowledges that the “transformation of the Bundeswehr into an expeditionary force” 
is still an on-going process in need of “considerable adaptation and modernisation 
effort” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 62).). 
 
It is not, however, the purpose of this chapter to analyse the post-Cold War reforms of 
the EU member states’ security and defence establishments. Rather, the causally 
important aspect of the military transition programmes for the questions undertaken 
here is not as much their substance as the need to manage them efficiently. This is 
because one of the most noteworthy trends arising from the 1990s was the realisation, 
or, as former Director of the French armaments directorate  (the DGA) phrased it, the 
“conviction,” felt by national armaments directors (NADs) across the EU that due to 
the “budget pressures…nobody could have what they used to have” in terms of 
armaments and equipment (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence).  What was needed to mediate the effects of these pressures on European 
military capabilities was “truly integrated procurement,” with “agreed, shared concepts 
and real operations,” (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence).  
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CSDP – the Capabilities Turn 
 
The 1998 Franco-British St Malo Declaration, which enshrined the establishment of 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), envisaged “a strong and 
competitive European defence industry and technology” to support the “strengthened 
armed forces” needed by Europe (ISS-EU, 2000). This aspiration was also an 
important impetus behind the British-backed initiative to convene in November 2000 
the first of several Capabilities Commitment Conferences which gave rise to the 
Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). 
These initiatives represent the first steps in the process of formulating collective 
operational demands and capability targets, respectively, which an EU defence and 
security policy would require to become a functional reality (Oikonomou, 2012: 178; 
Merand, 2012: 148; Quille, 2006: 119). Furthermore, as capability gaps, such as 
strategic airlift, sea transport, and electronic warfare were identified and schemes to 
fill them outlined, defence experts and defence staffs from across the EU were brought 
into the architecture and development of the CSDP.  For instance, as will be explained 
below, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the military “heart” of the CSDP  responsible for 
“coordinating the military instrument” by generating capabilities and launching missions, 
was “deeply involved” in procurement activities (Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS). 
Prior to transferring a part of this responsibility to the EDA, the EUMS defined armaments 
requirements, assembled the so-called capabilities catalogue, and then “edited it for 
correspondence between member states’ contributions” and operational needs (Interview 22, 
10 March 2014, EUMS).  
 
Throughout this process, the focus of the CSDP began to revolve more and more 
around capabilities’ improvement. This objective entailed the development of a 
technical, tangible dimension within this largely political and institutional structure 
(Merand, 2012: 148; Quinlan, 2001: 37; Clarke and Cornish 2002; Sakellariou and 
Keating, 2003: 88). Once the successive capability generation initiatives were 
launched, the link between military capabilities and armaments policy became both 
more pronounced and more frequently evoked by policy analysts as well as 
policymakers. In particular, the think tank circuit regularly argued that economic 
realities necessitated armament cooperation if member states’ armed forces were to be 
adequately equipped and a competitive European Defence Technological and 
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Industrial Base (EDTIB) was to be maintained (Schmitt, 2003a; 2003b; 2004; 
Keohane, 2002; RUSI Defence Systems, 2004). Similar reasoning was also emanating 
from national ministries of defence and the CSDP itself. Marc Otte, then at the CSDP’s 
Political Planning and Rapid Alert Unit had even speculated that it would be only a 
matter of time before Community rules would penetrate the defence sector and Article 
346 would be reinterpreted in light of a “Community [defence] market” (European 
Report, 2000). France’s then Director General for Armaments Jean-Yves Helmer had 
also echoed this projection nearly a decade before it came to pass, cautioning the 
delegates to the seventh Parliamentary “Peace and Defence” conference in Paris that 
“the defence sector will not escape from the application of community rules” 
(European Report, 2000). The merits of a single, efficient armaments industry and a 
single, competitive defence market in support of European military capabilities were 
also at the heart of the presentation delivered by the former defence minister of Spain 
Frederico Trillo to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in early 
2002 (Kirk, 2002).   
 
As this overview demonstrates, characterisations of integrated EU defence 
procurement as an enhancement of and a condition for CSDP effectiveness, were 
beginning to emanate from the “military circles” of the EU.  In addition, the economic 
and industrial dimension of defence was becoming an integral pillar of CSDP 
alongside “big” strategic aspects of security and crisis management. With the creation 
of the EDA, as will be demonstrated below, this justification became increasingly 
centred on strengthening the CSDP capability-generation aspect, with a defence 
market at its core. According to this logic, if the CSDP were to address the security 
threats of the day, the capability gaps obstructing it must be filled. In order to close 
them, a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base was required, including an 
efficient use of resources through harmonised equipment requirements, procurement, 
and research and technology (Oikonomou, 2012: 179). The emphasis on capability 
improvement within CSDP that was emerging during the early 2000s shared the 
policymaking stage with a European defence industry that had become “increasingly 
vocal” (Merand, 2012:149; Chapter III) Thus, “industrial concerns” functioned more 
and more as an “underlying factor, enabling” armaments cooperation initiatives 
(Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). As has been demonstrated, in 
the telling of the specialised media and within policy pieces emanating from the think 
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tank community, as well, open defence markets in the EU became increasingly 
associated with Europe’s military needs. In this association, the latter was put forward 
as both a justification and an explanation for the former. Consequently, these 
developments—rationale for common arrangements to manage member states’ 
military transformation processes, CSDP becoming increasingly focused on 
capabilities improvement, and defence market issues beginning to be seen as integral 
to these capabilities—combined to bring defence industrial competitiveness onto the 
policy agenda as a “salient issue” (Merand, 2012: 149).  In this manner, then, the 
evolution of the CSDP began to “align the discussions” that were taking place, with 
the “UK, in particular, focused on capabilities” while viewing the EDEM agenda 
through the lens of capability improvement (Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European 
Commission).  
 
 
The Origins of the European Defence Agency 
 
As the defence market and industrial issues were becoming incorporated into the EU’s 
emerging defence and security agenda, a strong rationale was also emerging for an 
organisation to oversee and coordinate armaments cooperation between EU member 
states. And if this objective was to be achieved, it was becoming increasingly clear to 
policymakers engaged in armaments decision-making at the beginning of the new 
millennium that an EU-wide context and an EU-wide, dedicated armaments agency 
would be required (Behr and Siwiecki, 2004: 48). In fact, already in the 1970s, one 
could discern calls for the establishment of a European armaments agency, such as the 
proposals made by Leo Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium, in a 1975 report 
to the European Council (Tindemans, 1975: 18). However, considering the unequivocal 
primacy of NATO in the European security and defence architecture throughout the Cold 
War, what followed Tindemans’ recommendations in 1976 was the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG) comprising European members of NATO. The 
IEPG was intended as a “strictly” European forum, that is, not including the United 
States, which would coordinate European allies’ defence equipment requirements and, 
beginning in the late 1980s, research and development (R&D) programmes.  
Functionally, regular meetings of national armaments directors (NADs) would serve as 
“the principal forum” within which collaborative projects would be identified and 
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launched  (DeVore, 2012: 446).  Eventually, IEPG member states’ defence ministers also 
began to meet in this configuration, and the Group’s mandate technically expanded to 
include defence market integration, although this direction did not produce tangible 
results. However, discussions of what was by then called a European Armaments Agency 
(EAA) were revived at the end of the Cold War, and an annex to the Maastricht Treaty 
incorporated member states’ declaration of their “aim of creating a European armaments 
agency,” potentially based on the framework of the WEU.32 This new agency was 
envisioned as a source of  “long-term political guidance” on the full spectrum of defence 
matters, and regarded as an “adjunct to the development of the CFSP” as well as a 
“contribution to improving Europe’s military independence” (Hayward, 1997: 30).  The 
aim of bringing this about was subsequently “entrusted” to the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG) established in 1993, which, as described in Chapter I, was 
also tasked with enhancing standardisation of defence equipment, promoting defence 
industrial cooperation, and taking the first tentative steps towards injecting greater 
competition into defence procurement (Cornu, 2001: 76; Chapter I).  
 
Thus, an ad hoc working group on the establishment of the EAA was created within the 
WEAG in 1994 (Cornu, 2001: 76). Other novel features of the WEAG, as far as 
European armaments organisations were concerned, were its permanent staff comprised 
of international civil servants, and the linkage which it embodied between armaments 
cooperation and the wider European integration process (De Vore, 2012: 448). However, 
the progress made by WEAG towards the establishment of an Armaments Agency 
remained inconsequential, not least due to the disagreements amongst member states 
“on the ultimate objective and responsibilities” of this body, with proponents of a 
“pragmatic, loose arrangement” at odds with those advocating a “more global vision” 
(Cornu, 2001: 76). Although the NADs across the EU grew dissatisfied with the 
WEAG’s progress after four years of its function, the Group’s existence and 
deficiencies, as well as those of other various armaments and defence industrial 
cooperation initiatives had nevertheless contributed to a “critical mass” of support 
amongst the member states for an EU-wide armaments agency (Interview 34, 16 April 
2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). Thus, following periodic policy suggestions advocating a formal EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Declaration	  on	  the	  WEU,	  Section	  C,	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  (1992)	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armaments organisation, and the “laborious” discussions of WEAG’s Master Plan for 
a European Armaments Agency beginning in 1998, the EDA as it exists today 
emerged as a tangible possibility at the December 2001 Laeken European Council the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (Cornu, 2001: 77). As mentioned in Chapter IV, 
the European Convention was charged with producing recommendations and options 
for wide-ranging institutional reform of the EU, but in practice focused its efforts on 
producing a draft constitutional text based on these proposals (Chapter IV). Its day to 
day drafting work was carried out by 11 working groups in fields including economic 
governance, external action, and simplification of institutional procedures and 
instruments. A Working Group on Defence (WG Defence) was also convened, and its 
meetings quickly came to revolve around the EU’s “capabilities-expectations gap” and 
the imperative of EU defence convergence. The French representative first flouted the 
idea of a European armaments agency during these discussions, and the French 
suggestion won the support of the majority of delegations, with the proviso that its 
projects would be open to all, rather than just the large armaments producing member 
states (Knowles and Thomson-Pottebohm, 2004: 596).  
 
It was not long before similar proposals began to emanate from high profile bilateral 
meetings, as well. In early 2003, Italy had also joined the call for what was then being 
called a European defence capabilities and acquisition agency, following a meeting 
with the UK’s then Prime Minister Tony Blair (Defence Daily International, 2003b). 
The British-Italian summit closely followed an earlier Franco-British call for such an 
agency issued by Blair and the then French president Jacques Chirac during the Le 
Touquet summit in February 2003. In a joint press conference, the British prime 
minister hailed the meeting of minds with President Chirac on the “new agency” as a 
measure to “match the aspirations…in European defence with capability and efficient 
procurement (Defence Daily International, 2003a). These pronouncements reflected 
the EU policymakers’ view of the proposed armaments agency as a means of 
improving the efficiency  and cost-effectiveness of “their” military equipment, thereby also  
“promoting cooperation” (Blair and Chirac, 2003; Defence Daily International, 
2003b). Similarly, the UK’s 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy cited the “desire to 
make European military contributions more effective” as a driving force behind the 
creation of the EDA, alongside “economic realities associated with national 
frameworks sustaining largely separate markets” (Ministry of Defence, 2005:26). 
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 The Convention recommendations for the establishment of the armaments agency 
were intended as part of the EU constitutional Treaty then planned for ratification 
during 2007-2008. However, this timeline was greatly shortened—or as one 
assessment phrased it, “the schedule became confused”—during the June 2003 
Thessaloniki European Council, when the proposed agency was divorced from the 
Treaty negotiations and the EU Council was tasked with “undertaking the necessary 
actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the 
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” 
(Chapter II; Council of the European Union, 2003b:19; Schmitt, 2004). Moreover, 
with what has been described as “unprecedented speed,” a so-called Agency 
Establishment Team under then High Representative Javier Solana was established by the 
Council in November 2003, and presented its proposals for the structure, funding, and mission of 
the European Defence Agency (EDA), as the new body was to be called, in April 2004 (Adams 
and Ben-Ari, 2006: 110-111). As also pointed out in Chapter II, this expedited timeline partly 
stemmed from the member states’ desire to maintain control of the defence procurement 
policy sphere into which the Commission was beginning to make inroads with its 2003 
Communication. The Team’s recommendations for the structure and mandate of the 
agency were endorsed in a Council Joint Action in July of that year (Council of the 
European Union, 2004a). The (pre-Lisbon) Secretary General/High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy—then Javier Solana—was appointed as the 
Head of the EDA and as such tasked with overseeing its overall functioning and 
organisation. The decision-making apparatus of the Agency is its Steering Board, 
which is comprised of participating member states’ representatives at defence 
ministers’, NADs’, or defence directors’ level. A representative of the European 
Commission is also included in the Steering Board meetings in an observer capacity. 
Officially, the Steering Board takes decisions via qualified majority voting, but in 
practice consensus is sought. The EDA’s staff is overseen by its Chief Executive, who 
is the Agency’s legal representative and bears ultimate responsibility for its day to day 
functioning.  
 
The establishment of the EDA in the summer of 2004—despite its “modest” starting 
budget of 25 million euros and permanent staff numbering 78—was accompanied by 
a considerable amount of fanfare within the EU defence policy circles. In particular, 
the Agency was heralded as “a critical breakthrough, empowering the European 
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Union to become a player in armaments policy,” while the launch of its Code of 
Conduct was greeted as its “most radical move” and a “landmark announcement” 
(Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 113; Tigner, 2007b; European Report, 2005c). Indeed, 
the EDA exceeds the mandate of the long-discussed European Armaments Agency 
“model,” because it is tasked with a significantly broader field of responsibility, 
spanning from crisis management to research and technology. Despite this breadth 
and bringing armaments cooperation amongst member states into the structure of the 
EU for the first time, the reach of the EDA is not as long as the EAA’s would have 
been, “falling short” of a supervisory High Authority of a European Defence Market 
originally envisioned (Georgopolous, 2005).  
 
Agenda	   Shaping	  
 
Contention at the Core of the EDA 
 
What is more, despite the apparent meeting of minds that characterised the origins of 
the EDA, considerable divergence emerged amongst member states as to the role, 
structure, and remit of the Agency soon after its establishment. Indeed, a lack of 
agreement amongst the UK, France and Germany on these issues threatened at one 
point to derail the entire timeline for the EDA’s establishment (Cronin, 2004).  
Furthermore, notwithstanding the smooth and swift process of the Agency’s founding, 
it was not long before the differences on key issues like “procurement philosophy or 
defence-industrial strategy” also made themselves felt (Schmitt, 2004). Most visibly, 
mirroring the divergences amongst member states on Armaments Agency discussions 
within the WEAG forum, a disagreement emerged between the UK and France as to the 
extent of the Agency’s institutional powers. France had much grander plans for the 
autonomy of the EDA, and desired a body with the ability to influence member states’ 
behaviour (Interview 26, 3 April 2014, Industry). The UK, supported by the small 
member states, envisioned an armaments “talking shop” which could be useful in 
instances when the United States needed to be kept out (Interview 26, 3 April 2014, 
Industry ). Although it viewed it as primarily a coordinating forum for member states’ 
initiatives, it was actually the UK delegation that had insisted on a QMV system for 
EDA decision-making, and yet lobbied intensely to keep national vetoes in foreign 
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policy aspects of the European Constitution discussions taking place at the time 
(Cronin, 2004). Although it seemed contradictory, this position was nevertheless a 
reflection of the UK’s interest “in a common defence market, in an armaments agency, 
in improving capabilities,” as the Convention WG Defence Chair Michel Barnier 
characterised it, but coupled with an opposition to any political “integrationist” moves, 
which could, even symbolically, have dislodged NATO from its position at the 
pinnacle of European security architecture (Spinant, 2003b).33   
Therefore, in the defence market sphere, France seemed to be advocating the 
integration of procurement processes to a degree of centralisation unacceptable to 
Britain (Agence France Presse, 2005a). Thus, while France sustained its push for a 
strengthened EDA with considerable resources and a wide reach, the UK vetoed the 
proposed three-year budget for the Agency in 2006 and then blocked plans funding 
increases supported by France on several occasions (Beatty, 2006; Taylor, July 2008e). 
Britain would also decline to participate in several high profile programmes of the 
EDA, such as the force protection research project. This reticence reportedly stemmed 
from concerns over the Agency’s increasing autonomy vis-à-vis member states, 
prompting the French then Minister of Defence Michele Alliot-Marie to describe the 
UK’s non-cooperative position as “a bit of a joke” (Beatty, 2006). As it were, 
Germany and Italy also held “minimalist” views of the EDA, amounting to a simple 
coordination structure which did not require any great financial resources. Germany 
was furthermore reluctant to empower the new organisation with the authority to 
inspect and evaluate member states’ capability development progress for fear it would 
publicise its own shortfalls in this area (Kowles and Thomson-Pottebohm, 2004: 597). 
In fact, Germany had originally attempted to have the EDA steering board almost 
entirely subjugated to the Council (Cronin, 2004). 
 
True, the EDA has been widely regarded as “one of the most consensual initiatives” 
arising out of the European Convention (Merand, 2012: 149). Its history has also been 
characterised as a “tough and often controversial but finally successful process” 
(Clermont, 2013). However, the establishment of the EDA in spite of the contention 
and divergence between member states did not mean that these fundamental 	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  For example, one proposal that elicited the UK’s ire was the mutual defence clause akin to NATO’s 
Article V, which was being flouted by some member states in early 2003	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differences had somehow given way to consensus. Rather, they have been temporarily 
put aside. The seeds of indifference, more than discord alone, were sown deeply within 
the EDA, and, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, would have profound 
implications for the development of the European Defence Equipment Market. With 
its mandate encompassing the “integration” between operational, acquisition-, and 
development-related aspects of military capabilities, the EDA came to “sit on the borders 
of two very well defended territories” of military capability development and defence 
market policies (Beatty, 2006). Batora characterised the tensions resulting from this 
incongruity as colliding institutional logics, which reflect “competing visions of 
appropriate institutional arrangements” characterising the “political order of EU 
defence” as a whole (Batora, 2009: 1075). The EDA’s “severely limited powers” to 
change and sanction member states’ behaviour and its “dependence” on their 
“willingness to support particular initiatives” have been integrated into the structure 
of the Agency (Batora, 2009: 1084). As a result, the much-heralded, but inherently 
transient, political will which ostensibly fuelled the speedy and decisive creation of 
the Agency has appeared less concentrated in reality. The existence of a number of 
armaments and defence industrial cooperation arrangements, such as the WEAO, 
OCCAR, and LoI meant that establishing the EDA was akin to reaching for a “low 
hanging fruit” for the member states. Its Industries and Market (I&M) Directorate in 
particular has been described by former EDA officials as a “political declaration 
‘costing’ almost nothing to establish” and “easy, non-committing prey” (Interview 34, 
16 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and 
Member State).  
Recounting the establishment of the EDA from this perspective yields several insights 
into the connection between the emergence of an EU military dimension and 
development of a defence procurement policy. Firstly, the origins of the Agency lay in 
an attempt to enhance the ability of  EU member states to act collectively in the crisis 
management arena, which also involved the improvement  and coordination of their 
military capabilities.  For the first time, an EU Agency, a Council of the EU Agency to be 
precise, was responsible for “pooling” the production, development, acquisition and use of 
member states’ military capabilities into a functioning European whole. There was no escaping 
the conclusion that the creation of the EDA was a sort of milestone, with the I&M 
Directorate its “most visible” part (Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and 
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Member State; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State). This in turn 
endowed the CSDP with a capability-generation capacity that would help Europeans 
react more efficiently to security crises of their choice. Secondly, this consensus was 
aided by a convenient rhetorical interchangeability between military capabilities as 
part of the CSDP and the equipment of member states’ respective armed forces. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the creation of the Agency amounted to a temporary 
bridging of fundamental divisions at the core of the European defence project, 
regarded as “an ingredient of political integration in Germany, an element of Europe 
puissance in France, and a curiosity in Britain” (Merand, 2012: 149). As such, it is a 
reflection of the inherent fragility of any wide-spread meeting of minds when it comes 
to EU defence issues, and would play a crucial role in the evolution of EDEM 
institutionalisation explored in this thesis.   
 
EDA in the Lead…or at least not the European Commission 
 
Even though its foundations were tenuous, the member states appeared to have 
formulated a collective agenda for EU armaments cooperation through the EDA, 
which then enabled the Agency to play an important role in shaping it. The conclusion 
that members viewed the EDA as the forum best suited—and most acceptable—to 
spearhead defence procurement integration seems to emerge upon examining 
contemporary debates on defence industrial issues. Firstly, this observation is 
reinforced by the qualified and rather lukewarm support for the Commission’s early 
hints at a defence procurement directive.  Speaking at a conference organised by the 
Brussels-based think tank Security and Defence Agenda (SDA) in April 2005, the 
French Armaments Counsellor at NATO, Alain Picq, stated that any binding legislation 
as part of EDEM could only be a long-term endeavour, and that France favoured first 
adopting an intergovernmental code of conduct as proposed by the EDA (SDA, 18 
April 2005). In fact, the official went so far as to describe the voluntary mechanism as 
the “right way” to follow the “lines of action in the field of defence procurement” 
proposed by the European Commission (SDA, 2005; European Commission, 2004). 
Moreover, he conditioned his government’s support for a potential legislative 
instrument on it being “specifically adapted for the defence market, both in terms of 
techniques and sovereignty,” and without compromising Article 346. In addition, an 
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expert-practitioner council on defence industrial policy convened by the former 
defence minister Michele Alliot-Marie explicitly cautioned against “simply opening 
up the European defence procurement market, especially if this is done merely to 
satisfy the European Commission’s apparent free-market bias” (Defence Economy 
Council, 2006: 313). Such a step, the group warned, would jeopardise “the autonomy 
[of national decision-making in defence purchasing” (Defence Economy Council, 
2006: 313). Instead, the council’s recommendations were to be implemented by 
“subscribing fully to the [EDA] Code of Conduct and then going beyond it” (Defence 
Economy Council, 2006: 313-314). 
 
Think tanks and specialist media, as well, have repeatedly contrasted the perceived 
complexity of a “long term,” “gradual” approach requiring a cumbersome timeline 
with the more expedient option of the Code of Conduct, which could deliver results 
“now” and provide a “clear platform for adherence” (Hatton and Wright, 2006). In one 
of its European Foreign and Security Policy-series research papers entitled 
“Challenges and Opportunities for the German EU Presidency,” the prominent Berlin-
based German Institute for International and Security Affairs, known by its German 
acronym SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), had urged the incoming German 
Council Presidency of 2007 to steer member states towards “making greater use” of 
the “procurement and savings potential” offered by the EDA (Mair and Perthes, 2006: 
21). In the recommendations section concerning the progress of EU Battle Groups 
formation, the document held up the EDA’s Code of Conduct as “an important effort 
to promote common military capabilities in Europe and thereby reach the Headline 
Goal 2010” (Mair and Perthes, 2006: 21).  
 
The view that the “turf” of defence procurement in an EU context “belonged” to the 
EDA appears to have been shared by other member states, as well. Thus, the UK’s 
2005 Defence Industrial Strategy claimed that the EDA’s Code upheld the UK’s 
historic “policy aims” for competitive defence equipment markets built on self-
regulation while ensuring that other member states were just as open (British Ministry 
of Defence, 2005:29). Therefore, the Strategy committed the British government to 
“work with the EDA” on its defence and security agenda, harmonising the UK’s 
approach with the Code of Conduct on defence procurement (British Ministry of 
Defence, 2005: 48). Significantly, although the Green Paper on the European Defence 
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Market, which had been published by the Commission shortly before the release of the 
Strategy, was also mentioned, the document merely commended it for “recognising” 
the efficiencies which may be achieved and instead drew attention to a list of 
obstacles to integration in a sector where “national interests remain dominant” (British 
Ministry of Defence, 2005: 28).  In the case of Germany’s 2006 White Paper on 
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, the initiatives of the European 
Commission did receive detailed treatment – the Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Article 296, which the Commission was in the midst of producing at the 
time, was mentioned alongside the EDA’s Code of Conduct as an “important means 
for promoting competition for defence procurements” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 
2006: 64). The Green Paper on Defence Procurement was also described. However, 
this was immediately followed with the “viewpoint” of the German government that 
“unfair competition and barriers still existing in the European defence market, such as 
protectionist export regulations, state subsidies to defence firms, and government 
ownership of defence industry, should be removed prior to the creation of legally 
binding instruments” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 64). Also espousing the 
view that any Community-led defence market could only be a “long-term, strategic 
objective” was Christian Schmidt, Germany’s Parliamentary State Secretary to the 
Minister of Defence. Schmidt expounded on his government’s desire for the 
“successful operation of the European armed forces” and underlined that this must be 
bolstered by an integrated defence market and an efficient EDTIB, both led by the 
EDA and based on its Code of Conduct (SDA, 2006). Finally, the then Assistant 
Director of the EDA’s Industry and Market Directorate Arturo Alfonso-Mariño 
presented the Commission’s initiatives as later, supplementary additions to the 
“coordination of member states” already undertaken by the EDA (Alfonso-Mariño, 
2010: 194, 200). He was careful to characterise the EC’s proposals as merely “an 
example of the way forward in the creation of EDEM” (Alfonso-Mariño, 2010: 201). 
 
 
“Intellectual Case” of the EDA  
 
The Inevitability of Cooperation  
 
It appears, then, that a consensus existed between the member states regarding the need 
	   184	  
to formulate a common EU armaments and defence industrial policy, and that it was to 
be channelled through the European Defence Agency, while the Commission was to 
be kept at bay. This placed the EDA, at least temporarily, in a privileged position to 
begin shaping the European defence equipment market agenda. Indeed, Nick Witney, 
just after his appointment as the first CEO of the EDA, signalled his intention to do 
just that. When asked to specify exactly the EDA could “get tough on opening up 
national defence procurements” at a debate in 2005, Witney described his Agency’s 
strategy of “winning the intellectual battle” by convincing the member states that 
creating an integrated defence market was in their own interests (SDA, 18 April 2005). 
Therefore, having “brought together” the EU’s defence ministers around market 
issues “for the first time,” the EDA then directed their discussions towards 
“improving the situation but without [legal] obligation” (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State). The Code of Conduct was judged to be the “best 
instrument” for this, and was regarded as the “flagship project” of the EDA’s I&M 
Directorate (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 35, 25 
April 2014, EDA and Member State).   
Following swiftly after the Agency’s establishment, its Industry and Market 
Directorate, with considerable personal commitment of Nick Witney as CEO, set 
about reconciling member states’ awareness that “something had to be done” to 
address defence market fragmentation—and could only be done jointly—with their 
defence establishments’ entrenched resistance to external “authority” and perceived 
encroachments on sovereignty. Hence, in many ways, the Code represented minimum 
necessary institutionalisation, and its voluntary nature was frequently emphasised to 
member states in order to secure their approval (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; 
Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 36, 5 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State). EDA officials, for their part, hoped that with time, 
cooperative mechanisms would “harden,” and the Code’s least common denominator 
aspect would give way to a more robust tool (Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member 
State Ministry of Defence; Interview 3, 15 December, Member State Permanent 
Representation). Yet, even as preparatory discussions were taking place, it was 
becoming apparent to some within the Agency that actual implementation would not 
be easy.  
The first stage of this battle could be described as more or less won by the time that 
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the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement entered into force in July 2006. 
Describing the new agreement as a “quiet revolution” Witney emphasised that a 
“number of member states” realised that industrial restructuring and implementation 
of Europe-wide competition was inevitable, either within the Code or without, since 
“the money is [just] not there in defence budgets” (Taylor, 2006a). The former CEO 
had also attested to the governments’ recognition that streamlined procurement 
processes, enabling them “to spend money on the right things” was the inevitable path 
toward the preservation of their “military clout” and competitive defence industry 
(Flight International, 2007b). An additional, if not decisive, impetus for the 
establishment of the Code of Conduct as far as member states were concerned was its 
utility as a “demonstration” to the increasingly active Commission of their resolve to 
inject more competition into EU defence procurement, and thus undermine the 
rationale for a legislative instrument (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; van Eekelen, 
2004). However, as has been argued throughout this thesis and will be expounded 
below, “think[ing] that one could stop the Commission with a Code of Conduct” 
proved highly “mistaken” (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence).   
The EDA, for its part, continued to advance its argument of the inevitability of 
cooperation between member states well after the Code of Conduct was launched. In 
particular, the pressing need for a fundamental change in the “business aspects of 
defence in Europe” was the overarching message of both the EDA’s Initial Long Term 
Vision for European Defence Capability and Strategy for the European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base. Both of these ambitiously titled documents were 
regarded as amongst the most prominent of the Agency’s outputs as they emanated 
“directly” from the EDA’s Steering Board composed of national defence ministers. 
Their authors decried the economic unsustainability of the fragmented reality which 
was leading Europe to a future of dependence on “the US, but also the rising Asian 
economies” and reiterated the contention that there was no viable alternative to a 
common defence industrial policy (EDA, 2007: 1; 4-6; EDA, 2006: 31-33). 
Furthermore, a widely shared belief was that the EDA’s work in the markets field, 
and its EDTIB Strategy in particular, both “drew its inspiration” from the CSDP and 
embodied the “intrinsic link [between] industry and capabilities,” (Interview 35, 25 
April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member 
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State). As such, the Strategy  also served as an ambitious “political statement,” that 
specified the necessary conditions for a truly internal market in defence (Interview 35, 
25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and 
Member State; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). 
 
 
Linking Defence and Industry: The “Business Aspects” of Defence 
 
In addition to emphasising the inevitability of cooperation, the “intellectual case” of 
the EDA  was aimed at bridging the divide between economic and military aspects of 
defence procurement. In fact, the very raison d’etre of the EDA lay in supplying the 
“missing link” between “ the armaments phase and the capability development phase” of 
EU defence cooperation (Briani, et. al., 2013: 23). As one experienced EDA official 
phrased it, “industry and capabilities are inextricably linked,” and the Agency’s 
purpose lay in solidifying the vision of a “EU defence industrial policy supporting the 
European Common Defence and Security Policy” (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and 
Member State).  Thus, shortly after its establishment, the work and development of the 
EDA began to feature in the Conclusions and agenda of the Council dealing with the 
CSDP, as well as in CSDP newsletters, both alongside and as part of military 
capabilities discussions.34  
 
Nick Witney highlighted the close connection between the two dimensions right at the 
start of his tenure as CEO, when he insisted that the preservation of Europe’s 
“effective military clout, and a globally competitive industry” was essential for a 
“stronger EU” and would as such “contribute to our common security” (Witney,  
2007). Moreover, in his keynote speech delivered at the EDA’s February 2006 
conference dedicated to EDTIB, Javier Solana, who also served as both EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Head of the 
EDA, declared the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base “to be the 
defence theme for 2007” (Solana, 2006). He characterised a “healthy” defence 
industry as not only the “very foundation upon which so much of our security and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/publications-and-documents/csdp_newsletter/index_en.htm for a 
collection of CSDP newsletters 2005-2009	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defence efforts is built” but also pronounced it essential to maintaining “operational 
autonomy” through control of defence systems’ technology (Solana, 2006). And 
defence industrial survival in the face of such a formidable challenge, according to 
Solana, “rested on” cross-border competition in an EU-wide defence market (Solana, 
2006).  
 
However, it is perhaps the last line of his speech that best illustrates the position 
advocated by the EDA at this time, namely that the nascent defence market initiatives 
were not “merely a matter of economics, but …a matter of the infrastructure of 
Europe’s essential security” (Solana, 2006). Such tangible support of the first Head of 
the EDA (and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy) Javier Solana for 
its initiatives was central to the viability of the EDA’s efforts.  Furthermore, Solana’s 
“personal commitment” to the work of the Agency, not least manifested in his 
willingness to “step in” and “intervene” on behalf of the EDA in the midst of what 
was coming to resemble an institutional “turf war” with the Commission, was key to 
the Agency’s early rigour and success (Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State; Chapter IV). This insight lends credence to the work of Kurowska and others 
who have examined the so-called “Solana milieu,” introduced in Chapter II, that 
comprises the former High Representative and the “divisions and working groups 
surrounding him in the Council Secretariat.” This “environment” has shaped the 
CSDP policy outcomes during its first decade by “making specific conceptions of 
European security commonsensical” as the “personification of EU foreign policy” 
operating through “high-profile political action” (Hoffman, 2012: 51; Kurowska and 
Kratchowil, 2012: 100). 
 
It appears that the EDA was not speaking in a vacuum, as a variety of military actors 
and defence and security forums began to be concerned with industrial matters—and 
more precisely, the need to resolve defence market problems in order to boost 
capabilities— further augmenting the link between the two dimensions of the defence 
procurement policy field. For instance, two (retired) senior NATO military figures, 
namely General Joseph Ralston of the US and Germany’s General Klaus Naumann, 
spearheaded a high profile report which called on EU governments to integrate their 
defence procurement and research practices, in a bid to mitigate the harmful impact of 
declining national defence spending on their militaries and thereby fulfil strategic 
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security objectives (Agence France Presse, 2005a). The document was a product of 
wide-ranging consultations with a number of senior officials and policymakers on both 
sides of the Atlantic. It couched its recommendations as ensuring not only the EU’s 
ability to “protect its interests,” but also helping to avoid doing damage to “the 
viability of NATO as an alliance and the ability of European countries to partner in 
any meaningful way with the US” – essential objectives both threatened by the status 
quo (Agence France Presse, 2005a). In another illustration, Andreas Pruefert, the 
Secretary General of the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) 
at the time characterised the impact of Article 346 as a “hindrance” to the coordination 
and cooperation between member states on defence and space matters (SDA, 2006a). 
Yet another example was defence and security applications of satellite systems in the 
EU. Here, the persisting “under-utilisation” of existing space activities for common 
EU military purposes— contrary to the EU’s repeatedly stated intention and the calls 
of both the aerospace industry and defence and security actors to achieve this 
objective— has been attributed to divergences in, amongst other areas, national 
procurement practices and “state-regulated markets” (Mair and Perthes, 2006: 79). 
 
In addition, as already mentioned, the European Parliament, and namely its 
Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) under former Chairman and long-
standing advocate of European defence Karl von Wogau, advocated a strengthened, re-
energised CSDP through a common defence equipment market (Chapter I). This, as 
von Wogau insisted in his own initiative report on the subject, would bolster the 
“CSDP’s ability to act” in accordance with the EU’s Security Strategy of 2003 (von 
Wogau, 2006; Europolitics, 2006a; Interview 14, 3 February 2014, European 
Parliament). V a r i a t i o n s  of this line of reasoning were also apparent in 
successive CSDP newsletters, and have been articulated by member states’ defence 
officials across the EU (Council of the European Union, 2005d: 28; Council of the 
European Union, 2007a: 7, 20-22). In a piece he penned for the prominent British 
daily The Guardian in 2007, the then defence minister of Portugal Nuno Severiano 
Teixeira equated “a European defence system” with “developing military 
capabilities,” including the establishment of a “European industrial base” with “a 
central role for the European Defence Agency” (reproduced in: Council of the 
European Union, December 2007d: 24). Moreover, the UK’s 2005 Defence Industrial 
Strategy presented the efforts of the EDA as building an effective European Defence 
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Equipment Market which, by strengthening the EU’s defence technological and 
industrial base, would help “our Armed Forces …to secure their equipment capability 
needs more cost effectively” (Ministry of Defence, 2005: 29). The German White 
Paper on Security, as well, stated that not only was an “efficient and sustainable 
defence industrial base” necessary for a “modern” Bundeswehr,” it “would need to be 
defined increasingly in a European Context,” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 62). 
The document also viewed a European armaments policy as a “central goal in 
establishing and expanding the European Security and Defence Policy” (Federal 
Ministry of Defence, 2006: 62). Thus far, it has been demonstrated that in the telling of 
the specialised media and within policy pieces emanating from the think tank 
community, as well, open defence markets in the EU became increasingly associated 
with Europe’s military needs. In this association the latter was put forward as both a 
justification and an explanation for the former. 
 
Aiding the EDA: Shared Awareness of Pressures and Consensus on the Need for 
Action  
 
The EDA’s efforts to concentrate minds were aided by a shared awareness of the 
problems the Agency was attempting to address. As one senior EDA official had 
summarised, “big industries of big member states were pushing their governments to 
apply transparency,” while “small countries” were interested in market access  and a 
“fair chance” this would generate for their small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State).  In fact, many of the 
latter, despite their much-maligned “protectionism, ” had also realised that market 
rationalisation could be beneficial, as their ministries of defence would be able to use 
the resulting diversification of the defence supplier base as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis 
“pushy” defence manufacturers who “expected” contracts to be awarded to them 
(Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State). It was becoming apparent to 
actors concerned that member states, including France, were using the Treaty 
exemption to procure equipment that “was not as sensitive as one might think,” and 
“more and more pressure” to curb the use of Article 346 was beginning to “convert” a 
few senior national defence procurement officials into sympathisers of the 
Commission (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence). 
The UK government in its 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy cited falling defence 
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spending and dwindling R&D funds for new capabilities across the EU as pressures 
acting for “further integration … in the European market.” (Ministry of Defence, 
2005:92). Although the Strategy acknowledged that “every nation ideally want[ed] to 
keep under its control critical defence technologies,” it also recognised that no state 
other than the United States was able to “afford…a full cradle to grave industry in 
every sector” (Ministry of Defence, 2005: 17, 21). Likewise, the former French 
armaments counsellor in NATO insisted that the very existence of the EDA was 
indicative of the requisite political will on the part of member states to “achieve an 
integrated EDEM”  (SDA, 2005).  
The vitality of the EDA during its early years was also bolstered by its initial success 
in launching credible capability generation initiatives with the potential to deliver 
where the Helsinki Headline Goal had largely failed. Thus, the Capability 
Development Plan (CDP) built upon the Long Term Vision objective of defining 
common requirements for EU member states’ armed forces (Heuninckx, 2008b: 4).  
The CDP had even generated some waves of optimism amongst the EU’s military 
cadre in that it “could be the beginning of something serious and useful” (Interview 
23, 10 March 2014, EUMC; Interview, 21, 7 March 2014, EDA and Member State).  
 
Finally, a number of policymakers interviewed for this thesis attested to a feeling of 
optimism during the years immediately following the European Convention – 
recalling the period of early-mid 2000s as the “halcyon days” of European integration 
in general and the EU defence project specifically (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; 
Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview, 22 
January 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview, 20 May 2014, Member 
State Permanent Representation; Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU Council ). One 
former senior EDA official described it as a widespread sense that “we were riding 
the wheel of history,” a feeling that “Europe was moving into the 21st century” and 
served as a “model to the rest of the world - one of economic success” (Interview 4, 
23 July 2013, EDA).  Considering the recent establishment of EU Battle Groups and 
the development of the CSDP, there was a “wind in favour of being better 
Europeans,” which mean empowering Europe to “really act,” (Interview 4, 23 July 
2013, EDA; Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU Council).  
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All of these developments contributed to the “impulse” which materialised “at an 
early stage” within the EDA to “try to break up the national silos” by “weaning the 
member states gradually off the careless, blanket” invocation of Article 346 
(Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). The combination of this “critical mass” of 
consensus, the “intellectual case” advanced by the EDA, and the Agency’s privileged 
status as an institutional innovator enabling the EU’s “defence ministers to discuss 
defence issues” for the first time, contributed to the relatively smooth consultation 
period preceding the Code of Conduct (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State). Its voluntary nature had no doubt contributed to this “lack of political 
difficulties” in establishing the Code, as well as to the generally “positive and 
supportive attitude of industry” regarding its provisions (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Chapter IV). The Code of Conduct was a “reflection of what 
was possible” in this regard and, as a “bottom-up approach,” an expression of the 
member states’ collective intent, in the absence of common defence, industrial 
capabilities to “help achieve national defence and security objectives” (Interview 36, 
5 May 2014, EDA and Member State).  
A number of former and current EDA officials who were directly involved with the 
establishment and operation of the Code of Conduct emphasised repeatedly that while 
its overall results may have been portrayed as unsatisfactory, the mechanism was 
beginning to build unprecedented amounts of trust between member states in its first 
year of operation (July 2006-July 2007). Thus the “growing level of confidence” was 
often highlighted, as was the gradual increase of contracts posted on the Electronic 
Bulletin Board (EBB) (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA).35 Some went as far as to speak of “the 
beginning…[of] a transparent, internal defence market” in the EU, and underlined the 
robust operation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism, as well as the 
willingness of  member states to provide defence equipment data to the Agency 
(Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State ). A number of officials also attested to the effective 
operation of the Code’s peer pressure dynamic, as member states’ non-compliance 
was both increasingly questioned by and justified to each other as per the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  As first explained in Chapter I, the EBB was the core of the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement. It was an online platform designed to “host” the non-sensitive, but Article 346-protected 
contract notices by member states, that they were opening up to inter-EU industrial competition	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mechanism’s intention. Specifically, member states’ decisions to invoke Article 346 
in relation to a defence contract would not be disputed, but they would then still be 
expected to publish the  contract notice on the EBB, or otherwise be compelled to 
defend their choice of continuing with closed competition (Interview 38, 22 May 
2014, EDA and Member State ; Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 4, 23 July 2013, 
EDA).  
 
The Reality of the Defence Capability-EDEM Link: Complex, Fragmented and Vague  
 
Thus far, the discussion above has demonstrated that the member states had viewed the 
European Defence Agency as the framework for making the European Defence 
Equipment Market a reality. The EDA, in turn, played a key role in shaping this 
perception as well as bringing the imperative of harmonised defence procurement to 
the fore of the military capability improvement agenda. At the same time, voices from 
within the EU defence and security structures were making similar arguments, 
resulting in a merging of industrial and military dimensions. It was also demonstrated 
that EU actors were underlining the importance of an integrated EDEM to CSDP 
capabilities, while sources from the member states indicate that they viewed a 
European Defence Equipment Market as contributing to a more cost effective supply 
structure for their armed forces. In addition, these trends, together with the 
“intellectual case” the EDA was busily making, were reflected in a consensus amongst 
the media and defence think tanks that industrial consolidation and harmonised 
procurement were key to military capabilities. Moreover, EDA officials clearly 
believed that the Agency’s efforts were finally laying the foundations for a solid, 
transparent defence equipment market in the EU. Crucially, however, the distinction 
between these two dimensions—the “European” and the national armed forces that 
would ostensibly benefit from EDEM—was left unspecified. 
 
Before drawing further conclusions, however, it is useful to pursue this line of inquiry 
a bit further, to see how, and if at all, member states’ defence white papers and 
defence industrial strategies positioned the utility of and scope for common intra-EU 
procurement structures. Although the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy released in 
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2005 “welcomed” the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement introduced by the 
EDA as a measure aimed at creating an effective European defence equipment market, 
in a departure from the earlier 2002 Defence Industrial Policy, the authors noticeably 
tapered the UK’s embrace of free markets, which was much-vaunted and frequently-
cited even in the field of defence and security. In particular, the Strategy cautioned 
against “open international competition,” which, given the “fragility of the wider UK 
industrial base,” could endanger the “sustainment of key [British] industrial 
capabilities” (Ministry of Defence, 2005: 7). In the view of the Strategy, this risk had 
nevertheless created an opening for a “coordinated approach” with other European 
governments to industrial rationalisation and consolidation required for the 
sustainability of a “viable industrial base” (Ministry of Defence, 2005: 7). Similarly, 
references to Europe and the EU permeate the armaments policy section of Germany’s 
2006 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. However, in 
a subtle turn, the document also stressed that, in fact, “indigenous defence technology 
capabilities” were essential for “co-shaping the…integration process,” as “only nations 
with strong defence industry have the appropriate clout” (Federal Ministry of Defence, 
2006: 64; emphasis added). Moreover, a “balanced European partnership” required the 
retention of defence technological capabilities in key and high-tech areas in Germany 
(p. 64). Yet, the White Paper also emphasised that a more competitive and transparent 
European defence market would benefit both the German defence industry and the 
transatlantic alliance (p. 64). 
 
As one can see, then, the armaments and defence procurement policy structures of the 
three dominant member states did see a space for and value in—as far as both their 
armed forces and defence industry were concerned— EU-wide cooperation in this 
field. Such an opening did exist. However, as the overview above so aptly 
demonstrates, the calls to “act together” exude caution and conditionality. There are 
certainly no proposals to construct an EU defence equipment market on a 
supranational edifice, nor does one see any meaningful endorsement of the 
Commission’s proposal for a defence procurement directive, which had been taking 
shape while France, Germany and the UK were formulating their defence white 
papers and strategies. Furthermore, the actual nature of the relationship between the 
objectives of the EDA’s Code of Conduct and the Defence Procurement Directive was 
left rather vague and it was not specified how these market-opening initiatives would 
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result in or were prompted by the equipment needs of EU’s militaries. 
 
In addition, it appears that this focus on the importance of the industry-defence 
linkage for capability building—a linkage that the European Commission was 
concertedly highlighting in its policy proposals— did not resonate as such within CSDP’s 
military structures. For one, an EU defence equipment market was not viewed in these settings 
as a means of achieving interoperability between the member states’ armed forces and 
bolstering the EU’s ability to project  force externally. As stressed by the former Chairman of 
the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the “supreme military body with the Council of the 
EU” which functions as the “forum for military consultation and cooperation” 
between the member states, industrial aspects of defence were “never, ever” discussed 
at EUMC meetings (Interview 23, 10 March 2014, EUMC). Furthermore, the 
discussions between the National Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) comprising the EUMC 
focused on the nature and timings of armaments programmes, and did not intersect 
with either the work of the National Armaments Directors concerned with the “cost 
and rules” of executing these programmes, or that of the Commission, which was 
beginning to concern itself with “legal and fiscal” aspects (Interview 23, 10 March 
2014, EUMC). In addition to the “very little linkage” between the work of the 
military representatives and market issues, there was also virtually no interest felt by 
the former in the latter (Interview 23, 10 March 2014, EUMC). Moreover, the 
“competition and mistrust” between NADs and CHODs that was apparently a 
customary feature of domestic defence bureaucracies, was transferred to the EU-level 
relationship between the EDA and EUMC when the agency was established, although 
this relationship had begun to improve throughout 2008, with the EDA CEO 
frequently invited to EUMC meetings to “discuss CDP priorities,” for instance  
(Interview 23, 10 March 2014, EUMC). Nevertheless, this uncertainty regarding the 
demarcation of responsibilities between the two bodies was also part of the 
institutional ambiguity that has characterised the Agency since its establishment, 
constituting a manifestation of Batora’s “colliding institutional logics” framework 
described earlier.  
 
The prevailing view within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) also held that the path to a 
“credible CSDP” bolstered by robust military capabilities lay in actually “using the 
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CSDP tool” for crisis management by deploying it on military missions (Interview, 
21, 7 March 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS). 
Thus, the difficulty lay not in “drawing up common military requirements,” but 
defining “common operational requirements” at the political level (Interview 22, 10 
March 2014, EUMS). The path to this ambitious objective, in turn, lay through 
forging a “common strategic view” regarding shared “European interests,” and then a 
harmonised intra-EU demand for capabilities would emerge (Interview 22, 10 March 
2014, EUMS; Interview 13, 27 January 2014, EUMS). Only then would joint 
acquisition of equipment follow interoperability— once the requisite contract 
specifications could be written in a manner allowing for the resulting capabilities to 
be used compatibly between member states (Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member 
State Ministry of Defence; Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA/NATO).  However, it was 
believed within the EU’s defence structures that striving for the EDEM could not 
compel member states to “want to improve capabilities at the EU level,” which they 
clearly appeared unwilling to do (Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS; Interview, 
21, 7 March 2014, EDA and Member State). Furthermore, amidst uncertainties 
regarding the “division of labour” between the EDA and the EUMS the responsibility 
of the latter for defence technology, research, and market issue areas was formally 
“transferred” to the EDA’s “portfolio” after the Agency was established (Interview 
39, 25 May 2014, EUMS). Prior to this, the Military Staff was the sole body in charge 
of defining capability requirements based on the so-called Petersberg tasks which 
stipulated the “type of military action that the EU can undertake in crisis management 
operations.”36 The resulting “requirement catalogue” was then submitted to member 
states, and the result “edited” for “correspondence” between their contributions and 
operational needs (Interview 22, 10 March 2014, EUMS). This definition of 
requirements is in fact an integral part of the defence procurement “spectrum,” but the 
responsibility for it is “shared” between the EDA and EUMS (Interview 22, 10 March 
2014, EUMS). Yet, EDEM items as such did not arise on the agenda of EUMS’ 
capability departments in any meaningful way (Interview 13, 27 January 2014, EUMS 
; Interview 39, 25 May 2014, EUMS). In addition, as underlined by a senior military 
officer, “in most cases,” the CSDP represented “only the third ‘customer’ of member 	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states’ military capabilities,” following “national missions and NATO obligations” 
within the prioritisation structure of national defence resources allocation  (Interview 
39, 25 May 2014, EUMS). This attachment, finally, reflected the tendency of the 
“uniform wings’” across the EU to be “enamoured with NATO” as the setting where 
interoperability was “truly” and successfully developed and defence equipment 
“standards defined” (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; Interview 12, 22 January 2014, 
Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview, 21, 7 March 2014, EDA and Member 
State).  
In fact, the “shadow” cast by NATO over the EDA and “everything in CSDP” was 
highlighted as the Agency’s Achilles’ Heel by both the military cadre and industry 
executives, while the lack of a clear demarcation of responsibilities between the EDA, 
EUMS, EUMC, and the NATO Capabilities Agency was perceived to encumber its 
effectiveness (Interview 23, 10 March 2014, EUMC; Interview, 21, 7 March 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 13, 27 January 
2014, EUMS). In addition, after a promising and ambitious beginning, the Capability 
Development Plan (CDP) initiated by the EDA lost its momentum due to dwindling 
“political will,” as explained by a senior military officer associated with the Agency’s 
work (Interview, 21, 7 March 2014, EDA and Member State). This allowed the 
United Kingdom, for instance, considering its preoccupation with capability 
enhancement, to claim with the appearance of credibility that the EDA was not 
helping “them” improve “their capabilities,” while the enduring commitment to 
NATO of other dominant member states such as Germany as the “primary vehicle for 
cooperation in capabilities, research and technology, and industry and markets” 
circumscribed the impact of the Agency’s work (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; 
Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). 
 
 
The Code of Conduct Loses its Rigour and the EDA Concedes its Policy Leadership 
 
During its first 14 months of operation beginning on 1 July 2006, the Code of 
Conduct resulted in 227 cross-border defence contract notices amounting to a total 
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value of ten billion euros. However, only in two instances were the contracts actually 
won by firms from other member states (EDA, 2007b). In order to illustrate this point 
further, it is helpful to look slightly beyond the time period demarcating this research, 
to get a sense of how the Code of Conduct performed beyond the inevitably rocky 
“early days.” Thus, according to the EDA’s 2009 Annual Report, of all the 725 
defence contracts amounting to 18 billion euros awarded in the EU between 1 July 
2006 and 31st December 2009, 259 were awarded under competition following the 
Code of Conduct, encompassing a total value of 3.9 billion euros. Cross-border 
contract awards were made in 75 instances (EDA, 2010: 45). In absolute terms, this 
represents a significant increase from the two cross-border awards cited earlier, while 
the invocation of exemptions from the Code in (slightly) fewer instances than 
compliance with it, also reflects this upward trend. However, it is also the case that 
the proportion of cross-border procurement stemming from the Electronic Bulletin 
Board amounted to only 10.3 per cent, while the value of these contracts represents 
just over seven per cent of the total value of awarded contracts in the EU.37 Such 
modest results reflected, in the view of one former senior British official, the “tension 
between security of supply and open procurement,” which the EDA was finding 
increasingly difficult to negotiate (Interview 7, 9 August 2013, Member State 
Ministry of Defence). Drawing on Batora’s framework once again, this particular 
conflict may be characterised as the collision between the “logic of pooled defence 
resources…championed” by the Agency and the pervasive “logic of defence 
sovereignty” compelling member states to “to develop military forces with a full 
range of capacities to conduct various kinds of operations independently” (Batora, 
2009: 1086; 1092).  
It has therefore emerged that the “conviction” of EDA officials regarding the pressing 
need for an EDEM did not easily translate into compelling member states to abide by 
its principles (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). Thus, despite the “exhortations” of 
the Agency, after an initial period of compliance, and even enthusiasm, member states 
could not be induced to commit to the provisions of the Code fully.  From the end of 
2007 onwards, EDA officials working on the implementation of the Code of Conduct 
began to ruefully acknowledge that “even though ministries of defence would say that 	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competition was needed,” the “political aspects” of forging a durable 
intergovernmental regime were proving prohibitive (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA 
and Member State). For instance, in his biannual report to the Council, Javier Solana 
characterised his assessment of the Code’s implementation as “positive,” but admitted 
that there “remains a need to increase the awareness of [the instrument], to ensure 
higher value cross-border awards and to encourage greater cross-border bidding” 
(Council of the European Union, 2008: 3). In November 2008, the Head of the 
Agency appeared to lower the benchmark for success, stating neutrally that the Code 
of Conduct was displaying “signs that cross border bidding and contract awarding 
take place” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 5). At the same time, Solana 
reiterated the need to enhance the “limited” bidding on cross-border contracts by 
industry (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 5). Moreover, protestations on the 
part of defence primes regarding a desire for greater market access also did not result 
in their lasting commitment to open supply chains to the SMEs of smaller member 
states— as envisioned in the supplementary Code of Best Practice in the Supply 
Chain (CoBPSC) intended to help strike the “bargain” of agreeing the Code of 
Conduct on Defence Procurement (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State; Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA).  This reluctance may be partly attributed to 
industry’s unwillingness to forego their “special relationship” with governments in 
favour of market forces, as explained in Chapter III. This attitude, however, did not 
exist in a vacuum, but constituted part and parcel of Batora’s “logic of defence 
sovereignty” pervading the EU’s defence sphere. In this particular manifestation of it, 
defence firms were reluctant to bid on defence contracts advertised by a foreign 
government unless they believed that there was a reasonable chance of a return on the 
financial and administrative investment necessitated by cross-border bidding in the 
form of contract award (Interview 26, 3 April, Industry).  The defence firms’ 
persisting reticence in this regard indicates their belief in the entrenchment of the 
“national silos” the Code was attempting to dislodge.  
 
Considering these dynamics, it is interesting to note that the timing of the 
Commission’s proposal for a defence procurement directive was attributed by the EDA 
to an agreement amongst member states on “the need for the gradual formation” of an 
EDEM that would “favour the development of the military capabilities required to 
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implement the CSDP,” while the  “firm support” lent to it by the Council and 
Parliament was due to the function of the integrated defence market as “an essential 
pillar” in generating capabilities for the “current and future missions of Europe’s 
Armed Forces” (Alfonso-Mariño, 2010: 199, 201). Primary research, has, however, 
indicated that policymaking circles emphasised the linkage between the growing 
ineffectuality of the Code of Conduct and the enhanced role of the Commission. The 
views emanating from member states’ ministries of defence furthermore 
acknowledged that the EDA’s Industry and Market Directorate yielding ground to the 
Commission could have been largely attributed to the difficulty of resisting at least a 
degree of supranational competence in the “market aspects of defence”  (Interview 19, 
26 February 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member 
State Ministry of Defence ; Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). This was coupled with the Commission’s determination to expand this 
competence, as well as its credibility in claiming some continuity for its defence 
market agenda.  
 
Within the EDA structures, the sentiment was somewhat different. At the highest 
levels, it was acknowledged that the Code of Conduct had indeed exerted only a 
limited impact on severing the link between member states’ “protectionist trade 
policy” and defence contracting – after all, the Code could not invalidate the potent 
argument that key domestic constituencies “needed jobs” and therefore “should” be 
entitled to the defence business (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). Moreover, officials 
formerly involved in the establishment and operation of the Code of Conduct and the 
Agency itself felt that the progress in solidifying inter-member state cooperation 
achieved by both has in a way emboldened the Commission in its pursuit of defence 
market integration. Specifically,  “the level of confidence” the EDA had managed to 
affect between member states through regular participation in its meetings and 
programmes “signalled” to the Commission that its involvement would perhaps be 
more readily received in national capitals than previously. While it was acknowledged 
that the substantive results of these initiatives, including the Code in its first year, may 
have fallen short of expectations, their role in building trust and facilitating 
cooperation amongst ministries of defence was optimistically regarded as indicative 
of their promising future (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA 
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and Member State). Specific instances that were highlighted in this respect included 
the Commission’s Interpretative Communication of 2006, the preparatory work for 
which ostensibly relied on the “high level of confidence” described above, as well as 
“high-level political agreement” embodied by the EDA’s EDTIB Strategy, which 
reportedly generated “ideas” for the initiatives of the Commission (Interview 35, 25 
April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State).  
Yet, the Agency’s “scepticism regarding the motivation and impact” of the 
Commission was kept in check as long as there was a credible perception that the two 
actors were “on the same side of the argument” and “working together” to achieve 
greater defence market openness (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; Interview 36, 5 
May 2014, EDA and Member State). Some within the EDA even regarded the 
Commission activity to be “helpful” as a means of applying pressure to the member 
states when needed, and thus “scaring the proverbial children,” in the words of one 
former highly-placed official (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). However, towards 
the end of 2007, this sense of accommodation began to give way to near-resentment, 
directed at the Commission’s ostensibly relentless and premature pursuit of “a 
supranational regime,” complete with “legal tools,” in defence procurement 
(Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 36, 5 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State). As 
suggested above, within the EDA structures, some of the blame for the eventual 
listlessness of the Code of Conduct was attributed to the Commission as well. 
According to this view, not only were the “conditions insufficient” and the member 
states “not ready” for the extension of internal market principles into this policy field, 
but as well as “taking advantage of the EDA’s work” the Commission had provoked a 
“self-defence mechanism” on the part of the member states. Specifically, as explained 
in Chapter IV, national officials as well as defence industry executives attributed 
member states’ lack of commitment to the Code of Conduct at least partly to their 
reluctance to subject any contract notices they published to the Commission’s 
scrutiny. Thus, despite the EDA “clearly” being endowed with the “responsibility for 
advancing the defence market,” it was the Commission that seemed to have won the 
institutional “turf war” (Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; 
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Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry).  
In addition, more practical aspects also impeded effective functioning of the Code of 
Conduct, including the devolution of defence procurement authority amongst the 
various military services (for instance, army, air force, and navy) within certain 
member states. This was the case in Italy with the result that, in the absence of a 
central contracting authority, implementing the provisions of the Code of Conduct 
presented significant bureaucratic difficulties (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). The 
agenda prioritisation structures of respective EDA CEOs contributed to the Agency’s 
relative loss of policy leadership in the defence industrial sphere and to its decline in 
prominence, as well. Specifically, one can see from the material presented above that 
Nick Witney, the Agency’s first CEO, frequently promoted both the Code of Conduct 
and the Agency itself in public statements and media outlets. This commitment was 
also reflected in closed settings and stemmed from Witney’s “personal investment” 
that was felt to have raised and maintained the profile of the Agency and its initiatives 
in the defence industrial sphere in particular (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and 
Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State).  Witney was 
thus known for his “strategic vision” and “focus on big strategies,” while his 
contemporaries believed that his stepping down from the helm in autumn of 2007—
the very period of intensified Commission activity preceding its publication of the 
Proposal for a Defence Procurement Directive—contributed to both the degeneration 
of the Code of Conduct and the “disappointing” performance of the EDA itself 
(Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 8, 28 August 2013, Industry ).  
The underlying issue confronting the architects of the Code of Conduct, however, 
may be described as one of the most intractable obstacles to the development of an 
effective EU security and defence policy, and meaningful inter-state cooperation more 
generally. While agreement regarding the “need for collective action” to address 
issues no member state could tackle unilaterally was shared across national capitals, it 
did not extend beyond a consensus “on principles” (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA).  
Thus, although member states signed up to the Code of Conduct with sufficient 
enthusiasm, no participating ministry of defence “wanted to be the first” to invite 
foreign firms to its tenders (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). The dominant arms-
producing member states, such as Germany in particular, felt that any 
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intergovernmental agreement in the defence industrial sphere would invariably yield 
benefits to partners, while the superior domestic technology  “would slip away” and 
finance would be “siphoned out” (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA). Therefore, the 
ineffectuality of the EDA’s Code of Conduct paralleled, and indeed, stemmed from, 
the sceptre of irrelevance looming on the horizon of the Agency itself (Interview 41, 
11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence).  Moreover, the much-lauded 
consensus and “meeting of minds” which ostensibly gave rise to the EDA was 
beginning to appear not only fragile, but transient as well. Immediately following its 
establishment, the Agency had generated much “enthusiasm and excitement” within 
national ministries of defence, and its meetings were regularly attended by the 
Ministers and National Armaments Directors themselves (Interview 38, 22 May 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). By early 2008, however, this high-level attendance became considerably 
less of a norm, with deputies and lower-level officials increasingly replacing their 
superiors at EDA meetings (Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry 
of Defence).  
Thus, it was extremely telling that the EDA was characterised within the higher levels 
of the British MoD as “useful…but only as long as it does not poke its nose into 
anything really important” to member states’ defence and security (Interview 7, 9 
August 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence). Similarly, within the armaments 
directorate of another dominant arms-producing member stat the functioning of the 
Agency was referred to as a “Catch-22,” wherein it was expected to deliver results in 
accordance with its ambitious mandate, but was not endowed by the member states 
with the necessary resources to do so (Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member State 
Ministry of Defence). In sum, then, the “unresolved tension” at the heart of the 
Agency, as well as the differing “visions” of its key “stakeholders” regarding its 
ultimate purpose, resulted in the relegation of the EDA to the “back burner” of its 
participating member states’ ministries of defence  (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). 
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Decision-­‐Making	   	  
 
 Member States’ False Sense of Security vis-à-vis the Commission’s Defence 
Package 
 
With the ability of the Code of Conduct to deliver its promised benefits of 
intergovernmental cooperation being increasingly questioned, the argument for a 
legally binding instrument could be more easily and credibly made. As detailed in 
Chapter IV, the Commission busily set about doing precisely this, while the member 
states found it increasingly difficult to deny that the proposed Defence Procurement 
Directive could be the “obvious next step” (Interview 19, 26 February 2014, EDA and 
Member State). Moreover, the publication of the Directive Proposal by the 
Commission in December 2007 did not incite a “huge hostility” or “surge of 
indignation” from the member states comparable to that bubbling to the surface within 
the EDA officialdom (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State). Rather, the response from ministry of defence and armament 
directorate delegates was to “listen to proposals, participate in consultations,” and 
repeatedly reaffirm their agreement that “something needed to be done” (Interview 4, 
23 July 2013, EDA; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 
8, 28 August 2013, Industry). This seemingly conciliatory, detached response 
stemmed from the lack of engagement and “political interest” on the part of senior 
echelons within national ministries of defence.  The considerable reluctance “to take 
up” the Defence Package proposals within member states’ capitals was highlighted by 
EU permanent representation delegates, national armament directorate officials, and, 
as detailed in the previous chapter, defence industry lobbyists (Interview 11, 6 
December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 9, 14 November 2013, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and 
Member State; Interview 15, 4 February 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 
22 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry;  
Interview 26, 3 April 2014, Industry). However, the interviewees have been self-
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admittedly less clear about the reasons for this senior-level lack of engagement within 
member states. A number of ministry of defence officials spoke of a “failure to grasp 
the significance” and “enormity” of the Commission’s agenda, to the extent that one 
expressed “amazement” at “how little discussion” there was regarding the 
Commission’s proposals at high bureaucratic levels (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, 
EDA and Member State; Interview 15, 4 February 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation).  Another factor emphasised frequently in this regard was a sense of 
“complacency” regarding the likelihood of the Directive’s approval (Interview 34, 16 
April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State; Interview 9, 14 November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation).  
 
According to this narrative, many member states believed that, even if it was 
ultimately successful, the legislative process advocated by the Commission would take 
years and be characteristically cumbersome.  In addition to this “sense of security,” it 
appears that the leadership of the traditional “guardians of national sovereignty,” that 
is, the armed forces and the ministries of defence, lacked sufficient interest in, 
appreciation, and understanding of not only the significance but also the process of EU 
legislation (Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State). This was perhaps 
not unexpected, since these actors had hitherto had little contact or experience with the 
“community method” or the European Commission. Thus, one senior official 
recounted the recent opening of a national industry association’s representation in 
Brussels, during which the president declared that  “‘only now, [he is] beginning to 
understand Europe’” (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). The 
interviewee felt that “this, precisely, was the problem,” especially since this 
characterisation could be applied to “many defence companies and officials” 
(Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State).  Moreover, the “normal 
interlocutor” of defence ministries, the EDA, appears to have initially shared this 
complacent outlook, as one official recalled that “all documents and presentations” 
associated with the Code of Conduct emphasised the “untouchable” prerogative of 
member states to invoke Article 346 as well as the exemption of the “defence market 
from internal market rules” more broadly (Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and 
Member State). The “lack of appetite” for  “fighting” to “defend national interests” 
vis-à-vis the increasingly “aggressive and determined” Commission was coupled with 
the perception within national capitals that its proposals could be “killed” or “pushed 
	   205	  
to the EDA” at any time they wished (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member 
State; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 24, 11 March 
2014, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 9, 14 November 2013, 
Member State Permanent Representation). Thus, the UK MOD was reportedly 
“alerted” by its Permanent Representation in the spring of 2008 that a “blocking 
minority” in Council voting that had still been hoped for in London “was not going to 
happen” (Interview 9, 14 November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation).  
In fact, the British Ministry of Defence had reportedly favoured “killing” the Directive 
Proposal in the first instance (Interview 9, 14 November 2013, Member State 
Permanent Representation). Finally, although they would struggle to pinpoint the 
precise reason why the member states’ ministries of defence, as one senior official 
phrased it, “did not care,” most national officials agreed that, by the time they did, “it 
was too late” to either “kill” the proposed Directive or, indeed, affect as many or as 
significant of substantive changes to it as they would have preferred (Interview 11, 6 
December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 9, 14 November 2013, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and 
Member State ; Interview 35, 25 April 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 34, 16 
April 2014, EDA and Member State).  
 
France to the Fore 
 
Such, then, was the policy “state of play” in the months following the December 2007 
publication of the Proposal for a Defence Procurement Directive. After its release, 
the proposal entered the first round of negotiations in the Public Procurement 
Working Party which supported the Competitiveness configuration of the EU Council 
and, in parallel, the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) of 
the European Parliament as part of the co-decision procedure. As also indicated in 
Chapter IV, these discussions centred on technical and procedural aspects until the 
proposal reached the COREPER level on the eve of the French Council Presidency of 
July – December 2008 (Interview 27, 3 April, EU Council; Chapter III). It is 
important to emphasise that while most member states “believed that [the 
Commission’s agenda] would just go away” even as the volume and frequency of 
consultations increased, French officials responsible for this issue were reportedly 
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“not at all surprised” when the Commission tabled the proposed Directive text. 
Rather, they attested to recognising its consultative “questionnaires that just kept 
coming” as a sign that the “tank” which was the Commission— slowly but surely 
demolishing all obstacles on its path—“had arrived” (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, 
Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). Indeed, as demonstrated above, the French calls for a 
“free trade area in defence equipment” and a “European Defence Procurement Area” 
bear the most direct relevance to the objectives of the Defence Procurement Directive. 
Moreover, such ambitions were not without precedent. A survey of policies emanating 
from successive French governments reveals periodic nudges to national defence firms 
to re-structure and consolidate on the European level, but only to the extent that these 
efforts furthered the dominance of French firms in the EU context (James, 2002: 125).  
 
Michele Alliot-Marie, French defence minister between 2002 and 2007, had 
established Defence Economy Council within her ministry, mandating it to evaluate 
the “health” of both French and European defence industries and attempt to boost 
defence spending (Spiegel, 2005). In fact, both Alliot-Marie and Francois Lureau as 
the National Armaments Director at the time were “strong” and “visionary” 
supporters of an EU-level defence industrial policy, with the latter in particular being 
described by one retired senior defence industrial lobbyist as “ahead of his time” 
regarding this issue (Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA; Interview 18, 10 February 
2014, Industry).  The theme of the comprehensive, highly analytical report compiled 
by the nine-member council in 2005 was the looming lag of the EU behind the United 
States when it came to maintaining the crucial high-technology underpinning defence 
systems. In order to preclude such a decline, the document in the section entitled 
“Maintaining and Developing European Defence and Security Capabilities” 
recommended “coming up with common rules … in an attempt to set up a European 
Defence Procurement Area” which would ensure what the report called Europe’s 
“competitive autonomy” and global competitiveness (Defence Economy Council, 
2006: 313). 
 
Soon after assuming office, the former president of France Nicolas Sarkozy set about 
promulgating his apparent agenda of enhanced defence spending across the EU to 
bolster its military capabilities. This, as Sarkozy phrased it in a 2007 foreign policy 
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speech, was necessary in order to counter “multiplying crises” and “assume 
responsibility for Europeans’ own security” (Hepher, 2007). Moreover, from the 
beginning of his term, Sarkozy widely publicised his grand ambitions for European 
defence, even generating expectations of an “St Malo II” under the approaching 
French EU Council Presidency of 2008 (Taylor, 2008c). In an overtly Atlanticist move 
not usually seen amongst French leaders, he also entered the French presidency 
intending to re-integrate France into the full military structure of NATO—completed 
in April 2009—as well as favouring strengthened EU “operational capabilities.” In 
this regard, Sarkozy was following well-established line of French policymakers in 
giving political visibility to “autonomous European defence” (Ortiz, 2007:2). The 
latter included the consistently controversial European Operational Headquarters 
(OHQ), ostensibly to enable EU intervention where NATO and the United States had 
no interest or desire (Lequesne and Rozenberg, 2008: 24).  
In addition, military officers, civilian officials, and defence industry executives, while 
acknowledging “French leadership” on the “EDEM agenda,” characterised it as a 
“reflection” of the “historic” French pursuit of “Europe of Defence, but on French 
terms”  (Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and 
Member State; Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State). It is telling that 
the French 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security, commissioned in 
July 2007 and released just before the commencement of the French Council 
Presidency, contained a chapter dedicated to “France’s Ambition for Europe,” in 
which France would occupy “the front rank” of a “more unified, stronger European 
Union, with a greater presence in … security and defence” (Ministry of Defence of 
France, 2008: 75). An important component of achieving this objective was 
reenergising EU cooperation on weapons programmes, which in turn necessitated 
coordination of procurement policies and “presupposed” greater common demand 
specification (Ministry of Defence of France, 2008: 86). The White Paper does declare 
France’s undertaking to support common defence equipment rules, but this intention is 
not set out as part of capability enhancement efforts, but rather “in addition to” them 
(Ministry of Defence of France, 2008: 87). 
 
The vision for European defence articulated in the document also relied upon “major 
industrial, technological and scientific capability” and specifically “a streamlined and 
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competitive European industry” (Ministry of Defence of France, 2008: 86). The White 
Paper also set out France’s defence procurement strategy on the basis of three levels 
corresponding to varying levels of national control. These ranged from “national 
proficiency” in the most sensitive areas “of sovereign prerogative” to purchasing from 
the world market, where security of supply was not a paramount concern (Ministry of 
Defence of France, 2008: 254). Between these two poles was what the document 
termed “European interdependence,” which ostensibly covered the majority of defence 
procurement, and involved “reciprocity, security of supply and overall balance” 
between EU member states “underpinned by effective procurement procedures” and 
built upon “free consent between” governments (Ministry of Defence of France, 2008: 
254). The White Paper urged its fellow “States” to develop “world-class European 
[industrial] champions” through harmonising military needs. France itself would 
follow a “pragmatic approach” of entering into “structural bilateral or trilateral 
partnerships” (p. 255). It was from these partnerships that “European ambitions for an 
arms industry would take shape” (p. 255). The EDA occupied a primary place in this 
scheme, bearing the responsibility of coordinating EU-wide military needs in 
conjunction with the EU Military Committee and Military Staff (p. 255). In order to 
bring this picture to life, the document called for “a free trade area in defence 
equipment” but only between states with “comparable control procedures” (p. 255).  
This overview indicates that when compared to the Defence Economy Council report, 
which articulated a far-reaching version of a European defence equipment market, the 
2008 White Paper placed a notably greater emphasis on “intergovernmental aspects,” 
making frequent use of concepts such as balance, security of supply, free consent, and  
a “pragmatic approach” through partnerships. Moreover, despite using language 
similar to that employed by the Commission, the document’s view of cooperation is 
characterised by qualification and caution, reaching only as “far” as is necessary for 
intergovernmental cooperation on weapons programs. This observation lends 
credence to the finding that has emerged in the course of this chapter regarding the 
disassociation of defence market integration as a policy objective from EU defence 
structures. Furthermore, the view from several other major arms’ producing member 
states’ capitals was that, much like former President Sarkozy’s 2007 highly-publicised 
castigations of the duplication and over-capacity across EU’s defence markets with 
which this thesis began, the French readiness to “criticise at the political level” was 
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not always translated into policy direction, and was thus regarded with a degree of 
scepticism (Chapter I; Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA).  
 
Public Portrayal of the French EU Council Presidency Agenda: From St Malo II to 
EDEM 
Nevertheless, a key component of Sarkozy’s EU agenda also focused on the European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base as well as the “development [of] a 
European arms industry” and defence industrial strategy (Hepher, 2007; Ortiz, 
2007:2). Indeed, the French plans to forge the beginning of a joint procurement policy 
in the EU frequently appeared in the media and policy discourse in the months 
preceding its Council presidency, and, in support of the argument advanced above, 
most often presented as a policy to be set and steered by the EDA (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008; Europolitics, 1 July 2008). In addition, as France’s time at the 
helm of the EU Council drew near, its initially grand objectives appeared to have been 
gradually de-scaled. One factor in this shift was reported as French doubts of British 
support for a major EU defence initiative at the time when Gordon Brown’s political 
weakness was leaving him open to domestic criticisms of “betraying” the UK’s prised 
“special relationship” with the United States (Taylor, 2008c). Sarkozy’s messages of 
reassurance – that the EU getting its defence act together in this way would bolster 
rather than rival NATO and serve a US interest in the EU “rationalising its own 
capabilities”—were not sufficient to assuage British fears of “new French activism” 
on EU defence and security (Hepher, 2007; Lequesne and Rozenberg, 2008: 24). 
Moreover, it had soon become clear to Paris that should the next UK government 
happen to be Conservative, realising French ambitions in this field would be much 
more difficult still (Lequesne and Rozenberg, 2008: 24). This timeline put some time 
pressure on Sarkozy’s desired policy outcomes, as they would have to be agreed 
before the intensive campaigning phase of the UK’s 2010 general election (Lequesne 
and Rozenberg, 2008: 24).  
German support for increased defence spending—a cornerstone of Sarkozy’s CSDP-
enhancement plan—could also not be counted upon, as election year positioning saw 
both major parties sway to the left, away from a focus on defence and security needs 
and towards “peace dividend” campaigning. Although Germany shared with France its 
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favourable outlook for harmonised procurement processes, largely as a result of both 
countries’ interest in increasing opportunities for their formidable defence industries, 
the former was not at all receptive to the French objective of compelling member 
states to increase defence spending (Taylor, 2008b; 2008e).  Furthermore, all was not 
calm on France’s home front, either, particularly considering the impending 
publication of the Defence White Paper which would advocate shedding tens of 
thousands of jobs and closing a number of military bases (Taylor, 2008d). Finally, it 
had already become clear by the summer of 2008 that the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, on which the implementation of the French agenda relied, would not 
occur until January 2009, when France would no longer hold the Council Presidency 
(Taylor, 2008c). In this regard, the ratification of the Treaty hinged on the approval of 
Ireland, which, having helped scupper the Constitutional Treaty and nervous about 
Lisbon’s implications for its jealously guarded neutrality policy, could not be made 
anxious again over “EU militarisation” (Taylor, 19 June 2008) 
 
Consequently, by the time France announced strengthening the CSDP capabilities as 
one of its presidency priorities, its plans for EU defence, which by now also included a 
more competitive, free defence market, were beginning to be portrayed in the media as 
more “pragmatic” and less “avant garde” (Taylor, 2008d). Thus, the then Secretary 
of State for EU affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet informed the media of his preference for 
strengthening the “operational capacity” of CSDP rather than a “grand conceptual 
review” (Taylor, 2008d).  Such a “pivot” was also more palatable to Britain, where 
the public and legislature were considerably more sympathetic to “opening markets,” 
which had “clearly and historically” worked very well for the UK (Interview 4, 23 
July 2013, EDA). For Jouyet, this entailed increasing the effectiveness of member 
states’ defence spending as well as enhancing equipment interoperability through 
common procurement procedures and a more integrated defence market (Taylor, June 
2008d). In addition, the relative reliance of Thales, the French defence prime 
contractor examined in Chapter III, as well as that of other major French defence 
firms, on the European versus the United States’ defence market is considerably 
heavier than that of other transnational firms in the EU (Luehmann, 2011: 7; Thales 
Group, 2008: 14; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State; Interview 9, 
14 November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation).  
 
	   211	  
The French Presidency’s Support of the Defence Procurement Directive behind the 
Scenes – Safeguard Against Future ECJ Rulings 
 
Therefore, the objective of constructing a European defence equipment market 
resonated with French traditional concerns for the “strategic autonomy of Europe.” 
Particularly true in the transatlantic context, this was also a “matter of French 
sovereignty, pride, and conscience” as well as France’s “credibility as an ally” 
(Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 21, 
7 March 2014, EDA and Member State).  There was certainly an “economic interest 
to reinforce industry” guiding the French Council Presidency, while in some French 
policymaking circles, the defence industrial equivalent of the state’s quest for 
“strategic autonomy” was the “protection of the European defence equipment market 
via a “European preference” in defence acquisition (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 12, 22 January 2014, Member 
State Ministry of Defence). However, underneath such grand political narratives 
surrounding the European Defence Equipment Market, a more narrow and more acute 
institutional concern was concentrating the attention of the French Council Presidency on 
the proposed Defence Procurement Directive.  
 
In fact, discussions of the French position and preparation of the Presidency agenda 
on the “EDEM dossier” within the permanent representation were already taking 
place during the preceding Slovenian Presidency, and had in fact begun under the 
Portuguese term before that (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation). In fact, it was the French representation, with the view towards its 
own time at the helm, that was key to securing one of a major concessions on the part 
of the Commission during the latter half of 2007 – the “big shift” from the planned 
regulation to the more flexible directive (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation; Chapter IV). Regarded as a “way to reassure the member 
states,” this development was key to reducing their opposition to community 
involvement (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation; 
Chapter IV) Consequently, by the time the intensive phase of the preparatory work on 
the Presidency commenced in early 2008, the Directive Proposal was already “on the 
table,” with the first phase of negotiations on its content initiated in January 2008 
(Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation).  On an 
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institutional level, Christine Roger, the former French Ambassador to the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), a permanent structure within the Council of the EU, was 
instrumental in securing a “defence focus” within the French Presidency’s agenda, 
and then extending that agenda to include the proposed defence procurement directive 
(Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 29, 
7 April 2014, EU Council).  An uncharitable reading of such support for the 
legislation would characterise it as one of focusing on “the only deliverable(s)” after 
the grander aspects of its European defence agenda proved untenable (Interview 9, 14 
November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 11, 6 December 
2013, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview 16, 6 February 2014, European 
Commission). Indeed, as an official tasked with the Defence Procurement Directive 
“brief” acknowledged, the Presidency had  “not envisioned the EDEM as a huge 
priority; the Directive was more like a beautiful present on top of the list” (Interview 
24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation). Moreover, there were 
a “number of packages” under negotiation, with the Climate and Energy Directive 
perceived “the big ticket item” at the time (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation; Interview 6, 30 July 2013, Member State Permanent 
Representation). However, reaching for the “low-hanging fruit” in this manner was a 
widespread technique amongst pre-Lisbon Council Presidencies, and, moreover, this 
narrative only tells part of the story (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). As mentioned above, the “political mood” set and 
propagated by the Sarkozy administration favoured an “EU initiative on defence,” and 
had filtered down throughout the bureaucratic levels (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, 
Member State Ministry of Defence).  
 
In addition, the significance of recent ECJ activity in solidifying the support for a 
Directive within the French Presidency must be noted (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member 
State Permanent Representation). As argued by Blauberger and Weiss, and indicated 
in Hoeffler’s work, the Case Commission vs. Italy (C-337/05) in which the Court 
ruled that the Article 346 exemption did not apply to dual-use goods, a number of 
infringement proceedings initiated by the ECJ throughout 2007 and the beginning of 
2008 questioning member states’ closed competition procurement decisions, and the 
“ECJ getting very close to ruling on defence markets” in general, reportedly 
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convinced the French Ministry of Defence and the Council Presidency that “not 
having a text was worse than having it” (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). These indications of the Court’s increasingly “restrictive 
interpretation” of defence acquisition cases sent a powerful jolt through the French 
bureaucracy that “fragility” and “transience” or Article 346 necessitated “legal 
certainty” and required a “safeguard” which the Defence Procurement Directive could 
provide (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation; 
Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation). 
Consequently, it was decided  in early 2008 that the French Presidency would “take 
the bull by the horns” and oversee its approval  (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation). Furthermore, unlike other member states’ 
legal systems, French domestic legislation already contained provisions for regulating 
the scope of Article 346, which boded well for the transposition process and could 
also provide a source of amendments, and thus French influence, to the text itself 
(Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence; Blauberger and 
Weiss, 2013).   In fact, Hoeffler has stated that this 2004 decree was the basis for the 
“instructions” to support the Directive conveyed by Paris to the French delegation 
(Hoeffler, 2012: 445). 
 
Other member states were also warily noting the “independent and serious indication 
of intent” on the part of the Court (Interview 36, 5 May 2014, EDA and Member 
State). The UK, similarly to France, understood that the Directive would provide a 
safeguard” vis-à-vis ECJ rulings.  Generally guided by a pragmatic approach, the 
British government at the time appeared “comfortable enough” with the French 
Presidency leading the negotiations once it had assumed that post (Interview 37, 20 
May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation).  Specifically, the Department 
of Business, as well as “parts of the Ministry of Defence” regarded the Defence 
Package as a “very positive development” (Interview 6, 30 July 2013, Member State 
Permanent Representation). Moreover, despite its “love affair” with the United States, 
the UK was beginning to understand that it was increasingly less willing to “share key 
technology” as part of transatlantic defence acquisition projects, further contributing 
to the British willingness to compromise (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006;Interview 39, 25 
May 2014, EUMS).  
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The French Presidency Forges Consensus 
 
This is not to say that this shift made for a smooth negotiating path. In fact, many calls 
for an intergovernmental approach to defence market matters continued well after the 
publication of the Proposal and throughout the better part of 2008 (Interview 37, 20 
May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation). Tacit support of Paris for the 
Directive Proposal did not mean that it was forthcoming from other member states’ 
capitals. Rather, the French Presidency faced “very reluctant” governments concerned 
about the “extremist” approach of the Commission and the likelihood of competence 
creep (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent Representation).  Thus, 
national EU representation officials recall “very tense, very difficult” discussions 
beginning with the first meeting and “all the way” until adoption (Interview 24, 11 
March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ; Interview 3, 15 December, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 9, 14 November 2013, Member 
State Permanent Representation). However, having determined that “there would be a 
very good Directive, if there were to be a Directive at all,” the officials and civil 
servants of the French Presidency set about achieving just that in the six months 
preceding the official July commencement (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member 
State Permanent Representation;). The task before the French delegation of bringing 
member states closer to “accepting a degree of interdependence and cooperation was 
eased by a general awareness in national capitals that “an internal market in defence 
was needed” to address budget constraints and help finance weapons programmes that 
“have been getting more and more expensive” (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). This sense was also reinforced by the shared 
understanding that “there are things that [member states] cannot do alone that are 
necessary in modern war,” while the pre-financial crisis “halcyon days” of European 
integration and CSDP “optimism” helped make “issues of competence” less “acute” 
then they are today (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation).  
 
 
	   215	  
 
Creation and Influence of the LoI Working Group 
In this context, the French diplomats and officials in Brussels set about making 
proposed legislation as palatable to the member states as possible. In particular, the 
French delegation made sure to organise “many meetings, lunches, and visits to 
[member states’] embassies” in Brussels (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). With “nobody” “killing” the idea of a defence 
procurement directive, an “agreement among the Big Three” arms producing member 
states was forged “in principle,” approximately three-four months prior to the 
beginning of the French term (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Lequesne and Rozenberg, 2008: 25). A key early component of this 
strategy was the establishment of the so-called Letter of Intent Working Group, 
known as the LoI Group in early 2008. Comprised of ministry of defence and 
armaments directorate officials from the six largest arms producing member states 
that had originally signed the LoI, as well as their representatives at desk-officer level 
in COREPER, the establishment of the forum had been a significant step in 
“placating” the largest member states (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation; Interview 41, 11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence). The LoI Group met on the days immediately preceding the Council 
Working Group meetings, and aimed to input “defence specific” concerns into these 
discussions (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence).  
 
In fact, the LoI Working Group became the chief forum for discussing the 
implications and provisions of the proposed directive, raising issues of common 
concern, and, in the words of one former participant, “comparing national positions” 
(Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence; Interview  41, 
11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence). Although the meetings were often 
fractious, and there was “no time when all six agreed,” a “common vision” began to 
emerge amongst them as a result of “testing ideas” and discussing shared concerns of 
a “larger, strategic nature” (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence ; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ).  
One official recalled that the LoI Working Group meetings also provided an 
opportunity to “work out competition amongst the six member states,” and it was 
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grudgingly agreed that, as the official phrased it, “having the Czechs buy equipment 
from a Swedish company was more acceptable to the French then having it be bought 
from an American firm. Although, of course, the French would have preferred that it 
had been purchased from France” (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation). Moreover, the LoI Working Group delegates would even 
give the floor to each other ahead of other member states’ representatives during 
Council meetings, secure in the knowledge that broad support  for their positions had 
been “worked out the day before” (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation ). Crucially, the Group, rather than the Council, also 
became the chief interlocutor of the Commission for much of the negotiating 
process—as Commission officials had requested to be included in LoI meetings— 
and held frequent meetings with the EDA, as well (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation ; Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member 
State Ministry of Defence; Interview,  32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of 
Defence ; Interview  41, 11 June 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence).  In fact, 
LoI Working Group participants recalled an amenable process during which they felt 
they were “educating” the Commission on the implications of the Directive’s 
provisions under discussion, while the Commission “used” the LoI forum to gauge the 
progress of the negotiations (Interview 11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry 
of Defence ; Interview 3, 15 December, Member State Permanent Representation). In 
the absence of more senior level input from their ministries of defence, the LoI 
Working Group also functioned as the main vehicle for conveying member states’ 
positions throughout a considerable portion of the co-decision discussions (Interview 
11, 6 December 2013, Member State Ministry of Defence). 
 
The Importance of Intra-Presidency Dynamics 
As stressed repeatedly by officials at the Commission, COREPER, and member 
states’ ministries of defence, as well as industry executives, the French Presidency 
beginning with the official commencement of its term on 1 July 2008, was widely 
regarded as “incredibly ambitious,” having “dedicated an enormous amount of 
resources,”  “worked extremely hard,” and “pushed everyone else to work extremely 
hard” (Interview 6, 30 July 2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 
24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ; Interview 9, 14 
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November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 3, 15 
December, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 18, 10 February 2014, 
Industry; Interview,  32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence ; 
Interview 26, 3 April, Industry; Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European 
Commission ). Fuelling the pressure to “get as much done as possible,” was the 
French Presidency’s desire, shared within COREPER, to secure a decision before the 
looming European Parliament elections, end of the first Barroso Commission’s term, 
and the commencement of the “untested, new” Czech Council Presidency in 2009 
(Interview 6, 30 July 2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 9, 14 
November 2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 32, 10 April 
2014, Member State Ministry of Defence ; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member 
State Permanent Representation ). Moreover, after the Commission had first 
published its Proposal for a Defence Procurement Directive, there was no certainty 
amongst stakeholders as to when and even if it would be finalised and approved.  
 
Therefore, the initial aim of the French Presidency was a legislative text that was “as 
advanced as possible,” in order to be optimally positioned to influence its content at 
later drafting stages (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation). As negotiations progressed, however, the Presidency became 
increasingly determined to take and  “maintain control of the  entire process,” 
(Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ). In a 
reflection of this, one interviewee recalled “everyone in COREPER” being “forced” 
to work through the night on the eve of the Directive’s adoption, for instance, while 
another characterised France’s time at the helm as “the Presidency on crack” 
(Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European Commission ; Interview 9, 14 November 
2013, Member State Permanent Representation).  Those involved also recounted 
“meetings with the Commission before and after Council meetings, seven hour-long 
meetings, informal, ad hoc meetings, and sometimes additional meetings in Council” 
(Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member State Ministry of Defence).   
 
The dynamics of the EU’s institutional alignment, and that of the French Council 
Presidency, played a key role in securing the adoption of the Defence Procurement 
Directive, as well.  The “traditional” defence and security structures within the EU 
Council, much like member states’ ministries of defence, were not the primary venues 
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of the Directive negotiations. Despite a “very strong interest in the issue,” the PSC 
had “discovered” the EDEM agenda “almost” by chance, and did not become actively 
involved until very late into the negotiating period (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, 
Member State Permanent Representation ). To the Committee, the likelihood of an 
“actual” Directive seemed like “a remote possibility” for much of the Directive 
Proposal discussions, and the text itself was deemed “too technical” (Interview 24, 11 
March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ). Similarly, the armaments 
counsellors of member states’ permanent representations to the EU had more or less 
“let the” brief “go” to the Competitiveness configuration of the Council, likely 
viewing it as yet another “administrative burden” and one that would likely be 
discussed within the same domestic government structures, at any rate (Interview 24, 
11 March 2014, Member State Permanent Representation ; Interview 9, 14 November 
2013, Member State Permanent Representation; Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU 
Council). Nevertheless, the engagement of the Brussels “defence actors” was 
necessary to forge a general consensus, and the “political support” of Christine Roger, 
the then French PSC Ambassador, was essential to securing it (Interview 37, 20 May 
2014, Member State Permanent Representation). Cognizant of “community matters,” 
she expended tremendous personal effort in order to “bring industry, the Commission, 
and national defence people” together (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation; Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU Council).   
In addition, a number of officials interviewed as part of this research recalled a 
congenial atmosphere and a “very good spirit” within the French “team,” the LoI 
Working Group, and the Council Working Party (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, 
Member State Ministry of Defence ; Interview 17, 10 February 2014, European 
Commission ; Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation). Thus, despite the sharp dividing line between “public procurement 
people” and “defence people” within these settings—which reportedly even translated 
into social activities—a shared goal of “working in the direction of a solution” 
emerged as the negotiations progressed (Interview 24, 11 March 2014, Member State 
Permanent Representation; Interview 40, 28 May 2014, European Parliament ; 
Interview 3, 15 December, Member State Permanent Representation). For instance, 
one senior official at the General Council Secretariat (GCS) spoke of a shared desire 
to have the proverbial baby,” after investing the time and resources into “not throwing 
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it out with the bathwater” during negotiations (Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU 
Council).  
 
The Devil is in the Detail: Reaching Agreement on Substance 
Substantively, the French Presidency was also instrumental in forging compromise on 
several thorny aspects of the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions.  Firstly, it 
was responsible for introducing the Directive’s treatment of offsets as a compromise 
measure, which enabled the member states’ contracting authorities to require defence 
firms who had won contracts from other member states’ governments to sub-contract a 
share of the project to local firms (Europolitics, 2008e). Described as a “very bitter part 
of the negotiations” the issue of offsets constituted one of the most sensitive aspects of the 
Commission’s EDEM agenda (Interview 6, 30 July 2013, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Chapter III; Chapter IV). Secondly, the Commission and the Council had 
clashed over the proposed “threshold” values of defence supplies and services 
contracts above which the Directive would apply, with the latter putting forward a 
much larger amount (1 million euros versus the 133,000 – 206,000 euros favoured by 
the Commission and European Parliament). It was the French Presidency that 
proposed the compromise amount of 412,000 euros, basing the figure on civilian 
procurement regulations (Europolitics, 2008e). Thirdly, the French Presidency was 
responsible facilitating agreement between the Commission, Parliament, and several 
member states on the specification of services to be covered by the Directive 
(Europolitics, 2008e). 38  
On the higher, more political level, the Presidency also insisted on the inclusion of the 
EDA into the Defence Taskforce being planned by the Commission at the time of the 
Directive negotiations (Interview 37, 20 May 2014, Member State Permanent 
Representation; Interview 38, 22 May 2014, EDA and Member State ).  Furthermore, 
the French concern with “strategic autonomy” has also found its way into the 
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  The Commission set out a list of services to which the Directive would apply in an annex, based on the 1958 
Council Decision. However, the EP wanted a general definition and an updated list of defence-related 
services, proposing to delete the annex. Several member states were opposed to this.  The compromise 
brokered by the French presidency was to retain two annexes with updated service definitions (dividing 
between primary and secondary services, based on how “directly” they relate to the 1958 list of materiel). 	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COREPER Draft Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, which proclaimed that 
“lessening our dependence for key technologies on non-EU suppliers” and 
“improving our security of supply” is essential to developing operational capabilities 
(COREPER, 2008: 8). In addition, the Presidency reportedly succeeded in securing 
assurances that any ECJ ruling resulting from the Directive would consider the impact 
of its decision on the viability of the defence contract in question – providing the 
member states with yet another “safeguard” (Interview 32, 10 April 2014, Member 
State Ministry of Defence ).  And finally, despite relative EC “victories” on curtailing 
offset practices and restricting the application of Article 346, the definition of what 
constitutes military equipment meriting an exemption from competitive procurement 
due to its sensitivity has been left to the interpretation of the member states 
(O’Donnell, 2008) 
 
Conclusion	  
 
This chapter has traced the connection—of both a rhetorical and a policy-making 
nature— between EU military capability development and the coalescence of an EU 
defence equipment market. This link arose from the post-Cold War military 
transformation efforts undertaken by EU member states, and specifically the need for 
an EU-wide framework to support defence industrial rationalisation. The massive 
military equipment demand structures of bi-polar posturing had become unsustainable, 
and considering the small defence market sizes across the EU, if its defence firms 
were to continue to operate (a political and labour market concern) and produce the 
equipment required by the armed forces (a defence and security concern), a European 
framework for industrial rationalisation and consolidation was necessary. This 
rationale coincided with Europe’s defence firms themselves becoming more “vocal” 
regarding the risks and challenges they were facing. The first post-Cold War decade 
also saw the emergence of an EU military construct as part of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although it had since acquired civilian crisis 
management capacities as well, the CSDP originated in an attempt to narrow the 
transatlantic gap in military capabilities which was so starkly exposed during the 
Balkan wars of the late 1990s. Subsequently, the Anglo-French meeting of minds at St 
Malo in 1998— CSDP’s official “birth” if there was one—soon became caught and 
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buoyed along by the European integration dynamic. In this self- reinforcing pattern, as 
the fundamental fragility of this historic consensus became apparent, CSDP was cast 
as primarily a military capability development and enhancement tool. Steering clear of 
politically grand but inherently divisive aspects, such as the relationship with NATO 
or a permanent EU headquarters, and focusing on “practical” ways in which CSDP 
could deliver on capabilities and close-to-home crisis management, allowed this 
project initiated into existence with such fanfare, to move along, if only from one 
usually unfulfilled capability target to the next. 
 
Another outcome of this shift, however—and one that is of direct relevance to the 
arguments presented in this chapter—was to strengthen the chain of policymaking 
rationale between crisis management capabilities and an integrated defence equipment 
market, via industrial restructuring. In turn, the EDA, an incarnation of the long-
touted European armaments agency, arose from this growing connection between 
defence and market policy fields. It was also spurned into existence by the mounting 
indications of the European Commission’s resolve, as the member states warily 
perceived it, to forge a role for itself in any EDEM that would emerge. Thus, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, the EDA was the direct result of member states’ recognition 
that the “business aspects” of defence were in dire need of policy attention if the 
defence aspect was to have any meaning at all. As such, the Agency was positioned by 
EU governments as the leading actor in the construction of the EDEM, while the EC 
and its proposals in this field, were kept resolutely at bay. Furthermore, in the words of 
the Agency’s first CEO, the “intellectual case” which the EDA dedicatedly set about 
making reverberated throughout the EU’s defence and security structures, as the 
imperative of an efficient defence market, with harmonised, competition-enhancing 
procurement procedures at its core, became increasingly characterised as a crucial 
component of developing Europe’s capabilities and furthering its security. There was, 
as the EDA officials never lost an opportunity to emphasise, no viable alternative to 
cooperation. 
 
That meeting of minds, however, proved fleeting and conditional, as indicated by the 
divergent roles member states originally envisioned for the EDA itself. Therefore, the 
Agency, despite producing initially promising results and facilitating (soft) rule-based 
cooperation between member states, has fallen victim to the fragility and transience of 
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intergovernmental consensus situated at the core of the EU’s attempts to forge a 
coherent defence policy in general. The frequently reiterated sentiment which 
emerged in the course of interviews regarding the over-zealousness of the 
Commission as it “moved in” with “its” regulations and ostensibly “scared” member 
states off voluntary cooperation must therefore be viewed in this context. 
Furthermore, these are significant not so much for their veracity but as an indication 
of the influence exerted by the Commission itself. Yet, paradoxically, the EDA and 
the Code of Conduct, as well as their decline, also “eased” the passage of the Defence 
Procurement Directive. The former created a level of trust between the member states, 
raised the defence equipment market issue on the policymaking agenda, and brought 
together hitherto non-intersecting actors (such as representatives of national 
armaments directorates) around the EDEM policy area. Rather, the inter-linkage 
between capability improvement objectives and defence industrial imperatives greatly 
strengthened the policy rationale for a legislative instrument as part of the EDEM, 
supplying a persuasive set of arguments in its favour—to be exploited by its 
proponents— and drawing in an additional caucus of supporters from the defence and 
security field. A European defence and security policy bolstered by a European 
defence equipment market is potent mission statement. The ineffectuality of the Code 
of Conduct then strengthened the rationale for the Commission’s involvement, as 
well. 
 
Yet the key finding of this chapter is that in the numerous policy statements with the 
message of “we need to forge an open EU defence market to ensure the effective 
operation of our armed forces,” a crucial detail was lost. In particular, it was never 
made clear, by member states policy makers or relevant EU officials, if the armed 
forces and military capabilities they were concerned about referred to an EU or a 
national context. In other words, did the key actors believe that an EU defence 
procurement policy would bolster CSDP—assuming that this was what they in fact 
desired—or did they see a value in it, as the EDA had hoped, for their national 
militaries and defence firms? This distinction is important not only because it could 
clarify if and how the EDEM elements which have emerged may be viewed as a result 
of EU’s continuing military integration, but also because its absence indicates vague 
policy proposals, which in turn suggest a lack of clear policymaking intent to bring 
about further institutionalisation of the defence equipment market.  
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Thus, as has been demonstrated above, the member states did see a purpose and 
benefit of institutionalised EU cooperation in the defence industrial realm for their 
national defence and security policy objectives. However, it has also been made 
apparent that this space for integration, so to speak, was highly conditional and 
carefully constructed to provide member states with decision-making primacy and the 
maximum possible room for manoeuvre. Moreover, and perhaps not very surprisingly, 
EU governments did not envision much of a role, and certainly not a leading role, for 
the European Commission and its “internal market for defence” proposals in an 
EDEM they may have wished to see. Therefore, the conclusion which emerges from 
the discussion above is that capability improvement was not the primary motivation 
behind member states’ acquiescence to supranational constraints in the form of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. It is reinforced by the continuing failure of member 
states to close the CSDP capability gaps they have repeatedly identified, as well as the 
lack of clarity in their policy statements regarding how precisely an EU defence 
equipment market—particularly one with a role for the European Commission— 
would benefit their armed forces. In addition, the EU’s capability generation structures, 
primarily the EUMC and the EUMS, did not concern themselves with “issues of the 
market,” and viewed the EDEM as functionally separate from true “defence” aspects such 
as deployment on missions and interoperability. The prevailing view within these settings 
was that the road to defence integration ran through increased operational integration of 
the member states’ armed forces, rather than the construction of a harmonised defence 
market.  
 
The focus on the interests and policy objectives of the Big Three member states, which has 
underpinned the research presented in this chapter, has indicated that the French EU Council 
Presidency of 2008 was fundamental in securing the adoption of the Defence 
Procurement Directive—primarily by forging a consensus “in principle” amongst the 
Big Three before the French term even commenced— and its influence in this regard 
was consistently highlighted in interviews. Furthermore, the French Presidency agenda 
prioritised the EU defence and security policy, and within that, emphasised capability 
development. In this, it was spurned on by the political direction of the Sarkozy 
administration. For France, this was a manifestation of its historic quest for a European 
“strategic autonomy”—largely vis-à-vis the United States—including the pursuit of  
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“Europe of defence, but on French terms.”  French calls for a “European Defence 
Procurement Area” based on “common rules” certainly constitute considerable policy 
continuity, as does the Directive’s compatibility with its domestic decree of 2004. 
However, the support of the French Presidency—as well as of Paris—for the 
Commission’s initiatives was essentially reactive,  rooted in not only the “threat” of 
potentially harsh future ECJ rulings in the field of defence procurement, but also in the 
apparent unworkability of its grander European Defence ambitions, the significance of 
the EU market to French transnational defence industry, and the desire to shape the 
process the result of which was increasingly seen as inevitable.
	   225	  
 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION –
INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND 
ITS MINUTE MANIFESTATIONS 
Introduction	  
This thesis had set out to investigate the emergence of an institutionalised European 
Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). Towards this end, Smith’s conceptualisation of 
institutionalisation was adopted here, which views this process as an increase in the 
level of detail and inter-linkage between the collective behaviours and choices of a 
social group. As a result, norms become more numerous, clear, binding—as 
behavioural standards become obligations— and formal, as they are codified into 
rules and laws, and as permanent organisations are “brought into the process (Smith, 
2004: 27; 39). As such, focus was placed on the first and most significant elements of 
EDEM to date— the legally binding 2009 Defence Procurement Directive issued by 
the European Commission, and, until its suspension in March 2013, the European 
Defence Agency’s (EDA) voluntary of Conduct launched in 2006. Both instruments 
have imposed conditions, limitations, and in the case of the Defence Procurement 
Directive, unprecedentedly binding rules on member states’ defence procurement 
practices. The most important manifestation of this constraint has been the 
curtailment of national governments’ hitherto unbridled and often superfluous 
invocation of Article 346 of Lisbon Treaty. The provision allows the member states to 
derogate from the stringent Single Market regulations mandating open competition 
within the Union, when the “essential interests of its security” are at stake.  
Having been preserved throughout successive Treaty revisions, the exclusion 
constitutes a jealously guarded prerogative of the member states, which view it as the 
tantamount legal safeguard of their sovereignty. Situated at the core of nation-states’ 
perceptions and expressions of sovereignty is control over the production, 
development, acquisition and trade of armaments. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
this linkage has been emphasised within major theoretical traditions in IR, such as 
realism, constructivism and liberalism, and is routinely invoked in policy discourse 
emanating from the defence industrial policy field.  Moreover, the entrenched 
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equation of defence industrial matters to core state functions finds numerous 
empirical manifestations within the EU armaments and defence procurement sphere, 
as, for instance,  persisting protectionism, fragmentation, and lack of cooperation in 
this areas are consistently attributed to “sovereignty concerns” within policymaking 
and academic circles alike. Thus, the Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG) within NATO, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), followed 
by the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), and finally the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) of today constituted political, intergovernmental 
initiatives.  The so-called Letter of Intent Agreement (LoI) and the establishment of 
the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-Operation, known by its French acronym 
OCCAR, have had a more industrial focus, encompassing governments’ commitment 
to ease the life of defence industry through cooperation. Yet, all of these organisations 
have proven largely incapable of fulfilling their mandates due to the lack of true 
commitment to cooperation and the seemingly ever elusive political will. The 
fundamental reason for difficulties or descent into irrelevance, however, lay in the 
inherent difficulty of inter-state cooperation in policy fields which lie at the heart of 
nation-state sovereignty conceptualisations 
Nevertheless, as stated above, member states have acquiesced to supranational rules 
which would, for this first time, circumvent their monopoly on defence procurement 
decision-making. Furthermore, they have done so despite a long-held resistance to 
meaningful involvement of the European Commission in any aspect of the EU’s 
defence and security policy, and following the rejection of its previous forays into 
defence industrial matters.  This empirical puzzle has consequently resulted in the 
research question addressed by this thesis: why have member states made the more 
costly move toward binding regulation in the shape of the Directive, having already 
enacted a soft cooperation mechanism represented by the Code? This inquiry was also 
approached as a means of examining rule-based inter-state cooperation in a policy 
area that lies at the core of national sovereignty conceptualisations, while seeking to 
elucidate the dynamics of European integration in a field that has been notoriously 
and historically resistant to such forces. Consequently, three hypotheses were 
generated. Taking into account the industrial, economic, defence and security aspects 
of the defence industrial policy field, and informed by the existing literature and 
policy documents available at the time, it was hypothesised that: 
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H1: Transnational defence firms and industry associations, created by industrial 
consolidation within the EU, have lobbied member state governments to agree to 
harmonisation measures  
H2:  Supranational EU bodies have secured member states’ agreement to an 
unprecedented measure of defence procurement integration by playing opportunistic 
policy entrepreneurship roles  
H3: Development of the EU security and defence dimension has generated an interest 
in a common defence procurement framework on the part of the dominant arms 
producing member states, which then ensured the cooperation of other governments 
The final chapter in this thesis will first review and assess the evidence in support of 
each hypothesis. Subsequently, a conclusion will be drawn regarding the respective 
causal significance of each, while pathways of interaction between these three lines of 
inquiry will also be specified. These findings will then be placed in the context of the 
conceptual framework and organising principles underpinning this research – namely, 
processes of institutionalisation and policy stages. This chapter will conclude by 
suggesting fruitful avenues for future research.  
	  
European	  Defence	  Industry	  –	  Resignation	  Rather	  Than	  Jubilation	  	  	  
The EU’s  largest transnational defence firms (also referred to as primary contractors, 
or primes) were certainly vociferous regarding their desire for a more open, 
harmonised defence market in the EU.  Indeed, the EU’s armaments manufacturers 
have been feeling under pressure for some time – at least since the late 1980s. Thus, 
as discussed in Chapter III, Europe’s transnational defence industry entered the new 
millennium with frequent calls for “one customer” and greater political cooperation in 
order to alleviate the heavy pressure of decreasing defence budgets, dwindling 
government investment, and intense competition with US firms. They were thus 
instrumental in bringing concerns regarding the competitiveness and even survival of 
this strategically vital sector to the fore of the policy agenda. These industrial players 
have also helped concentrate the minds of member states’ policymakers on the critical 
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importance of political cooperation for ensuring that competitiveness and survival. 
Viewed through the lens of international political economy, if BAE Systems, Thales, 
EADS, and Finmeccanica—the four primes on which the analysis has concentrated –
were to reap the benefits of economies of scale through lower unit costs and increased 
production runs, more EU customers than just their home government would need to 
purchase the defence equipment they produced.  
However, in the course of research undertaken here, it became apparent that the 
trajectory of primes’ interests could not be traced to a competition-based European 
Defence Equipment Market  in a straightforward manner. Rather, their interest in any 
such construct was conditional on the benefits it would yield for their profit margins, 
including with respect to market-share and export potential. And in the transnational 
defence sector, where “home” governments still constitute the most important 
regulators, chief customers, and majority shareholders, the viability of the industrial 
bottom line is a complex concept.  Decades of tightly-knit association with member 
states in which BAE Systems, Thales, EADS, and Finmeccanica are headquartered, 
have resulted in an uneasy tension, with a “close identification of interests” between 
them on one hand and divergence in preferences on the other.  The prime contractors 
constitute only one, albeit key, component of national defence technological and 
industrial bases (DTIBs), in which inherently contradictory objectives regarding 
armed forces’ autonomy, security of defence supply, maintenance of employment and 
technological know-how, efficiency and industrial competiveness are pursued 
simultaneously.  Complete security of supply and information would imply 
maintaining all industrial capabilities within the state’s territorial borders, while 
market forces prioritise cost considerations within contracting decisions. Similarly, 
true industrial consolidation within the EU would imply halting support to non-
competitive firms, which would of course have negative consequences for domestic 
employment.  
All of these tensions were manifested in the preferences, behaviour, and impact of 
transnational defence primes in the sphere of EDEM. The EDA’s Code of Conduct on 
Defence Procurement and the EC Defence Procurement Directive purported to 
address the grievances of industry by furthering the removal of political barriers to a 
more open defence equipment market within the EU. The Code of Conduct has 
proven to be a “low hanging fruit” of an intergovernmental agreement, and as such 
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enjoyed both the support and significant substantive input from industry.  This 
became intertwined and eventually gave way to a rueful awareness of both the Code’s 
and, in fact, the EDA’s, inability to affect change in member states’ behaviour. At the 
same time, as the EDEM policy agenda of the Commission materialised, it 
increasingly diverged from the interests of the EU’s transnational defence primes. It 
furthermore emerged that, rather than acting as autonomous drivers of harmonisation, 
the defence industrial demands—as well as their uncertain fortunes—were also 
utilized by the Commission and the EDA as part of the policy rationale for the 
initiatives they advanced, that is, the Code of Conduct and the Directive, respectively.   
Tracing the extensive consultations   and numerous meetings between industry and 
Commission representatives indicated that the implications of a community vision of 
an open and harmonised defence equipment market contradicted the preferences of 
large defence firms in several important aspects.  In particular, they contravened the 
primes’ desire to maintain their preferential status of national champions and 
attendant privileged relationship  to “home” governments, while at the same time 
enjoy enhanced access to the markets of other member states. Therefore, such 
fundamental aspects of the Defence Procurement Directive as the curtailment of 
member states’ invocation of Article 346, heavy restriction of offset arrangements, 
and exemption of the research and development stage of equipment production from 
open competition have been described by defence primes EU representatives as 
“perverse,” “misplaced,” and “misguided.” 
Consequently, it may be concluded that defence firms’ preferences  could be aptly 
described as having the proverbial cake and eating it too. This idiosyncrasy in turn 
stemmed from their contradictory relationship with the governments of member states 
in which they are headquartered. In particular, Article 346 has elicited the primes ire 
when it had been deployed as a protectionist measure denying them access to  other 
member states’ markets. At the same time, BAE Systems, Thales, Finmeccanica and 
EADS have all grown accustomed to the benefits accruing to them as a result of 
provision being invoked to channel business opportunities to them, most often by 
their “home” government. A similar dynamic existed in relation to the notoriously 
opaque offset practices, wherein governments, when purchasing defence equipment  
from foreign suppliers, require a (typically high) proportion of defence contracts’ 
value to be reinvested in their domestic industry. Again, although offset requirements 
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add unnecessary cost and complexity to defence firms’ business, they have also 
become instrumental to obtaining business opportunities in a fiercely and increasingly 
competitive export environment. In fact, such “sweeteners” are often instrumental in 
securing the entire contract, as purchasing governments—increasingly located outside 
of the EU—can afford to select suppliers based on the “extra” packages they offer.  
Finally, the exemption of national research and development (R&D) contracts from 
the Directive’s scope effectively meant that the necessary investment was not subject 
to competition requirements, while the (more advanced) products resulting from this 
phase would be opened to “fair competition” following a “reasonable” risk 
assessment phase.  Industry viewed this provision as problematic since, as R&D in the 
EU tends to be co-financed by government and industry, member states could not be 
sure that the manufacturing work resulting from their investment would be carried out 
within their territory or bolster the arsenal of their armed forces. Similarly, defence 
firms could not have a guarantee that their own R&D investment would be rewarded 
by a home government purchase of the resulting product – a long established means 
of bestowing a “seal of approval” within defence industry that has become critical for 
export potential.  
As a result, Brussels-based industry representatives have repeatedly chided the 
Commission for not understanding and appreciating such “specificities” of the 
defence market. In fact, upon closer examination of defence primes’ public statements 
and on the basis of interviews conducted, it emerged that the industry’s version of a 
defence equipment market entailed the injection of competition as a complimentary 
and intermediate step to greater demand harmonisation—that is, encouraging member 
states to formulate common armaments requirements— and stimulating government 
investment. It appears industry did not believe that the Commission’s proposals 
would address the root cause of their malaise as they saw it, namely, lack of common 
armaments programmes and R&D investment.  Furthermore, the research undertaken 
here also found that rather than actively lobbying “their” member states to acquiesce 
to the binding provisions of the Directive for the sake of greater competition, defence 
primes’ Brussels-based lobbyists were driven by a belief that the Commission could 
not be prevented from extending its competence into the defence  industrial sphere if 
it had set upon this policy path. Thus, they expended considerable efforts on 
mitigating what they perceived to be noxious aspects of the Commission’s agenda, 
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motivated  more by resignation than proactive policy moulding. The limited impact of 
such efforts—as evidenced by the implications of the finalized Defence Procurement 
Directive discussed above—also signifies a lack of influence during the decision-
making stage of the Directive’s approval. Therefore, the proposition that the EU’s 
largest industrial actors pushed for the “single market of defence” as embodied in the 
Directive could not be empirically supported.  
The examination of transnational firms’ positions has also demonstrated that even 
though they interacted heavily with the European Commission, and to a lesser extent, 
the European Parliament and EU Council, the primary interlocutors of the EU’s 
transnational defence primes have been their home governments’ ministries of 
defence,—and specifically their armaments directorates— particularly during the 
decision-making stage of the Directive’s approval. This conclusion is also consistent 
with the distinct sense of near betrayal expressed by industry representatives in 
interviews—many believed that their interests had been diluted within a “political” 
bargaining process between the member states and the Commission, each pursuing 
their own objectives. A number of interviewees also felt that “their” governments had 
failed to grasp the implications of the Commission’s intentions  sufficiently early in 
the policy process, and had thus missed an opportunity to  shape it according to their  
will and defence firms’ demands. These sentiments indicate that the “flow” of 
influence is not necessarily unidirectional in instances of interest group lobbying, that 
is, exerted by lobbyists upon policymakers, but may rather take on an interactive 
character between supranational, subnational, and national actors.  
 
The	  European	  Commission	  as	  Policy	  Entrepreneur	  	  	  
This thesis had also explored the role of the European Commission as a policy 
entrepreneur and caretaker in facilitating the institutionalisation of the European 
Defence Equipment Market. Initially, it appeared that the EC’s motivation—and 
eventual success—in extending binding EU-level rules into the defence industrial 
policy field had materialised suddenly, following a period of inactivity and “policy 
silence.”  In the aftermath of the irrelevance that befell the previous supranational 
forays into this sphere, that is, Commission Communications issued in 1996 and 
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1997, it seemed that the 2003 Communication, which first flouted the possibility of a 
Directive, was unprecedented. However, a more detailed inspection revealed a 
considerable amount of  policy continuity. Firstly, despite possessing no competence 
in defence, the European Commission had been gradually but steadily carving out 
islands of influence in attendant policy fields, such as security research – where its 
substantial funds accord it a significant degree of influence—and control of dual-use 
exports, meaning goods with both military and civilian applications.   
Secondly, Callum and Guay (2002) highlighted  the “revival of the Commission’s 
interest” in the defence industrial area beginning in 2000 (p. 771). In 2001, it had 
convened two high profile groupings of senior aerospace executives, the so-called 
Group of Personalities and the European Advisory Group on Aerospace. Chaired by 
Commissioners for Research and Enterprise, respectively,  the objectives  set before 
the panels was an examination of the challenges and prospects of the EU’s aerospace 
industry, as well as reflection upon the value of an EC  “contribution” thereto. In fact, 
according to interviews with Commission officials,  the objective of “contributing to” 
the construction of the European defence industrial policy had survived from 1996 
until 2003 as a task on the desks of successive desk officers.  
In addition, the  examination of the Commission’s policy entrepreneurship and 
caretaking arsenal has revealed the importance of policy windows, or, rather, 
recognising such windows of opportunity and making effective use of them.  In the 
case of the EC’s involvement in the defence industrial field, such an opportunity 
materialised with the commencement of the Convention on the Future of Europe. 
Grandiosely referred to as the Convention on Europe, this extended summit was itself 
a manifestation of a dynamic period within EU integration, a stretch of pre-financial 
crisis “halcyon days” and optimism regarding the development of its defence and 
security dimension in particular.  Systemic level pressures—that is, consistently 
declining defence budgets, rapidly increasing costs of modern weapons systems, and 
the ever-widening Transatlantic “competitiveness” gap—made the intra-EU defence 
industrial status quo palpably untenable. There was a shared, widespread awareness 
that the fragmentation and overcapacity across the EU’s defence markets, particularly 
in light of decreasing defence spending, was both unsustainable and deleterious for 
European defence industry and capabilities. As such, the Convention was concerned 
with the inefficacy of existing armaments and defence industrial cooperation 
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arrangements. The combination of these factors – existence and awareness of external 
efforts, as well as a certain pro-integration dynamic, however fleeting, contributed to 
the opening of a policy window which was then recognized as such by a capable 
policy entrepreneur. 
Interview material and policy documentation both indicate that Commission officials 
regarded this conflation as a window of opportunity to advance their policy initiatives. 
They have subsequently embarked on a path of  “purposeful opportunism,” engaging 
in a number of  policy entrepreneurship and caretaking techniques. Firstly,  the 
Commission had launched an intensive consultation period at an early stage of the 
policy process. Taking the form of sustained series of frequent meetings at regular 
intervals, it enabled the Commission to engage with “stakeholders” within industry 
and member states,  and to begin assembling a coalition of supporters while 
neutralising  opposing arguments as well as incorporating differing views. The 
consultation period also allowed the Commission to claim legitimacy as a propagator 
of the “sacred” Internal Market principles within the defence industrial sphere.  By 
allotting member states only a limited time to respond to its questionnaires, the EC 
also decreased the scope for resistance, as the ambitious response deadlines were 
often missed, while the Commission could reasonably claim to have carried out the 
consultations in good faith. 
Another—and related— tactic employed by the Commission was the conscious 
framing of its agenda as a market fragmentation  and competitiveness issue, which 
could only be sufficiently addressed at the Community level. Beyond their normative 
and rhetorical significance, the framing efforts of the Commission had significant 
material consequences. Specifically, they ensured that, once tabled, the defence 
procurement legislative proposal would be debated and voted upon as a (pre-Lisbon) 
First Pillar issue. This triggered the co-decision process between the Council and an 
already largely sympathetic, supportive Parliament, with qualified majority voting 
(QMV) as a decision-making method. Moreover, the Commission’s framing and 
consultation strategies drew in particular interlocutors, in this case, representatives of 
member states’ ministries of economy, finance, and industry, and activated certain 
institutional venues, here—the Council’s Public Procurement Working Group (within 
the Competitiveness Preparatory Body). Such actors embodied an economically 
liberal organisational ethos, and viewed the Commission’s proposals and 
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argumentation through a “marketised” cognitive frame. Helpfully for the EC, this 
orientation prioritised considerations of competitiveness and value for money, as 
opposed to privileging the “specificities” of defence procurement.  
The Commission also proved adept at cajoling as well as coercion. For instance, it 
repeatedly extended official consultation deadlines until the desired number and type 
of responses were received.  At the same time, the Commission has consciously 
downplayed the implications of its proposals for member states’ institutional 
dominance within the defence industrial field by consistently paying rhetorical 
homage to their primacy in this sphere.  Furthermore, DG MARKT and, to a lesser 
extent, DG Enterprise officials portrayed their agenda as merely ancillary to that of 
intergovernmental cooperation initiatives and national efforts.  In their telling, the 
Commission was not interested in arm-twisting, but rather helping member states 
achieve optimal policy outcomes.  
Nevertheless, the supranational Dr. Jekyll was not without his Mr. Hyde. Thus, 
beneath the veneer of emphasising complementarity  in public statements, 
Commission officials frequently drew attention to, first, the Code’s of Conduct 
voluntary nature and thus questionable potential and, later, its apparent inefficacy.  
They have done so both in closed meetings, during their consultations with the 
member states, and even in relevant Commission staff working documents. Finally, 
perhaps the most causally consequential policy entrepreneurship action taken by the 
European Commission was skilfully timing its submission of the Defence Package to 
the Council and Parliament. Specifically, it ensured that the crucial, intensive 
negotiating period of the decision-making stage coincided with the French Council 
Presidency of 2008. 
	  
Defence	  Capability	  Development	  Priorities	  of	  the	  Big	  Three	  	  
As the overview of European intergovernmental armaments cooperation initiatives 
suggested, an examination of the defence industrial policy field must by definition 
include a defence and security dimension. In this thesis, this has been undertaken by 
focusing on the causal linkages between the EU’s developing defence and security 
policy and the rule-based provisions of the European Defence Equipment Market. A 
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focus on the three dominant arms producing member sates—that is, the UK, France, 
and Germany—was maintained throughout this line of inquiry, as their defence 
capability requirements and large, transnational defence firms shape both supply and 
demand within the EU’s defence industrial environment. Moreover, consensus 
amongst the Big Three has historically shaped the nature, output, and progress of the 
EU’s foreign and defence and security policies.  
Policy documents and existing literature have repeatedly characterised the CSDP as 
both the beneficiary and an enabler of the EDEM. The former scenario featured 
arguments for the necessity of a robust defence industrial policy in support of a 
“credible CSDP,” while the latter line of reasoning held that the evolution of an EU-
level defence and security policy provided a “vital rationale” for an integrated defence 
equipment market. Yet, as no specified causal pathways existed, the approach adopted 
here sought to arrive at an empirical specification of causal linkages, if any, between 
the EU’s CSDP structures and the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive. In 
addition, the existence of intergovernmental cooperative structures described above, 
aiming to develop a European defence industrial policy in support of European 
capabilities also merited a consideration of a European Defence Equipment Market 
with an emphasis on defence. 
The first strand of research in this line of inquiry, however, found that the notion of 
European defence capabilities, much like European defence industrial capabilities, 
corresponds to a complex and often contradictory empirical reality. Specifically, 
interview material highlighted that European capabilities—routinely invoked in 
policy rhetoric and documentation—are understood by member state actors as 
primarily national capabilities, to be deployed first and foremost for national 
priorities. Contributions to NATO operations were still widely viewed as the second 
most important use of military arsenals across the EU, and CSDP missions came only 
after that. Consequently, the need to bolster CSDP capabilities through a common 
defence procurement policy could not be the primary driver behind member states’ 
approval of the Defence Procurement Directive. This is also reinforced by the finding 
that  discussions regarding or calls for a European Defence Equipment Market did not 
figure on the agenda of CSDP structures or institutions, such as EUMS or EUMC. 
Moreover, the involvement of national ministries of defence only late in the Directive 
discussion indicates that member states did not view the EDEM as significantly or 
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directly beneficial to their capability development.  
In addition, it was found that the arms-producing Big Three member states, and in 
fact, many in defence industry, viewed the EDA, and not the Commission, as the 
primary vehicle for advancing the market and  industrial aspects of defence capability 
development within the EU.  As this thesis has also demonstrated, the EDA was 
initially successful in this endeavour, and the officials implementing its agenda 
certainly believed that it had made valuable gains in facilitating intergovernmental 
cooperation through its voluntary Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement.  
However, after a little more than two years of  its operation, the fragility of member 
states’ commitment to the Code of Conduct, as well as industry’s enthusiasm for it, 
was becoming an increasingly prominent feature of policy discourse. Again, a number 
of policy makers interviewed in the course of the research conducted for this thesis 
cited the premature and “aggressive” pursuit of a  defence industrial legislative 
instrument by the European Commission, as a key contributor to the dysfunction of 
the Code of Conduct.  Its ineffectuality in turn strengthened the arguments in favour 
of a binding Defence Procurement Directive, and provided a policy “opening” which 
aided the European Commission in bringing about its adoption.  In addition to 
providing such “policy space” for the Commission, the decline of the EDA’s defence 
industrial role also brought the EDEM “issue” to the fore of member states’ concerns 
and helped created invaluable consensus around the need to address the fragmented 
states quo; EDA also inadvertently contributed to the “complacency” of member 
states that helped secure agreement in Council. 
The failure of the EDA to be “useful” in this area, its lack of a clearly delimited remit, 
and member states’ resulting disengagement from it constituted other prominent 
explanations of capitals’ “increasing reticence” regarding the future, potential, and 
value added of the Agency (Interview 34, 16 April 2014, EDA and Member State; 
Interview 4, 23 July 2013, EDA).  However, these factors are rather manifestations of 
the “contradictory logic” pervading the entire defence industrial policy field, of which 
the establishment of the EDA is a part  (Interview 29, 7 April 2014, EU Council). As 
stated above, Internal Market norms imply unilateral openness to competition, 
without the expectation of reciprocal access, and as such fundamentally contravene 
the “defence norms” which privilege domestic control and at best iron-cast reciprocity 
guarantees within any intergovernmental cooperation agreement (Interview 29, 7 
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April 2014, EU Council).  Consequently, the “business aspects of [EU] defence” at 
the core of the EDA’s mission is itself a highly contested concept. Moreover, as 
perceptively discerned by Batora (2009), the European Defence Agency also 
embodied the fundamental tension spanning the gamut of EU member states’ efforts 
to construct an integrated, truly common defence and security policy. It is the fissure 
between the staunch preservation of nation-state sovereignty and the recognition that 
sharing it is unavoidable in light of the defence budgetary pressures weighing heavily 
upon individual member states. Consequently, as Batora argues, the EDA represented 
an attempt to square this circle by establishing an organisation endowed with an 
ambitiously “integrationist” mission but thoroughly inadequate resources to achieve 
it. The consensus which gave rise to the EDA proved transient and superficial, falling 
short of a truly autonomous, effective Agency which could set the rules for inter-state 
cooperation and then enforce their observance.  Such a remit was crucial if the EDA 
were to fulfil its stated purpose of compelling member states to finally close EU 
defence capability gaps.  
Nevertheless, a linkage between member states’ objectives, European defence policy, 
and EU defence procurement harmonisation was demonstrated in Chapter V, 
although it was not as direct as originally hypothesized. Specifically, the Commission 
would not have been able to capitalise on its policy “foothold” in this field without 
the influence of the 2008 French Council Presidency. It is true that the Commission 
has purposefully set the stage for the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive 
by tabling to proposal in order to coincide with the French Council Presidency, and 
ensuring that the text was presented in an advanced form, bolstered by numerous 
consultations and much “learning.”  However, the French Presidency was 
fundamental to securing the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive in the 
co-decision procedure between the Council and Parliament.  Interview material has 
consistently emphasised the tireless efforts of French officials and civil servants in 
forging the necessary consensus in the trilateral negotiations between the Council, 
Parliament, and Commission. The French Presidency also made a significant 
contribution to making the proposed Defence Procurement Directive “palatable” to 
member states by orchestrating important compromises, activating the Letter of 
Intent (LoI) Working Group comprised of six largest armaments producing member 
states, and maintaining dialogue with key MEPs and defence industry 
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representatives. This, in turn, had only been possible after securing the tacit 
agreement of Paris and a nod from the remaining two Big Three member states as to 
their willingness to engage with the legislative proposal.  
 
However, similarly to the characterisation of the British Council Presidency’s 
success in “delivering” the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy in December 2005 as an 
attempt to “show leadership” in the field, the French time at the helm was also 
conditioned by French, rather than European, objectives (Argomaniz, 2009: 161).  Its 
historic quest for European “strategic autonomy” and desire for  “Europe of defence 
but on French terms” were the paramount guiding principles in this regard, 
underpinned by a drive to shape an institutionalisation outcome that was increasingly 
viewed as inevitable. In fact, the 2013 and 2014 Commission Communications on 
defence procurement, which will be discussed below, are peppered with the term 
“strategic autonomy.” The French “performance” in the application of the Directive  
together with the prominence of common EU defence procurement structures in its 
policy thinking suggests a bounded complementarity between French interests and the 
narrative frame constructed by the European Commission. To what extent this 
notion—that is, EU ensuring defence industrial and technological independence from, 
primarily, United States’ technology—is translated into policy objectives of other 
member states will become apparent in the next several years, and could constitute a 
fruitful line of future research on EU defence market integration.  
 
The	  Importance	  of	  the	  “Purposeful	  Opportunist”	  	  
In order to obtain a comprehensive, nuanced understanding of EDEM 
institutionalisation, it is first important to underscore the limitations of the 
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship reach and of the integration “space” within 
which it may have been realised. Thus, despite all its policy caretaking efforts, and 
the “degeneration” of the EDA, the Commission could not force the member states to 
approve the Defence Procurement Directive, just as it could not guarantee that they 
would not once again deem its efforts “premature” as they had in the mid-1990s. It 
has already been argued above that the Commission’s publication of the Defence 
Package to coincide with the ambitious, defence-oriented French EU Council 
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Presidency of 2008, determined as it was to “close”  the maximum number of EU 
legislative deals  on the table, was decisive for the adoption of the Defence 
Procurement Directive. Another key factor that helped it achieve these outcomes has 
been identified in the course of this thesis as the lack of sufficiently senior, 
ministerial-level engagement on the part of member states’ governments, and 
ministries of defence in particular.  Such political disinterest, leading to a reluctance 
to “to take up” the Defence Package proposals within member states’ capitals was 
repeatedly highlighted during interviews by a cross-section of actors, that is, EU 
permanent representation delegates, national armament directorate officials, and 
defence industry representatives.   
The reasons cited for this disengagement included an apparent sense of “complacency” 
within national capitals, itself underpinned by the highly technical nature of the 
proposed regulation and continued “reassurances” from the EDA as to the 
immutability of Article 346 and entrenched dominance of member states in defence 
industrial matters.  These actors’ lack of familiarity with the EU legislative process, 
underpinned by a belief that the Commission’s initiatives could be “killed” at any 
time they so desired, fed into the “false sense of security” on the part of member 
states, as well (Chapter V).  Moreover, this situation stemmed in part from the 
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship techniques.  It was already indicated above 
that the EC’s framing efforts drew in sympathetic interlocutors who prised market 
rather than security of defence supply as the highest national good. Its intensive 
consultation tactics also left little opportunity for member states—and their defence 
and security structures in particular— to process the implications of its proposals or 
provide substantial input. Finally, virtually every type of policy actor interviewed for 
this thesis emphasised that the need to address the impact of budgetary pressures was 
acknowledged across the defence industrial policy field. Even the rationale for a 
binding curb on protectionism and circumvention of Article 346 was grudgingly 
conceded. Such awareness was also cited by interviewees as a major contributing 
factor to member states apparent failure to stamp out the Commission’s proposals and 
invalidate the argumentation underpinning them. As a result, by the time the higher 
national echelons recognised the implications of the Directive for their primacy within 
defence acquisition decision-making, the EU policymaking machine was in full swing 
and very difficult to halt.  
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Post-­‐Directive	  Developments	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  EU	  Defence	  Market	  	  
 
Following the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive in 2009, the 
Commission has closely monitored the member states’ transposition process, 
admonishing all those it deemed to lag behind through warnings and “reasoned 
opinions.”  In the aftermath of the August 2011 transposition deadline, the 
Commission referred Poland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia to the 
European Court of Justice for missing that date by nearly a year. In addition, the 
Commission has investigated the Czech Republic’s 2009 purchase of four aircraft in 
2011on grounds of non-compliance with competition rules, while the ECJ made a 
landmark ruling upholding the principles of the Directive against a Finnish defence 
contract award decision in 2012. Interviews conducted as part of this research also 
indicated that while member states may continue to take advantage of loopholes 
within the Directive’s provisions, they have also felt increasing pressure to take into 
account the “reaction of the Commission” to non-competitive defence contract 
awards. According to both industry representatives and government officials, the new 
regulations have already begun to have an impact on behaviour. Paradoxically, this is 
also evidenced by member states going to considerable lengths to avoid scrutiny by 
the Commission and consequences thereof. 
In addition, the Commission has continued to advance further policy initiatives and 
appears set on enhancing its role within EU defence policy. Indeed, the term defence 
rather than armaments cooperation or defence procurement, is used here deliberately 
as it reflects the high level of its ambition in this regard. The July 2013 
Communication Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security 
Sector speaks boldly of the Commission’s intent to forge a “single defence market,” 
while its subtle shift in terminology from the European Defence Equipment Market to 
(just) European Defence Market is also significant (European Commission, 2013). 
Defence equipment denotes a distinction between the “goods and services” regulated 
by the Defence Procurement Directive and the large-scale, complex armaments 
programmes which would have been exempted from its terms, either due to their 
“status” as “essential” for the “interests of member states’ security” or because they 
involve collaboration between two or more member states.  The 2013 Communication 
does away with this distinction, and often refers to the European Commission as the 
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European Union, with, for instance, EU contributions to European defence discussed 
under the heading of “European Commission’s Contribution.” The tone of the 
document is also markedly more assertive than that of the Commission’s earlier 
communications associated with the Defence Procurement Directive. It opens with a 
suggestion that “strengthening CSDP and improving the availability of the required 
civilian and military capabilities” is also the responsibility of the European 
Commission, citing the somewhat ambiguous statement to that effect within the 
European Council Conclusions of 14 December 2012.  
The Communication also specifies a host of initiatives, from supporting industry 
restructuring to facilitating the development of military satellite communication “at 
European level,” the Commission intents to undertake in order to “strengthen 
European defence” (p. 4). These include monitoring the “openness of member states’ 
defence markets” and their application of the Directive, restricting a number of its 
legislative exclusions, and focusing on definitively prohibiting offsets. Furthermore, 
the Commission intends to implement a security of (defence) supply regime, support 
defence and security SMEs, develop a certification system for dual-use goods, and 
forge a role in CSDP-related research.  Perhaps the most far-reaching proposals 
advanced in the Communication concern dual-use assets “directly purchased, owned 
and operated by the Union” (p.12) and  “supporting European defence industry on 
[sic] third markets” (p. 15). The extension of EC competence to acquisition and 
operation of capabilities and external defence policy would constitute a considerable 
expansion of the Commission’s remit in the defence sphere, decidedly beyond what it 
had gained with the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive. 
The 2013 Communication was followed with an Implementation Roadmap in July 
2014, entitled a “New Deal For European Defence,” in which the Commission 
specified “concrete actions and timelines” for the initiatives announced in the earlier 
document (European Commission, 2014: 2). This Report reiterates the Commission’s 
determination to forge a single market of defence in even starker rhetoric – stating, for 
instance, that it intends to monitor both the defence contracts that member states open 
for EU-wide competition and those that they do not, “through the specialised press 
and information provided by market operators” (p. 3). There are also warnings that 
the EC would “intervene, when necessary” to prevent unjustified” offset requirements 
(p. 4). As has been emphasised throughout this thesis, the restrictions placed on 
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defence offsets by the Defence Procurement Directive have constituted its most 
restrictive measures and have been repeatedly denounced by the member states and 
industry. Furthermore, the Commission’s “ban on offsets” has been consistently cited 
in interviews as the most prominent example of the EC’s “competence creep.”  The  
Roadmap also reflects the Commission’s growing profile in the EU dual-use export 
control regime, with a public consultation undertaken in 2012, a report on the 
implementation of export control Regulation 428/2009 presented in October 2013, 
and a Communication issued in April 2014, all aimed at reviewing and “modernising” 
strategic export controls (European Commission, 2013b; European Commission, 
2014b). 
Chapter V of this thesis has also demonstrated that the Commission’s pursuit of the 
Defence Procurement Directive has contributed to the redundancy of the EDA’s Code 
of Conduct on Defence Procurement and the irrelevance of the Agency’s Industry and 
Markets (I&M) Directorate as a whole. This “side-lining” of the Agency in defence 
industrial matters has continued in the years following the approval of the Defence 
Procurement Directive.  In fact, whereas the Code was featured prominently on the 
EDA’s website as a major achievement until approximately mid-2012, reference to it 
is now found only with difficulty by conducing a “search” within the Agency’s list of 
“projects.”39 According to the Agency, “due to the changes in the European Defence 
Equipment Market the EDA Steering Board tasked on 12 March 2013 the EDA to 
analyse the need for a possible new intergovernmental arrangement to replace the 
Code [sic].”40  As of late August 2014, such an analysis has still not been announced, 
and is unlikely to materialise in light of the Commission’s enhanced role. 
Furthermore, although the Agency’s 2013 Annual Report implies that its newly-
developed Defence Procurement Gateway is a sort of replacement for the “closed” 
Electronic Bulletin Board (the platform on which the member states committed to 
post defence contracts as part of the Code), the former functions as merely a defence 
procurement information platform amalgamating opportunities, policies, and 
developments within the EU and advertising the EDA’s own procurement needs 
(EDA, 2014: 14). Finally, as was mentioned in the introductory chapter to this thesis, 
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the Agency’s Industry and Market Directorate which oversaw all of its EDEM-related 
activities, has been phased out as part of the January 2014 restructuring process, and 
integrated as a sub-unit into the newly-formed European Synergies and Innovation 
Directorate.   
The strengthened role of the European Commission does not, however, imply the 
emergence of a truly integrated and competitive defence market in the EU. There was 
a nearly 2.5 year delay in member states’ transposition of the Directive, and the 
completion of this process (in March 2013) has yielded limited results. Conspicuously 
absent from the Implementation Roadmap, for instance, is any reference to European 
Union/Commission ownership and development of capabilities, and this omission 
poignantly illustrates the limitations of EU integration and supranational authority 
within the European defence market. Towards a More Competitive and Efficient 
Defence and Security Sector was prepared by the Commission as input into the 
discussions of the European Council which took place on December 19-20, 2013. It 
was widely referred to as the “Defence Council” due to its focus on CSDP as one of 
the agenda items, for the first time in five years. However, interview material has 
indicated that there was widespread resistance to the Commission’s “drive for 
competence,” with member states, particularly Germany, voicing their firm 
opposition to proposals regarding Commission-owned capabilities and industry 
representatives wary of any Commission “help” vis-à-vis third market exports 
(Interview 18, 10 February 2014, Industry; Interview 25, 19 March 2014, Industry; 
Interview 30, 8 April 2014, Industry). Despite the urging of the European Parliament 
to “provide the necessary fresh and ambitious impetus and to lay down guidelines, 
overarching political priorities and timelines for supporting a truly European defence 
technological and industrial base,” the Council Conclusions featured no concrete 
measures to develop the defence market or enhance the effectiveness of its existing 
measures (European Parliament, 2013; European Council, 2013).  
As suggested in Chapter I, the implementation of the defence procurement directive 
has been uneven and enforcement of its provisions has yet to materialise. Eighty per 
cent of procurement expenditure  within the EU continues to be spent domestically, 
and even though the Commission in its 2013 Communication has commended France 
as the member state that has awarded the highest number of  contracts under the 
Defence Procurement Directive, all of these went to French firms. Consequently, 
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national thinking continues to dominate the defence industrial policy field, while 
member states continue to equate their security of (military) supply with domestic 
production, just as they remain highly sceptical of the Directive’s ability to ensure it. 
Thus, in the short term, the member states will most likely exploit legislative 
loopholes and evade the Commission’s reach. In fact, this observation lies at the heart 
of one of the first academic examinations of the Directive’s impact. Castellacci’s et. 
al. study of Swedish and Norwegian defence firms’ responses to the implementation 
of the Directive indicates that, in the immediate future at least, the former “expect a 
slow and cautious [process], where EU members will watch each others’ steps and 
will not be willing to fully open their own national markets,” while the latter “doubt 
the sincerity of the largest EU members, the willingness of the EU to enforce the 
Directive and their own ability to assert their rights” (2014: 1228; 1231). However, 
these views represent the perspective of smaller firms, and are limited to short-term 
projections. As such, the pattern of uneven implementation and “loophole seeking” 
may not be entirely different from the post-liberalisation histories of other policy 
sectors. 
It therefore remains to be seen whether the EC will be able to progress with its 
planned initiatives in spite of these obstacles. It has already announced its plans to 
establish a government-industry forum in the “fourth quarter of 2014” to discuss its 
“third country” proposals. If it succeeds in establishing such a role, this would 
constitute another step in the path of what one former high-level defence procurement 
official in the UK termed, rather disparagingly, as “the great European state 
…marching relentlessly forward” (Interview 7, 9 August 2013, Member State 
Ministry of Defence). Parallels in this regard may be drawn to the “integration 
records” of other policy fields in the EU, such as telecommunications, immigration, 
and counter-terrorism. In the case of the telecommunications sector during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Commission had pursued its liberalisation and harmonisation 
“creating, financing and relying upon an epistemic community, mobilising interests to 
support its strategies, and increasingly institutionalizing the policy-making 
environment at the European level,” (Goodman, 2006: 50). It achieved success in this 
regard despite initial failures and the opposition of the intergovernmental Conférence 
Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications (CEPT) 
whose “non-binding agreements” dominated the policy space (Goodman, 2006: 
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Chapter III) Notably, the Commission’s agenda was also approved by the national 
industry ministers and not the parochial  PTT (post, telephone and telegraph) 
ministers. This decision followed widespread concerns regarding the encroachment of 
Japanese and American telecommunications firms into the European market, 
propagated in large part by EC-funded studies. The Commission was also aided by 
liberalisation reforms in key member states, favourable ECJ rulings, and the 
incentivisation potential of its considerable research funds (Goodman, 2006: Chapter 
III).  Nevertheless, a “regulatory patchwork” of member states’ telecommunications 
regulatory approaches—and their reluctance to cede power to the “European level—
proved highly resilient in the face of a number of Commission directives and 
harmonisation “rounds.” Yet, it has gradually eroded and all but disappeared in recent 
years.   
Argomaniz also attributes the institutionalisation of “European Union counter-
terrorism” to skilled policy entrepreneurship efforts of the European Commission,  
although the “impact” of its integrationist initiatives “in practice” has proven limited  
in the years immediately following their implementation and less ambitious than what 
was originally proposed (Argomaniz, 2009: 160-162).  However, the analysis has also 
indicated an enhanced profile of the European Commission in the counter-terrorism 
sphere as well as the growing relevance of EU-level rules for national security actors 
(Argomaniz, 2009: 162; 167). Similarly, in the field of migration, Cerna concludes 
that the 2009 ‘Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment’ (the Blue Card 
Directive) has “not resulted in a harmonized immigration policy,” and the legislative 
tool itself reflected considerable “watering down” in light of member state discord 
and opposition (2013: 2).  
 
These developments, much like the construction of a single market for energy and 
civil transport, reflect the Commission’s willingness to play “long games” in pursuit 
of its objectives. Its quest for harmonisation, liberalisation, and market integration in 
these policy fields exhibits a number of shared features – incremental regulatory 
“successes” in light of national resistance, often less ambitious than its original intent, 
but nevertheless followed by a policy “foothold” in the form of successive rounds of 
regulatory packages.  In some areas, such as telecommunications and transport, this 
	   246	  
has after several decades resulted in the establishment of a truly integrated European 
policy. In others, specifically, migration, counter-terrorism, and energy, fragmentation 
along national lines has persisted, falling short of Smith’s governance criteria, but a 
shift to communitarisation may nevertheless be observed in these fields during recent 
years (Maltby, 2013: 442). Similarly to defence procurement, these areas have been 
constitutive of member states’ sovereignty conceptualisations, although, it could be 
argued, to a lesser extent. 
It is clear that the Commission is set on bringing defence under the umbrella of the 
single market.  This would entail, in the first instance, extending the scope of the 
Directive to include the current loopholes and exclusions – such as the R&D, 
collaborative procurement, and Article 346. Secondly, a mechanism to affect member 
states’ compliance with existing rules would need to be implemented. These tasks 
alone provide significant challenges, and a truly integrated, efficient, and open 
defence market does not appear plausible in the foreseeable future. The Defence 
Procurement Directive benefited in no small part from straddling fields of defence 
and single market, public procurement and armaments acquisition, politics and 
economics, with all the attendant competences, ambiguities, and institutional 
precedents. However, the further supranational initiatives move away on this 
spectrum from areas of EC competence and towards member states’ dominance, the 
less likely the creation of a single defence market becomes. This is because a truly 
single defence market would imply a de-coupling of member states’ perceptions of 
security of supply from territoriality and a disassociation of national governments’ 
understandings of security of information from national decision-making dominance. 
It would also necessitate a significant weakening if not the abolition of Article 346 of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The ultimate rationale for common procurement is, of course, a 
single army. However, barring a crisis of systemic proportions, this development 
appears highly unlikely in the imaginable future, not least because it would entail a 
fundamental reconceptualization of post-Westphalian sovereignty as enshrined in 
domestic constitutions and international law, an acceptance of unprecedented and 
nearly complete degree of interdependence, and radical re-alignment of foreign policy 
and national defence and security structures and postures. The lack of political will 
amongst the member states that has plagued the Common Security and Defence 
Policy, and their insistence on sovereignty that has been the bane of EU armaments 
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cooperation, makes these developments all the more unlikely.  
 
Implications	  for	  Institutionalisation	  Studies	  and	  Future	  Research	  	  
This thesis has relied on Smith’s stages of institutionalization, which includes the 
establishment of the policy domain as an intergovernmental forum, information-
sharing between actors, norm creation and codification, the establishment of 
permanent organisations  to “administer the policy domain,” and, lastly, a move 
towards a form of governance, where actors behave as a “unified whole” by  
“setting goals, devising specific policies (or norms) to reach them, 
implementing such policies, providing the necessary resources to carry 
out the policies, and establishing some form of policy assessment or 
oversight to ensure that goals are being met and actors are fulfilling their 
obligations” (Smith, 2004: 40-47).  
Viewed in this context, it is safe to conclude that its institutionalisation had not yet 
reached the “governance stage” and it is uncertain when and whether it will do so. 
Nevertheless, the development of the EDA’s Code of Conduct and the approval of the 
Directive do nevertheless constitute institutionalization of the defence procurement 
policy domain, particularly since Smith acknowledges the possibility of “formal 
organisations” developing their own distinct interests and exerting autonomous 
influence on the policy process in accordance with them (2004: 46).  However, the 
account presented in this thesis also departs from this scenario in two important ways. 
Firstly, the involvement of a “permanent organisation,” in this case the European 
Commission, developed in parallel with earlier stages of institutionalization, rather 
than progressing from them, and the EC did indeed generate and concertedly pursue 
its interest—the extension of internal market rules into defence procurement. 
Secondly, this objective came to supplant and dominate the intergovernmental mode, 
with the result that the “organisations stage” included more of a “takeover” by a 
permanent organisation than its mere inclusion.  
In this sense, Pierson’s notion of “loose coupling” between institutions, or sets of 
rules and norms, provides a useful insight.  According to this conceptualisation, when 
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“substantial ambiguities” regarding the demarcation of authority exist between two 
institutional settings, as they did between the intergovernmental regime of the EDA’s 
Code of Conduct and the Commission’s drive for a Directive, there is an increased 
likelihood of unintended consequences emerging in the course of 
institutionalisation—here, the approval of the Defence Procurement Directive in spite 
of the Code and to the “surprise” of a number of policy actors (Pierson, 2004: 163). 
Ambiguity within authority delimitations implies a diminished ability on the part of 
the original institutional creators to maintain control over further institutional 
development, as was arguably the case with the member states, who, having 
established the EDA, then ceded ground to the European Commission.  
One of the most prominent conclusions to emerge in the course of the research 
undertaken here has focused on the role of the European Commission acting as a 
policy entrepreneur and characterized its role as a “purposive opportunist” (Cram, 
2005).  Institutional approaches refer instead to “institutional entrepreneurs” or 
“skilled social actors,” (Stone Sweet, Fligstein, and Sandholtz, 2001: 11-12). A 
recurring theme in policy entrepreneurship analyses draws attention to the favourable 
positioning of skilled actors vis-à-vis “multiple social networks,” enabling them to 
engage in productive coalition-building and issue-framing (Pierson, 2004: 139; 
Thelen, 2003: 139).  Thus, much of the literature examining this category of  actor is 
concerned with unpacking the dynamics of their entrepreneurship rather  than its 
causal influence on the institutionalisation process, taking as a given that  “to the 
extent that such actors are successful … we can expect to find changes at the micro-
level that will provoke evolution at the meso and macro levels (Stone Sweet, 
Fligstein, and Sandholtz, 2001: 11-12).  
Of course, identifying generalisable conditions which spurn and shape 
institutionalisation is a notoriously difficult task (Pierson, 2004: 139; Thelen, 2003: 
139). One of the most relevant exceptions to this trend has been contributed by 
Kaunert, who has argued that advantageous timing and informational superiority 
facilitate the success of supranational policy entrepreneurs’ strategies (2010). In 
addition, Citi, although not using the policy entrepreneurship terminology, has 
analysed the Commission’s “creeping competence” into the security R&D policy area 
(2014).  In particular, Citi has argued that the Commission has been “allowed” to 
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extend its competence in this manner  as a result of the need to address the dual 
collective action problem facing EU member states (p. 136). This consisted of “the 
provision of new, standardised and interoperable security and defence technologies to 
be employed across the whole range of CSDP operations,” coupled with “sustaining 
the competitiveness” of transnational defence firms (p. 143,144).  In this context, “the 
Commission found itself in the best position for proposing and negotiating new 
supranational initiatives in this area, pursuing additional governance functions and 
new budget opportunities” (p. 144).  
The research presented here contributes to this endeavour by deriving several 
conclusions regarding the likelihood of an enhanced role of “self-interested” and 
“purposeful” (supranational) policy entrepreneurs in forging rule-based cooperation in 
a highly sensitive policy area. Chief among these are widespread awareness of the 
unsustainability of status quo due to a long-standing build-up of external pressures, 
fragility of alternative intergovernmental, less binding arrangements, and at least tacit, 
conditional support of powerful, well-placed institutional decision-makers. From the 
perspective of European integration processes, this thesis has demonstrated that 
member states remain the “gate-keepers,” but their decision as to whether, when, and 
how widely to open the gates to “more Europe” may be conditioned by the 
autonomous interests and activities of supranational actors and transnational interest 
groups, even in traditionally “taboo” policy areas such as defence procurement.  Thus, 
the dominant arms-producing member states may not have desired for the Defence 
Procurement Directive to have seen the light of day, but once they judged this 
outcome to be a sufficiently likely prospect, they dedicated their efforts to ensuring 
that the legislative instrument reflected their preferences to the greatest extent 
feasible. The Directive’s compatibility with French domestic legislation and eschewal 
of a “European preference”—which would have harmed British firms’ transatlantic 
market prospects—constitute key indicators of this finding. 
The organising principle for the material presented in this project was based on the 
policy cycle heuristic, while relying on concepts such as policy windows and policy 
entrepreneurs, developed to a great extent by Kingdon and derived from public policy 
literature. The conclusions drawn as a result of employing that framework are also 
relevant for studies of institutions and institutionalisation. Historical institutionalist 
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approaches envision institutional change occurring in the context of “critical 
junctures” which refer to “brief moments” in a long period of path-dependent, 
reproductive institutional stability  during which “opportunities for major institutional 
reforms appear” (Pierson, 2004: 135; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341). The 
“criticality” of such junctures is due to their decisive impact on the future of 
institutions, as “they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which 
are then difficult to alter” (Pierson, 2004: 135; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341).  
During critical junctures the ability of political actors to exert lasting influence is also 
heightened (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). In the literature, critical junctures are 
typically associated with “big, exogenous shocks,” leading analysts in this tradition to 
“distinguish sharply between periods of institutional creation and periods of ‘stasis’” 
(Thelen, 2003:19; Pierson, 2004: 135).  
The research presented in this thesis demonstrates that critical junctures and policy 
windows share a number of conceptual similarities—indeed, exogenous crises may be 
one reason why windows “open”—but finds that the latter present a more suitable 
conceptual tool, not least due to their ability to elucidate periods of opportunity for 
“heightened influence” even in the absence of observable shocks.  Rather, the 
institutionalisation process examined here bears more relevance to Pierson’s argument 
that “the moment of institutional innovation will often follow a long build-up of 
pressure”  echoed by similar contentions that successful challenges to institutional 
status quo and catalysts for change are slow to emerge (Pierson, 2004: 164; Thelen, 
2004).  
This thesis has also demonstrated that actions not taken and decisions not made 
during policy windows’ opening or critical junctures may also exert lasting influence 
and contribute to path dependency. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that 
insufficient attention paid to the Commission’s early “policy activism” within 
national capitals, including ministries of defence, has enabled it to advance its 
objectives without significant opposition for a considerable amount of time.  
Similarly, although high public attention has often been cited in literature as an 
important characteristic of a policy window, as well as a contributing factor to foreign 
policy agreements in light of divergent member state preferences, the 
institutionalisation of the EU defence industrial sphere discussed here demonstrates 
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that in the latter stages of the policymaking process, it is the lack of public and elite 
attention that may facilitate cooperation. Viewed from a slightly different angle, this 
conclusion also concurs with Smith’s finding that repeated interaction amongst 
“lower-level state actors,” who in this analysis have been demonstrated to dominate 
much of the policy process, provides grater opportunities for cooperation and “mutual 
understanding,” than bargaining between “high-level state officials”  (Smith, 2004: 
57). 
Due to its limited scope, this project could only present a snapshot account of the 
institutionalizing process. Future research could take a longer view of armaments and 
defence industrial cooperation in Europe, beginning in the Cold War period, and 
perhaps reaching as far back as the end of World War Two.  This would help derive a 
more nuanced and robust set of conditions under which institutionalisation occurs, 
especially if particular attention is paid to “transitions” to successive stages of 
institutionalisation. More specifically, it would be useful to chart the continuing 
institutionalisation process of the EU defence market, particularly in light of the 
Commission’s stated ambitions and the member states’ “red lines” described above.  
It will be important to chart the degree to which national behaviour changes to 
comply with supranational rules, and whether transnational defence contract awards 
become more of a norm and less of an exception. The impact of high-profile ECJ 
rulings would also be an important component of such a study, as would the effect of 
member states’ enhanced awareness of the EU’s heavy dependence on American 
defence technology.  This latter aspect appears particularly significant in light of the 
frequent references to the EU’s “strategic autonomy” found in the latest Commission 
defence market communications. Further examinations of the EU’s largest defence 
industrial firms could focus on the extent to which the financial crisis of 2009 and the 
subsequent economic recession, may have altered these actors’ views of the benefits 
to be gained from a European defence market, and how these events could affect their 
future behaviour regarding cross-border activity. 
In addition, the development of the EU defence equipment market as presented here 
could benefit from comparative and normative approaches. From a comparative 
perspective drawing on other policy areas, most fruitful would be studies of fields that 
share similar essential characteristics with defence procurement, such as a “sensitive” 
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nature from the perspective of nation-state sovereignty, while straddling the “border” 
between “high” and “low” politics of the EU, its internal and external action, and 
member states’ domestic and foreign policies.  In this regard, EU counter-terrorism 
and migration policy areas, already touched upon here, come to mind, particularly as 
they also “feature” Commission directives. In fact, a special issue of Cooperation and 
Conflict edited by Kaunert and Leonard is dedicated to exploring policy 
entrepreneurship exercised by the European Commission in the area of counter-
terrorism following the “major exogenous shock” of 9/11 attacks (2012). More 
generally, contributions illustrate the “transition of supranational governance” in the 
EU’s security policy field, particularly within the context of the “former third pillar,” 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Amongst articles that bear the 
most relevance to the examination of defence procurement undertaken here is that by 
Howorth, who questions the rigid distinction between intergovernmental and 
supranational modes of decision-making within the EU that is often drawn by 
scholars and emphasised within policymaking circles (2012a). He argues that, even 
within the CSDP field, persisting with such binary categorisation is “at the very least, 
unhelpful to our understanding of what is actually happening” (p. 449). What may 
instead be emerging in this area is akin to “intergovernmental supranationalism,” 
characterised by a “marked trend towards consensus-seeking” amongst officials 
within Brussels-based “institutional agencies” (p. 449, 448). Leonard and Kaunert’s 
own contribution focuses on the policy entrepreneurship carried out by the European 
Court of Justice, which, through its “landmark rulings,” has extended supranational 
governance further into European security policy (2012a: 427; 2012b).  
Another strand of comparative analyses could draw parallels to studies of the roles 
played by each set of actors examined here—that is,  policy entrepreneurs, 
transnational industry groups, and powerful nation-states—in other instances of 
institutionalisation or inter-state cooperation, even beyond the EU.  Regarding 
industrial lobbying in particular, a valuable contribution could focus on actors whose 
preferences are not as clearly defined in favour of liberalisation as those typically 
studied under the interest group in the EU rubric. Rather, attention could be devoted 
to other transnational industrial actors that have a more ambiguous, even 
contradictory relationship with open markets and national governments. Insights 
could be drawn from studies of EU gas market privatisation and liberalisation, for 
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instance, wherein the “national monopolies and suppliers… tried to keep their 
traditional position in their home market to the largest extent possible, at the same 
time trying to penetrate other markets” (Graetz, 2011: 69-70). Finally, normative 
approaches could focus on the impact and influence of the (single) market norm in the 
emergence of common EU defence procurement, as it confronts the deeply 
entrenched nation-state sovereignty norms. 
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